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ABSTRACT 
 
Before June 2010, a dividend could only be paid out of profits of a company. At the time, the 
government suggested that this profits test had become inconsistent with a trend to lessen the outdated 
capital maintenance doctrine in Australia. This observation is common, but, as this thesis 
demonstrates, invalid and conceptually flawed. 
 
This thesis shows that the profits test was forged in the embers of the speculation mania of the South 
Sea Bubble. By examining the profits test within its proper historical context, this thesis dispels some 
of the myths which shroud the origins and early development of the capital maintenance doctrine. 
Contrary to belief, the profits test was not aimed originally at creditor protection, but arose from 
concerns about frauds on shareholders perpetrated by the boards of directors and management. The 
test cannot be considered part of the price that was paid by shareholders for limited liability, as the 
early authorities deal with unincorporated associations and the earliest cases were decided prior to 
the general introduction of limited liability in 1855.  
 
The thesis traces the profits test and the capital maintenance doctrine through modern British 
legislation, to the reception of British law in the colonies of Australia and then the government’s 
reforms under the corporations power of the Constitution. 
 
The thesis examines why the profits test was repealed in 2010, before examining the current provision 
with which it was replaced (which allows a company to pay a dividend if it satisfies an “assets greater 
than liabilities”, “fair and reasonable to shareholders” and “no material prejudice to creditors” test). 
After identifying the shortcomings of the current provision, the thesis critically evaluates proposed 
further law reform and statutory amendments. 
 
The thesis then considers international developments, with a focus on the United States, Canada, New 
Zealand and South Africa, as examples of dividends tests in overseas jurisdictions, before proposing 
how to address the current confusion and uncertainty.  
 
The thesis concludes that the proposed replacements for the current provision will only partly address 
existing problems. Thus, comprehensive reform in this area of Australian corporations law is 
recommended. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background 
 
It is important that Australia get the law right on the payment of dividends. Shareholders are 
concerned about dividends as the periodical income return on their investment. However, any 
dividend paid to shareholders must necessarily diminish corporate funds available to meet the claims 
of a company’s creditors or to finance the expansion of the company’s business and operations. If 
funds become inadequate to pay creditors’ claims, as and when they become due and payable, then 
the company will become insolvent, and may cease as a going concern. 
 
Until June 2010, the law, which is described in s 254T of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) 
(‘Corporations Act’), attempted to reconcile the competing interests of the company, its shareholders 
and creditors by providing that dividends could only be paid out of the company’s profits (or, as the 
courts often put it, that dividends could not be paid out of the company’s capital). This dividends test 
had longevity. In Australia, the first statutory prohibition was contained in an 1840s provision enacted 
for the regulation of public utilities and railways in South Australia; however, the test is consistent 
with common law principles that were developed long before any statutory intervention in this field. 
 
1.1.2 Definitions and Key Concepts 
 
One of the reasons why this area of the law is complex is that the principles, rules, doctrines and 
concepts that apply were developed by the courts over at least the last 165 years. This thesis spends 
Chapters 2 and 3 unravelling this history in the United Kingdom and Australia. Since the general 
introduction of limited liability in 1855, the British and Australian legislatures have extracted the 
common law principles and recorded them in statute. However, this is a dynamic area, where 
developments and innovations are happening at a considerable pace.  
 
In 2010, the Parliament asserted that the profits test has become ‘inconsistent’ with a ‘trend to lessen 
the outdated capital maintenance doctrine in Australia’.1 This observation is a common one, but 
invalid and conceptually flawed as is explained in Chapters 2 and 3. 
 
The commonly assumed definition of the capital maintenance doctrine requires that a company 
limited by shares must maintain its share capital as fund for the protection of creditors.2 The 
assumption is that a shareholder, whose liability is limited to the capital invested in a company, ought 
not to enjoy the benefit of such limited liability without remaining so invested. Considered against 
the purpose of creditor protection, this doctrine is obviously defective. In the first place, there is no 
minimum capital which must be provided for the incorporation of a company,3 and therefore no 
                                                     
1 Explanatory Memorandum, Corporations Amendment (Corporate Reporting Reform) Bill 2010 (Cth) 19 [3.2], 59 
[10.51] (‘Explanatory Memorandum, Corporations Amendment Bill 2010’). 
2 LexisNexis, Ford’s Principles of Corporations Law (online at February 2011) [24.360] (‘Ford’s Principles’). For a 
discussion regarding a director’s duty to creditors, which upends the usual order of directors’ duties to shareholders, see 
Jason Harris and Anil Hargovan, ‘The Intersection Between Shareholders’ and Creditors’ Rights in Insolvency: An 
Australian Perspective’ in Janis P Sarra (ed) Annual Review of Insolvency Law 2007 (ThomsonReuters, 2008) 699; Anil 
Hargovan and Timothy M Todd, ‘Financial Twilight Re-Appraisal: Ending the Judicially Created Quagmire of Fiduciary 
Duties to Creditors’ (2016) 78(2) University of Pittsburgh Law Review 135; Andrew Keay and Hongtao Zhang, 
‘Incomplete Contracts, Contingent Fiduciaries and a Director’s Duty to Creditors’ (2008) 32(1) Melbourne University 
Law Review 141; Andrew Keay, ‘A Theoretical Analysis of the Director's Duty to Consider Creditor Interests: The 
Progressive School’s Approach’ (2004) 4(2) Journal of Corporate Law Studies 307; Andrew Keay, ‘Directors’ Duties to 
Creditors: Contractarian Concerns Relating to Efficiency and Over‐Protection of Creditors’ (2003) 66(5) Modern Law 
Review 665. For a discussion regarding the more familiar director’s duty to act in the interests of his or her company, see 
Rosemary Teele Langford and Ian Ramsay, ‘Directors’ Duty to Act in the Interests of the Company: Subjective or 
Objective?’ [2015] (2) Journal of Business Law 173. 
3 See generally Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ch 2A (‘Corporations Act’). 
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minimum capital which must be maintained. Although a company needs to have at least one 
shareholder,4 and that shareholder must give consideration of some kind in respect of his or her 
shares,5 the issue price for a share may be as little as a fraction of a cent,6 and that amount may be 
paid or unpaid.7 In the second place, the paid-up capital may be depleted in the course of the 
company’s trading,8 and no rule of company law requires that such losses need be made good by the 
appropriation of future profits or contributions from shareholders.  
 
Some commentators have seen in the statutory reforms of the First Corporate Law Simplification Act 
1995 (Cth) and the Company Law Review Act 1998 (Cth) the lessening of the capital maintenance 
doctrine.9 The better view is that the doctrine remains as fundamental as ever to ‘the shape of company 
law’.10 Statutory law reform in 1998 introduced provisions (for the reduction of capital and the buying 
back of shares) which authorise what, absent such provisions, would offend against the capital 
maintenance doctrine.11 However, the presence of such provisions in corporations legislation 
confirms that what they authorise would otherwise be prohibited by the common law principles of 
company law.  
 
In connecting the requirement that dividends only be paid out of profits with a purportedly obsolete 
capital concept, the government accepted the view that the profits test is merely a strict expression of 
the capital maintenance doctrine. This assumption is open to challenge upon an historical analysis of 
company law.  
 
In Chapter 2, this thesis will show that the profits test was forged in the embers of the speculation 
mania of the South Sea Bubble.12 By May 1720, this crisis reached such an intensity that ‘a panic-
stricken Parliament’ felt compelled to resort to ‘a law, which even now when we read it seems to 
scream at us from the Statute Book’,13 which would become known as the Bubble Act.14 As with the 
profits test, the aim of the Bubble Act was the protection of the public from promoters, schemers and 
directors. 
 
By examining the profits test within its proper historical context, Chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis 
dispels some of the myths which shroud the origins and early development of the capital maintenance 
doctrine. In Chapter 2, this thesis demonstrates that the idea that dividends presuppose profit (and are 
not to be paid out of capital) emerged gradually in the eighteenth century, long before the evolution 
of the limited liability company. Contrary to belief, the profits test was not aimed originally at creditor 
protection, but arose from concerns about frauds on shareholders perpetrated by the boards of 
directors and management. The profits test was developed as a protection for the investing general 
public, which was then first beginning to participate in joint stock enterprises. The origin of the rule 
cannot be considered part of the price that was paid by shareholders for limited liability, as the early 
authorities deal with unincorporated associations and the earliest cases were decided prior to the 
general introduction of limited liability in 1855.  
 
                                                     
4 Ibid s 114. 
5 Ibid s 117(2)(k)(ii). 
6 Ibid s 117(2)(k)(iia), (iii). 
7 Re Australian Pacific Technology Ltd (1994) 13 ACSR 478, 484 (‘Australian Pacific Technology’). 
8 Trevor v Whitworth (1887) 12 App Cas 409, 423 (‘Trevor v Whitworth’). 
9 LexisNexis, ‘Share Capital’ in Australian Corporation Practice (online at Service 103) [11.005] (‘Australian 
Corporation Practice’).  
10 Ford’s Principles (n 2, online at July 2012) [18.090.6]. 
11 Corporations Act (n 3) pt 2J.1. 
12 Armand Budington DuBois, The English Business Company after the Bubble Act, 1720–1800 (Octagon Books, 1971) 
2 (‘English Business Company’). 
13 HAL Fisher (ed), The Collected Papers of Frederic William Maitland (University Press, 1911) vol 3, 390 (‘Collected 
Papers of Maitland’).  
14 Royal Exchange and London Assurance Corporation Act 1719, 6 Geo 1, c 18 (‘Bubble Act’). 
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Having swept away these misconceptions, it becomes necessary to consider, firstly, how the specific 
legal rule against paying dividends out of capital generated the various rules of capital maintenance, 
a doctrine of wide application, and, secondly, how this doctrine became a cornerstone of capital 
finance. Rather than seeing the profits test as the price paid by shareholders for limiting their liability 
to calls on shares, this paper shows that both the profit test and limited liability were concepts 
cultivated independently, as express contracts in unincorporated associations, before they were 
transmitted to the modern company limited by shares, where they became contracts implied in law. 
It was during this time that the capital maintenance doctrine acquired the dominant traits it would 
keep until the debate which led to the repeal of the profits test in Australia a century and a half later. 
It then remains to trace the capital maintenance doctrine through modern British legislation, to the 
reception of British law in the colonies of Australia before federation (see Chapter 2), and then the 
federal government’s legislative intervention under the corporations power of the Constitution (see 
Chapter 3).15  
 
The profits test is considered outdated today partly because modern accounting principles (which are 
linked to fair value measurements) have resulted in the increasingly unpredictable accounting profits 
of Australian companies, which are require to include a large number of non-cash expenses in the net 
result.16 A company with sufficient cash to pay a dividend, without materially prejudicing creditors, 
may be prevented from doing so because non-cash expenses, including depreciation of property, plant 
and equipment, and impairment losses on intangible assets, may have eliminated the accounting 
profits of the company. In 2002, the Australian Accounting Research Foundation released a 
discussion paper recommending that Australia move away from the profits test and adopt a solvency 
test for the payment of dividends.  
 
Chapter 3 of this thesis demonstrates that what was actually adopted in 2010 was not a solvency test 
at all, at least as it is known in Australia; there is no reference to ‘solvency’, or s 95A, which defines 
solvency, in s 254T. Instead, the new s 254T includes a requirement that, immediately before a 
dividend is declared, a company’s assets must exceed its liabilities and the excess must be sufficient 
for the payment of the dividend, which is a type of balance sheet test, in combination with a ‘fair and 
reasonable to shareholders’ test and ‘no material prejudice to the company’s ability to pay its 
creditors’ test.  
 
In this thesis, the term ‘solvency’, which has been given different and often competing meanings 
historically and internationally, is necessarily challenged and reconsidered. Although the ‘no material 
prejudice to the company’s ability to pay its creditors’ test has been described as a type of solvency 
requirement by some commentators,17 Chapter 3 of the thesis discusses why this description may 
ultimately be too simplistic and misleading. ‘Material prejudice’ is, at best, a type of ‘watered-
down’18 solvency requirement; less rigid, more manipulable and more ambiguous than solvency as 
defined in 95A.19  
 
In Australia, the term ‘solvency’ is defined as the ability of a company to pay all its debts, as and 
when they become due and payable.20 Section 254T(1)(a) is the first and only provision, dealing with 
                                                     
15 Australian Constitution s 51(xx) (‘Constitution’). 
16 Explanatory Memorandum, Corporations Amendment Bill 2010 (n 1) 19 [3.2], 59 [10.51]. 
17 Chris Bowen, ‘Cutting Red Tape and Improving Australia’s Corporate Reporting Framework’ (Media Release No 042, 
4 December 2009) <http://ministers.treasury.gov.au/DisplayDocs.aspx?doc=pressreleases/2009/042.htm&pageID=003 
&min=ceba> (‘“Cutting Red Tape” (Media Release)’); Thomson Reuters, The Laws of Australia (at 1 October 2011) 
[4.3.1000] (‘Laws of Australia (Thomson Reuters)’).  
18 Frank Clarke and Graeme Dean, Submission to Treasury, Submission in Response to Exposure Draft of the 
Corporations Amendment (Corporate Reporting Reform) Bill 2010 (1 April 2010) 3  <http://archive.treasury.gov.au/ 
documents/1764/PDF/University_of_Sydney.pdf> (‘Submission in Response to Corporations Bill 2010’). 
19 Ibid. 
20 See Corporations Act (n 3) s 95A(1). 
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distributions to shareholders, which requires a balance sheet test; there is no reference to a balance 
sheet test in the capital maintenance requirements in ch 2J or in the insolvent trading prohibition 
under s 588G, an inconsistency which, it is submitted, reflects Parliament’s intention.21 However, in 
many foreign jurisdictions, which Australia has begun to move in the direction of with the 2010 
reforms, it is the balance sheet test which is called the ‘solvency’ test, while the company’s ability to 
pay all it debts, as and when they become due and payable, is not known as ‘solvency’ but rather 
‘liquidity’.22 In such jurisdictions, which include the United States, Canada, New Zealand and South 
Africa, a dual solvency and liquidity test has been used effectively to overcome many of the problems 
associated with distributions to shareholders in all their forms, including dividend payments, share 
buy-backs and share capital reductions.23  
 
1.2 Objectives and Focus of Research 
 
The new dividends test is clearly complex, confusing and in need of comprehensive reform. Although 
Treasury claimed the reform was ‘generally well received’, it admitted that there had been ‘calls by 
some stakeholders for changes’;24 in fact the amendments have created considerable confusion, 
leading professional bodies to argue that there is an urgent need for further reform.25 A perceived 
deficiency with the dividend test which stakeholders have raised with the Australian Government 
includes that ‘the test can have little relationship to solvency (as it does not take into account the 
timing and magnitude of funds flows)’.26 There is broad agreement that the reform of the dividends 
provision to date has been inadequate.  
 
Indeed, Australia’s insolvent trading provisions have long been criticised as ‘troublesome and 
complex’,27 ‘crude … both in terms of policy and practice’28 and ‘inconsistent’.29  
 
                                                     
21 See, eg, Explanatory Memorandum, Corporations Amendment Bill 2010 (n 1) [3.9]. 
22 See, eg, American Bar Association, Model Business Corporation Act (2002) § 6.40(c) (‘Am Bar Ass’n, Model Bus 
Corp Act’); Canada Business Corporations Act, RSC 1985, c C-44, s 42 (‘Canada Business Corporations Act’); 
Companies Act 1993 (NZ) ss 4, 52 (‘New Zealand Companies Act’); Companies Act [No 71] 2008 (South Africa) s 4(1) 
(‘South African Companies Act’). See also Kathleen Van Der Linde, ‘The Solvency and Liquidity Approach in the 
Companies Act 2008’ [2009] (2) Journal of South African Law 224, 225 (‘Solvency and Liquidity’). 
23 Jean J du Plessis, ‘Company Law Developments in South Africa: Modernisation and Some Salient Features of the 
Companies Act 71 of 2008’ (2012) 27(1) Australian Journal of Corporate Law 46, 55–64 (‘Company Law 
Developments’). 
24 ‘Proposed Amendments to the Corporations Act’ (Discussion Paper, Treasury, 28 November 2011) 4 (‘“Proposed 
Amendments” (Discussion Paper, Treasury)’). 
25 See, eg, Robert Austin, Michael Barr-David and Karen Payne, ‘Alert – Dividends: Untangling the Web’, MinterEllison 
Lawyers Publications (20 October 2012) <http://www.minterellison.com/Pub/NA/20111201_Dividends>. 
26 ‘Proposed Amendments’ (Discussion Paper, Treasury, n 24) 5. 
27 Cally Jordan, ‘Unlovely and Unloved: Corporate Law Reform’s Progeny’ (2009) 33 Melbourne University Law Review 
626, 642. For an examination of these provisions in a British context, see Andrew Keay and Michael Murray, ‘Making 
Company Directors Liable: A Comparative Analysis of Wrongful Trading in the United Kingdom and insolvent trading 
in Australia’ (2005) 14(1) INSOL International Insolvency Review 27. 
28 Elizabeth Boros and John Duns, Corporate Law (Oxford University Press, 2007) 58. 
29 Du Plessis, ‘Company Law Developments’ (n 23) 56. On 12 September 2017, Parliament passed significant 
amendments to the Corporations Act (n 3), introducing s 588GA to provide ‘safe harbours’ for directors who start to 
suspect a company may be or become insolvent. According to the Explanatory Memorandum to the Treasury Laws 
Amendment (2017 Enterprise Incentives No 2) Bill 2017 (Cth) the intention of the ‘safe harbours’ is to ‘drive cultural 
change amongst company directors by encouraging them to keep control of their company, engage early with possible 
insolvency and take reasonable risks to facilitate the company’s recovery instead of simply placing the company 
prematurely into voluntary administration or liquidation’: at 3. Although the new safe harbour insolvency laws do not 
absolve directors from past debts incurred by trading while insolvent, they are intended to provide directors new 
opportunities to incur debts where these debts are incurred in connection with a process of moving the company away 
from insolvency. It remains to be seen how Australian businesses adjust to the safe harbour insolvency laws, and they are 
outside the scope of this thesis. 
14 
 
The Australian Institute of Company Directors has called for the removal of the entire dividends 
provision. The Law Council of Australia has suggested that if a simple solvency test is not adopted, 
it may be time to return to the profits test. Both are concerned that a balance sheet is just as susceptible 
to distortion by non-cash liabilities as a profit and loss statement is to non-cash expenses. The joint 
accounting bodies, whilst recognising that both have a point, would like to see the government try to 
get a dual solvency and balance sheet test to work, to foster further international consistency as 
contemplated by the Trans-Tasman agreement between Australia and New Zealand. 
 
1.2.1 Research Questions 
 
The question ultimately asked in this thesis is one which remains unresolved by lawmakers and 
stakeholders. Should the profits test for payment of dividends be replaced with a balance sheet test, a 
solvency test, a dual balance sheet and solvency test or something else? 
 
This research question is addressed through an argumentative thesis which contributes to the debate 
about the operation of Australia’s company dividend restriction, capital maintenance provisions and 
insolvent trading prohibition by asking also: 
 
1. Is there a trend to lessen the capital maintenance provision in Australia, and is a requirement 
for companies to pay dividends only out of profits inconsistent with this trend? 
2. Is the terminology and application of the balance sheet and solvency tests in Australia’s 
company dividend restriction inconsistent with Australia’s capital maintenance provisions 
and insolvent trading prohibition? 
3. Does Australia’s company dividend restriction provide sufficient certainty, reliability and 
objectivity? 
 
1.2.2 Thesis Structure 
 
Firstly, this thesis examines the profits test within its proper historical context, to answer the question 
why the profits test was omitted from s 254T. In doing so, this thesis challenges some of the 
assumptions of lawmakers and stakeholders about the capital maintenance doctrine, including the 
assumption that the profits test is inconsistent with a trend to lessen the outdated capital maintenance 
doctrine in Australia (see Chapter 2). Then, this thesis examines the current dividends provision, 
identifying the shortcomings of the current s 254T and critically evaluating proposed replacement 
provisions (see Chapter 3). 
 
In Chapter 4, this thesis considers international developments, comparing the current Australian 
approach with the ‘modern, well-drafted’30 corporate insolvency laws in the United States and Canada 
(where corporate codes have a dual balance sheet and solvency test for payment of dividends, but 
lack insolvent trading prohibitions)31 before considering the reforms in common law and mixed 
jurisdictions such as New Zealand and South Africa, respectively, which now emulate the two-
pronged solvency test in § 6.40(c) of the US Model Business Corporation Act and s 42 of the Canada 
Business Corporations Act, RSC 1985, c C-44 (‘Canada Business Corporations Act’). The thesis 
enquires whether these examples provide good models and studies which could serve as touchstones 
for Australian corporate law reform. South Africa adopted the solvency and liquidity test as part of 
their Companies Act [No 71] 2008 (South Africa), which came into effect on 1 May 2011. Although 
                                                     
30 Jordan (n 27) 637. For a broad comparative analysis of laws for the protection of creditors and shareholders, see Helen 
Anderson, Michelle Welsh and Ian Ramsay, ‘The Evolution of Shareholder and Creditor Protection in Australia: An 
International Comparison’ (2012) 61(1) British Institute of International and Comparative Law 171. 
31 See, eg, Dale Oesterle, ‘Corporate Directors’ Personal Liability for “Insolvent Trading” in Australia, “Reckless 
Trading” in New Zealand and “Wrongful Trading” in England: A Recipe for Timid Directors, Hamstrung Controlling 
Shareholders and Skittish Lenders’ in Ian Ramsay (ed), Company Directors’ Liability for Insolvent Trading (CCH 
Australia, 2000) 19, 20. 
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there seems to be some inconsistencies,32 these provisions will be analysed and compared with the 
provisions in Canada and the US. 
 
The thesis employs a combination of doctrinal analysis, particularly legal theory, law reform and 
public policy research which looks at primary materials and the academic literature, as well as 
comparative analysis, in seeking to analyse the corporate insolvency laws in the United States (see 
Section 4.2), Canada (see Section 4.3), New Zealand (see Section 4.4.1) and South Africa (see Section 
4.4.2) to determine whether they are superior or inferior to Australia’s. It considers this question in 
the broader context of legal policy and of Australian attitudes to insolvency, which appear to be 
sympathetic to the view that existing insolvency provisions in s 588G and the following already 
operate to protect creditors from the consequences of declaring a dividend in an insolvency context.  
 
It also considers whether the balance sheet test has any benefit or whether Australia’s laws should 
use a solvency test based on cash flow or a hybrid approach. Commentators have observed that the 
solvency test ‘provides an earlier trigger’ and encourages directors to take corrective action earlier, 
‘but at the sacrifice of a considerable amount of certainty and predictability’.33 Against the end of 
protecting creditors, Canadian and US commentators ‘[reading] from the book of regulatory 
competition’34 worry insolvent trading prohibitions have resulted in ambitious entrepreneurs 
becoming overly risk-averse to the detriment of economic growth. 
 
On 15 March 2013, submissions closed on exposure draft legislation and associated explanatory 
material intending to ‘further clarify the test for payment of dividends’.35 More than 40 stakeholder 
submissions were received by Treasury in response to its consultation on the exposure draft (and 
another 30 submissions were received for Treasury’s consultation on the associated discussion paper), 
none of which favoured the current law or the proposed amendments. Clearly the company dividend 
restriction is of interest to many stakeholders. It is also an area of corporate law which is inadequate 
and requires reform; commentators have variously described the current dividends provision as a ‘fine 
mess’ and a ‘failure’.36  
                                                     
32 Du Plessis, ‘Company Law Developments’ (n 23) 55. 
33 Oesterle (n 31) 36.  
34 Jordan (n 27) 644. For a discussion of statutory protections aimed at alleviating directors’ fears that their commercial 
decisions made in good faith and for the benefit of the company will be subject to onerous second guessing, see Jason 
Harris and Anil Hargovan, ‘Still a Sleepy Hollow? Directors’ Liability and the Business Judgement Rule’ (2017) 31(3) 
Australian Journal of Corporate Law 319; Rosemary Langford, ‘The New Statutory Business Judgment Rule: Should It 
Apply to The Duty to Prevent Insolvent Trading?’ (1998) 16(7) Company and Securities Law Journal 533. For an example 
of the attention Australia’s business judgment rule has attracted internationally, see: Michele Havenga, ‘The Business 
Judgment Rule - Should We Follow the Australian Example’ [2000] (1) South African Mercantile Law Journal 25. 
35 Bernie Ripoll, ‘Exposure of Corporations Legislation Amendment (Remuneration and Other Measures) Bill 2012’, 
(Media Release No 055, 14 December 2012) <http://ministers.treasury.gov.au/DisplayDocs.aspx?doc=pressreleases/ 
2012/055.htm&pageID=003&min=bfr>. As at 27 February 2019, the amendments to s 254T proposed in the draft 
Corporations Legislation Amendment (Remuneration and Other Measures) Bill 2012 have yet to be put to Parliament. A 
further consultation (for which only 20 submissions were received) was held during the period 10 April – 16 May 2014 
in respect of alternative exposure draft legislation aimed at ‘increasing the flexibility of companies to pay dividends’: 
‘Corporations Legislation Amendment (Deregulatory and Other Measures) Bill 2014’, Treasury (Consultation) 
<treasury.gov.au/consultation/corporations-legislation-amendment-deregulatory-and-other-measures-bill-2014>. The 
exposure draft legislation, issued for consultation on 10 April 2014, was called the draft Corporations Legislation 
Amendment (Deregulatory and Other Measures) Bill 2014. It was sharply criticised, and withdrawn prior to 22 October 
2014: see MinterEllison, ‘Corporations Legislation Amendment Bill’, MinterEllison Lawyers Articles (29 October 2014) 
< https://www.minterellison.com/articles/corporations-legislation-amendment-bill>. While a revised Bill was introduced, 
the alternative amendments to s 254T contained in the withdrawn draft Corporations Legislation Amendment 
(Deregulatory and Other Measures) Bill 2014, as at 10 April 2014 (‘withdrawn draft Corporations Amendment Bill 
2014’), were omitted from the revised Corporations Legislation Amendment (Deregulatory and Other Measures) Bill 
2014, as enacted (‘enacted Corporations Amendment Bill 2014’). The 2014 consultation process is largely outside the 
scope of this thesis (although references are made where appropriate). 
36 Robert Austin, ‘The New Dividend Law is a Failure’, The Australian Financial Review, 6 September 2010, 63 (‘New 
Dividend Law a Failure’). 
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1.3 Hypothesis 
 
Despite significant efforts at law reform in the last twenty years,37 or perhaps because of it, the 
inconsistent application of balance sheet and solvency tests to the provisions of the Corporations Act 
remains troubled and unsatisfactory. To make it possible to rationalise and reconceptualise this 
problematic area of Australia’s corporate law, it is now timely to undertake a comprehensive overhaul 
of corporate insolvency laws, as was done in South Africa and New Zealand.38 
 
1.4 Some Concluding Remarks 
 
A comparative and historical inquiry is urgently needed to contend with the confusion and uncertainty 
this thesis identifies in Australia’s company dividend provision. A historical perspective assists in 
answering why the profits test was omitted from s 254T, which must be done before examining the 
current dividends provision, identifying the shortcomings of the 2010 reforms and critically 
evaluating the provisions proposed to replace the current s 254T. The comparative research, focussed 
on the United States, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa, provides some valuable perspectives 
regarding a dual solvency and balance sheet tests. Harmonisation across jurisdictions is sometimes a 
proper objective, but so too is a test which is workable and which reduces the distortions and other 
problems which existed with the profits test.  
                                                     
37 Jordan (n 27) 627. 
38 Tshepo H Mongalo, ‘An Overview of Company Law Reform in South Africa: from the Guidelines to the Companies 
Act 2008’ [2010] (1)  Acta Juridica xiii, xiv; Andrea Bather, ‘The Companies Act 1993 and Directors’ Duties: Small and 
Medium Entities Are Not Well Catered for’ (Working Paper Series No 90, Department of Accounting, University of 
Waikato, December 2006) 2 
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CHAPTER 2: THE EARLIER HISTORY OF THE LAW OF DIVIDENDS 
 
2.1 General 
 
Before June 2010, a dividend could only be paid to shareholders out of the profits of a company.39 
This rule was known as the ‘profits test’. At the time, the government suggested that the profits test 
had become ‘inconsistent’ with a ‘trend to lessen the outdated capital maintenance doctrine in 
Australia’.40 This observation is a common one, but invalid and conceptually flawed. 
 
The commonly assumed definition of the capital maintenance doctrine requires that a company 
limited by shares must maintain its share capital as fund for the protection of creditors.41 It is the idea 
that a shareholder who limits his or her liability to the capital he or she has invested in a company 
ought not to enjoy the benefit of such limited liability without remaining so invested. Considered 
against the purpose of creditor protection, the doctrine is obviously defective. In the first place, there 
is no minimum capital which must be provided for the incorporation of a company,42 and therefore 
no minimum capital which must be maintained. Although a company needs to have at least one 
shareholder,43 and that shareholder must give consideration of some kind in respect of his or her 
shares,44 the issue price for a share may be as little as a fraction of a cent,45 and that amount may be 
paid or unpaid.46 In the second place, the paid-up capital may be depleted in the course of the 
company’s trading,47 and no rule of company law requires that such losses need be made good by the 
appropriation of future profits or contributions from shareholders.  
 
Some commentators have seen in the statutory reforms of the First Corporate Law Simplification Act 
1995 (Cth) and the Company Law Review Act 1998 (Cth) the lessening of the capital maintenance 
doctrine.48 The better view is that the doctrine remains  as fundamental as ever to ‘the shape of 
company law’.49 Statutory law reform in 1998 introduced provisions (for the reduction of capital and 
the buying back of shares) which authorise what, absent such provisions, would offend against the 
capital maintenance doctrine.50 However, the presence of such provisions in corporations legislation 
confirms that what they authorise would otherwise be prohibited by the common law principles of 
company law.  
 
In connecting the requirement that dividends only be paid out of profits with a purportedly obsolete 
capital concept, the government accepted the view that the profits test is merely a strict expression of 
the capital maintenance doctrine. This assumption may be vulnerable to challenge upon an historical 
analysis of company law.  
                                                     
39 Corporations Amendment (Corporate Reporting Reform) Act 2010 (Cth) s 2(1) (‘Corporations Amendment Act 2010’); 
Corporations Act (n 3) s 254T, later amended by Corporations Amendment Act 2010 (n 38) sch 1 item 7. 
40 Explanatory Memorandum, Corporations Amendment Bill 2010 (n 1) 19 [3.2], 59 [10.51]. 
41 Ford’s Principles (n 2, online at February 2011) [24.360]. For a general discussion of creditor protection in Australia, 
see Helen Anderson, Michelle Welsh and Ian Ramsay, ‘Shareholder and Creditor Protection in Australia: A Leximetric 
Analysis’ (2012) 30(6) Company and Securities Law Journal 366; Helen Anderson, Michelle Welsh and Ian Ramsay, 
‘Shareholder and Creditor Protection Indices: Australia 1970–2010’ (Research Paper No 641, University of Melbourne, 
1 February 2011). 
42 See generally Corporations Act (n 3) ch 2A. 
43 Ibid s 114. 
44 See ibid s 117(2)(k)(ii). 
45 See ibid s 117(2)(k)(iia), (iii). 
46 Australian Pacific Technology (n 7) 484. 
47 Trevor v Whitworth (n 8) 423. 
48‘Share Capital’ in Australian Corporation Practice (n 9) [11.005].  
49 Ford’s Principles (n 2, online at July 2012) [18.090.6]. 
50 Corporations Act (n 3) pt 2J.1. 
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This chapter will show that the profits test was forged in the embers of the ‘financial frenzy’51 which, 
by May 1720, had ascended to such heights that ‘a panic-stricken Parliament’ felt compelled to resort 
to ‘a law, which even now when we read it seems to scream at us from the Statute Book’52 — the 
Bubble Act.53 The promoters, the schemer and the director were the persons at whom the Bubble Act 
was aimed. The vulnerable public, from whom these persons solicited sums, were its intended 
beneficiaries. So it was with the profits test.     
 
By examining the profits test within its proper historical context, this chapter dispels some of the 
myths which shroud the origins and early development of the capital maintenance doctrine. Contrary 
to belief, the profits test was not aimed originally at creditor protection, but arose from concerns about 
frauds on shareholders perpetrated by the boards of directors and management. The origin of the rule 
cannot be considered part of the price that was paid by shareholders for limited liability, as the early 
authorities deal with unincorporated associations and the earliest case was decided prior to the general 
introduction of limited liability in 1855.  
 
Having swept away these misconceptions, it becomes necessary to consider, firstly, how the specific 
legal rule against paying dividends out of capital generated the various rules of capital maintenance, 
a doctrine of wide application, and, secondly, how this doctrine became a cornerstone of capital 
finance. Rather than seeing the profits test as the price paid by shareholders for limiting their liability 
to calls on shares, this chapter shows that both the profit test and limited liability were concepts 
cultivated independently, as express contracts in unincorporated associations, before they were 
transmitted to the modern company limited by shares, where they became contracts implied in law. 
It was during this time that the capital maintenance doctrine acquired the dominant traits it would 
keep until the debate which led to the repeal of the profits test in Australia a century and a half later. 
It then remains only to trace the capital maintenance doctrine through modern British legislation, to 
the reception of British law in the colonies of Australia before federation and then the federal 
government’s legislative intervention under the corporations power of the Constitution.54  
 
2.2 The View from the 18th Century 
 
We begin by looking back from 1882, and an end point in Flitcroft’s Case.55 In that case, Jessel MR 
provided the clearest exposition on the classic capital concept when he said: 
 
The creditor has no debtor but that impalpable thing the corporation, which has no property except the assets of 
the business. The creditor, therefore, I may say, gives credit to that capital, gives credit to the company on the 
faith of the representation that the capital shall be applied only for the purposes of the business, and he has 
therefore a right to say that the corporation shall keep its capital and not return it to the shareholders …56  
 
In exchange for their enjoyment of limited liability, the common law requires that share capital must 
not be returned to shareholders, but may be applied only in the ordinary course of the company’s 
business. The courts pay regard to commercial reality by conceding that ‘capital may be diminished 
or lost in the course of the company’s trading; that is a result which no legislation can prevent’.57 In 
its classic form, the capital maintenance doctrine exists and operates for the protection of corporate 
creditors, not shareholders. 
                                                     
51 DuBois, English Business Company (n 12) 2. 
52 Fisher (ed), Collected Papers of Maitland (n 13) vol 3, 390. 
53 Bubble Act (n 14). 
54 Constitution (n 15) s 51(xx). 
55 Re Exchange Banking Co (1882) 21 Ch D 519 (‘Flitcroft’s Case’). 
56 Ibid 533–4 (Jessel MR). Of course, creditors have always had a dominant role in the vicinity of insolvency, and 
especially in external administrations. For an examination of the role of shareholders in external administrations, see 
Colin Anderson and David Morrison, ‘Seen but not heard? The significance of shareholders under Pt 5.3A of the 
Corporations Act’ (2008) 16(4) Insolvency Law Journal 222. 
57 Trevor v Whitworth (n 8) 423 (Lord Watson). 
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It is tempting to treat dividend policy as a particular aspect of general capital maintenance, but this is 
ahistorical and a revisionist perspective. The idea that dividends should only be paid out of profits 
preceded both the general introduction of limited liability and the modern company limited by shares. 
It will also be seen that it first originated in the interest of shareholders, not creditors.  
 
2.2.1 Until the Bursting of the South Sea Bubble and the Enactment of the Bubble Act 
 
The landscape of company law on the eve of 1720 looked very different from the one we see today. 
The types of commercial association known to the era were the corporation, sometimes called the 
‘regulated’ company,58 created by royal charter or by statute, and the unincorporated partnership, 
including the small and the large partnership and that quasi-partnership which is known to history as 
the ‘joint stock’ company.  
 
2.2.1.1 Chartered and Statutory Corporations 
 
Corporate personality was a special privilege, a prize the granting of which depended upon the 
success of an application to the crown for a charter of incorporation or to Parliament for a special 
Act.59 It was during the 16th century, a period which saw the expansion of foreign trade, exploration, 
and colonisation and settlement, that such grants became popular.60 Merchant adventurers 
undertaking trade abroad required organisation and cooperation,61 and for these they sought 
incorporation. In the teeth of the retailers and shopkeepers who agitated for free trade, ‘[t]he 
merchants who favoured corporateness replied that without it they could neither assemble nor make 
by-laws nor defend their by-laws at law’.62  
 
Separate legal personality was not the motivation behind adoption of the corporate form,63 the motive 
was trade protection. By obtaining a royal charter or the passing of a private statute, merchants could 
acquire both a monopoly of trade64 and self-government or local jurisdiction over large territories and 
regions.65 However, the modern company limited by shares owes much less to these earliest 
incorporated trading companies than to that revolutionary innovation of 16th and 17th century 
partnership law66 — the unincorporated joint stock company. The first important example was that 
of the African Adventurers founded in 1553, which represented the evolution of the joint stock 
enterprise by the grafting of some ‘corporate character’ and ‘fixed methods of procedure in the 
                                                     
58 L C B Gower, The Principles of Modern Company Law (Stevens, 2nd ed, 1957) 23. It was the trade of their members 
that they regulated. Sir Cecil Carr gives a raison d’être for the regulated company when he observes ‘it was an accepted 
tradition to supervise production, regulate employment and exclude competition’: C T Carr, General Principles of the 
Law of Corporations (Cambridge University Press, 1905) xiv (‘Law of Corporations’). 
59 Carr, Law of Corporations (n 58) 164. Says Sir Cecil Carr: ‘Until and unless the State has cried “Fiat” over a 
corporation, that corporation — according to the Concession-theory — does not, and cannot exist.’ Since 1862, 
incorporation has been obtainable by mere registration, and concession theory has entered into eclipse: see generally at 
174–6.  
60 Gower (n 58) 23. 
61 Carr, Law of Corporations (n 58) 117. 
62 Cecil T Carr, Select Charters of Trading Companies AD 1530–1707 (Bernard Quaritch, 1913) xxv (‘Select Charters’). 
63 WS Holdsworth, A History of English Law (Methuen, 1925) vol 8, 201. 
64 Holdsworth (n 63) vol 8, 201. 
65 See, eg, Hudson’s Bay Company, Sean Barrett and Charles Franks, Royal Charter of the Hudson’s Bay Company (2013) 
<http://www.hbcheritage.ca/hbcheritage/collections/archival/charter/charter>. Extraordinary powers were granted to the 
Hudson Bay Company to hold and dispose of land, to deploy ships of war, to erect forts and build colonies, to make war 
on or peace with any non-Christian people, to seize and return to England any subject of the crown who had entered 
Hudson Bay without the company’s leave, and to convict and sentence any subject of the crown for any offence committed 
within the Bay: at [5], [34], [35]. 
66 Gower (n 58) 34. 
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conduct of business’ on to partnership.67 Highly successful, in part due to the trust concept, a clear-
cut distinction would not be drawn between company and partnership until the Joint Stock Companies 
Act 1844 finally provided that partnerships and associations, of more than 25 members, were to be 
made unlawful unless incorporated by registration or formed under charter or statute.68  
 
Such split might have come earlier, for a report prepared by Bellenden Ker, a Chancery barrister 
appointed by the Board of Trade, had in 1837 recommended partnerships be limited to 15 members 
(‘perhaps 10’), else they must register a deed of settlement.69 Unfortunately, the idea was ‘pigeon-
holed’70 for half a decade, and it was not until the Board of Trade was encouraged, by the many frauds 
committed by sham insurance companies,71 to instruct the preparation of a report by William 
Gladstone in 184472 that some form of the recommendation was adopted.   
 
2.2.1.2 The Rise of the Joint Stock Company 
 
In the course of his dissenting opinion in Baird’s Case,73 James LJ provides an introduction to the 
joint stock company which illustrates a number of reasons why some large partnerships found it 
expedient to approximate the corporate form: 
 
there were large societies on which the sun of royal or legislative favour did not shine, and as to whom the whole 
desire of the associates, and the whole aim of the ablest legal assistants they could obtain, was to make them as 
nearly a corporation as possible, with continuous existence, with transmissible and transferable stock, but without 
any individual right in any associate to bind the other associates, or to deal with the assets of the association.74 
 
The joint stock company was born of two commercial wants which had become acutely apparent by 
the 18th century. They were the need for the raising of large sums of capital, which demanded 
extending invitations for participation from the investing public, and the difficulty and expensive 
formality of obtaining a charter or the passing of an Act.75  
 
Simpler forms of partnership had been outstripped by ‘the increasing power, opportunity and habit of 
investing capital’;76 and the growth of domestic trade had waxed even as the companies trading 
abroad began to wane.77 Writing in the first half of the 17th century about the typical manner in which 
a joint stock company was established, Houghton describes the usefulness of the device in providing 
the public with an opportunity for investment and in interesting them in new trading ventures:  
 
                                                     
67 William Robert Scott, The Constitution and Finance of English, Scottish and Irish Joint-Stock Companies to 1720 
(Cambridge University Press, 1912) vol 1, 17–8 (‘English, Scottish and Irish Joint-Stock Companies’). 
68 See especially Joint Stock Companies Act 1844, 7 & 8 Vict, c 110, s 2 (‘Joint Stock Companies Act 1844’). 
69 H Bellenden Ker, Report on the Law of Partnership, House of Commons Paper No 530, Session 1837 (1837) vol XLIV, 
399, 8 (‘Law of Partnership’). 
70 Gower (n 58) 40. 
71 Ibid. 
72 See William Gladstone, First Report of the Select Committee on Joint Stock Companies, House of Commons Paper No 
119, Session 1844 (1844) vol VII, 1. 
73 Re Agriculturist Cattle Insurance Co (1869–70) LR 5 Ch App 725 (‘Baird’s Case’). 
74 Ibid 733. 
75 Carr, Select Charters (n 62) xix. The former was not entirely free from blame for the latter, as Bellenden Ker points 
out. ‘In order to give effect to joint stock companies, it was necessary that means should be afforded to individuals of 
withdrawing their capital, and to others investing it. Hence the necessity of permitting the transfer of shares. But here an 
abuse arose, the enormity of which, when at its height, had nearly proved fatal to joint stock companies, and under the 
effect of which they are suffering at the present time. Members of companies, not content with the ordinary and legitimate 
profits of their capital, sought a further profit by the sale of their shares. The transfer of shares (or what is called stock-
jobbing) became itself a trade, and was embarked in with all the energy with which trading speculations are followed in 
this country’: Ker, Law of Partnership (n 69) vol XLIV, 399, 5. 
76 Carr, Select Charters (n 62) xxi. 
77 Gower (n 58) 26. 
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When someone has thought of an art or invention or discovered some mine or knows or thinks of some new … 
way of trade, whereby he thinks a considerable gain may be gotten, and yet this cannot well … be carried on by 
a private purse, or if it could the hazard would be too great; he then imparts it to some friend or friends, who 
commonly consider or enquire of the learned whether it will stand good in law, and, if so, they contrive some 
articles for a constitution, whereof to give the first inventor a sum of money for his charge or some certain 
number of the shares or both is certainly and with good reason one of the principal articles. This done, the parties 
concerned let it be known and each brings in his friend, till all the shares be bought at such a price as stated, 
either presently or to pay down all the money (which is generally found to be the best and easiest way) or only 
some part which is often troublesome, one or other being backward of paying his quota.78 
 
Although it was well recognised that the corporate form facilitated the alliance between capital and 
entrepreneur,79 the ‘stream of corporateness’ which sprang from Parliament, it was dourly observed, 
appeared to flow ‘at some periods more freely than at others’.80 The tribute which Gower pays the 
legacy of the joint stock company, in the development of company law, is at the same time a scathing 
indictment of the government’s hostile reaction against these unincorporated associations: 
 
Had the authorities granted incorporation more readily, already in the 18th century, incorporated companies might 
have become the dominant type of commercial enterprise. And had that policy been adopted, the Government, 
by its control over charters and statutes, would have shaped the development of business practice 200 years 
earlier than it attempted to do so on any large scale. Instead … the authorities placed almost insuperable 
difficulties in the way of incorporation and thus abdicated their control to businessmen and their legal advisers 
who sought an alternative device. This they found in the unincorporated association …81  
 
2.2.2 Early Concepts of Capital 
 
It was the joint stock company that hastened a revolution in the manner in which capital was regarded. 
Scott tells us that prior to the advent of the joint stock company, ‘[t]he idea of capital, as something 
which should be kept intact, was unknown’.82 Although the term appears in accounting literature from 
1569, ‘capital’ cannot be found in any document relating to English companies in the 16th century, 
the period during which royal charters became common.83  
 
Since the common law lacked clarity regarding which increases in equity were divisible amongst 
shareholders,84 it was ‘quite usual’ for dividends to be paid out of capital until ‘very much later’.85 
The reason this eventually began to change was because of the growing need for ‘some form of 
continuous organisation with transferable shares’.86 Scott describes the ability to meet this need as 
the only significant difference between a ‘large partnership’ and a ‘small [joint stock] company’,87 
                                                     
78 John Houghton, Husbandry and Trade Improv’d: Being a Collection (Wooman and Lyon, 1727) 261–2. Scott points 
out that, by contrast, ‘the practice of confining membership’ of the regulated companies to ‘those who had been “bred to 
the trade of merchandize [sic]”, would have limited this new opening to such funds as were already owned by persons so 
qualified. Therefore, at the time when capital was exceedingly scarce, a possible supply would have remained untapped, 
had there not been some means by which the wealth of those, who were not merchants, could have been made available’: 
Scott, English, Scottish and Irish Joint-Stock Companies (n 67) vol 1, 442. 
79 Gower (n 58) 26. 
80 Carr, Select Charters (n 62) cxxxi. 
81 Gower (n 58) 31. 
82 Scott, English, Scottish and Irish Joint-Stock Companies (n 67) vol 1, 60. 
83 Ibid vol 1, 59, 60 n 1. 
84 Holdsworth (n 63) vol 8, 216. 
85 Scott, English, Scottish and Irish Joint-Stock Companies (n 67) vol 1, 60. 
86 Carr, Select Charters (n 62) xix. Of course, Sir Edward Cook, the great Common Lawyer, had famously declared that 
a corporation aggregate was ‘immortal’ in the Case of Sutton’s Hospital (1611) 10 Co Rep 23; 77 ER 960, 973. But for 
one of many examples where a company was initially incorporated for only a limited term, see the first charter of the East 
India Trading Company: Ministry of Law and Parliamentary Affairs (Pakistan), ‘Queen Elizabeth’s Charter 1600’ in 
Constitutional Documents (Pakistan): 1600–1933 (1964) vol 1, 1–20.   
87 Scott, English, Scottish and Irish Joint-Stock Companies (n 67) vol 1, 442. 
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pointing out that ‘the member in the latter could dispose of a part or the whole of his share in the 
undertaking without receiving the consent of others concerned’.88  
 
The corporation of the 17th century could not have been the agent of this innovation in shares and 
share capital. In the earliest incorporated trading companies, members conducted their own trade on 
their own account and with their own stock, subject to the rules and regulations of the corporation.89 
Trade protection was their object, not capital finance; they were ‘careful of men as well as of money’ 
and jealously limited membership.90 Scott points out that ‘[t]he regulated companies laid great stress 
upon apprenticeship, and it was by this device that membership was confined to what were called 
later “legitimate merchants”, namely those who had been apprentices’.91 
 
Since each member could trade ‘for his own hand’,92 the problems of corporation officers withholding 
distributions to members,93 or of distributions which were unfair or inequitable to a member or class 
of members, were not yet known. Thus if one considers the case of the East India Company, one sees 
that it was not established with a permanent or constant stock. Members were given the freedom to 
choose the company ventures they would invest in and subscribed separately for different voyages, 
and the company’s accounts were kept separately for different voyages.94  
 
By contrast, the joint stock company, which was ‘bound together for business rather than 
benevolence’,95 was operated on joint account with a joint stock.96 The joint stock system became 
‘the means of an immensely enlarged credit, which could not have been carried on, even with a 
moderate degree of success, by any other method’.97 It provided for ‘improving production by 
arranging for the ready inflow of capital’.98 Unlike in a regulated company, there was no test for 
admission.99 Its natural advantages over the regulated company was laid out by Scott: 
 
the confining of participation in certain trades to what was in practice an hereditary caste of merchants cut off 
such industries from two valuable accessions of strength. A commercial body stood to gain, on the whole, by the 
adhesion of self-made men, who had raised themselves from small beginnings by exceptional ability or industry. 
Also younger sons of the landed families frequently devoted themselves to commerce; and, unless these men 
started as apprentices, they would find it difficult, if not impossible, to enter the regulated company. In so far as 
the joint-stock undertakings were open to either class, they gained by the energy of the one and by the relatively 
wide outlook of the other. Thus the attacks, made later on the joint-stock company by the regulated bodies, 
originated in the restriction of the membership of the latter, and at the same time constitute indirect evidence to 
the growing success of the former type of organization.100 
                                                     
88 Ibid; see generally the judgement in Re Mexican and South American Mining Co (1858) 26 Beavan 177; 53 ER 865. 
This case involved an unincorporated joint stock company, about which the court held ‘a holder of shares at the date of 
the winding-up order, who was not an original allottee but had purchased them and received dividends, was a 
contributory’: at 177; 865. Cf: at 177; 865 (Selwyn and Cotton) (during argument).    
89 Holdsworth (n 63) vol 8, 206. 
90 Carr, Select Charters (n 62) xx. 
91 Scott, English, Scottish and Irish Joint-Stock Companies (n 67) vol 1, 11. 
92 Carr, Select Charters (n 62) xxi. 
93 For the position in American law see generally I Maurice Wormser, Disregard of the Corporate Fiction and Allied 
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94 Holdsworth (n 63) vol 8, 206. 
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96 Gower (n 58) 23. 
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The joint stock company’s members did not trade independently, but were shareholders who invested 
in ‘one common enterprise for profits distributed in some proportion to capital subscribed’.101 
Regulation of such distributions was required; laissez-faire would no longer do. 
 
2.3 The Development of Dividend Rules in the Early 19th Century 
 
Williston tells us: 
 
The most important right of shareholders, the right to dividends, was of course always recognized. It is 
necessarily implied in the conception of a joint-stock company.102 No cases, however, seem to have been decided 
before the year 1800 which illustrate the nature of the right. The same remark applies to the right of a shareholder 
to share in the distribution of the capital stock if the affairs of the corporation are wound up.103  
 
However, by 1849 when the House of Lords decided Burnes v Pennell,104 this ‘extreme poverty of 
the ascertained rules of law’105 applicable to the payment of dividends which Williston had described 
had been ameliorated. Reiter tells us that, together with the Limited Liability Act 1855,106 it is the case 
of Burnes v Pennell which provides ‘the foundation upon which was erected the structure of law 
governing the liability of corporation directors and stockholders for the declaration and receipt of 
dividends not having profits as their source’.107 If true, this has important implications. In Burnes v 
Pennell, Lord Campbell provided one of the earliest authorities on the profits test when he said: 
 
it is most nefarious conduct for the directors of a joint stock company, in order to raise the price of shares which 
they are to dispose of, to order a fictitious dividend to be paid out of the capital of the concern. Dividends are 
supposed to be paid out of profits only, and when directors order a dividend, to any given amount, without 
expressly saying so, they impliedly declare to the world that the company has made profits, which justify such a 
dividend. If no such profits have been made, and the dividend is to be paid out of the capital of the concern, a 
gross fraud has been practised, and the directors are not only civilly liable to those whom they have deceived 
and injured, but, in my opinion, they are guilty of a conspiracy, for which they are liable to be prosecuted and 
punished.108  
 
It is curious that this dictum reserves liability for the directors, and omits consideration of any vitiating 
conduct on the part of shareholders. However, it is unlikely that the position would have been 
significantly different to that enshrined later in the Limited Liability Act 1855 and the Joint Stock 
Companies Act 1856, which exempted directors from liability if they were absent at the time of 
making a dividend, or if they objected thereto and filed their objection in writing with the company’s 
clerk.109      
 
Writing about the way in which companies were governed at the turn of the 18th century, Gower tells 
us that although directors were generally left with an unfettered scope of action, the probability of 
interference and domination by the general court, an assembly of shareholders, was ‘a factor that they 
                                                     
101 Carr, Select Charters (n 62) xxi. Sir William Holdsworth observes this form of association ‘was more adapted to a 
company formed for the strictly commercial object of making money for its members’: Holdsworth (n 63) vol 8, 206. 
102 And, it need scarcely be added, it has not always been a necessary implication of separate legal personality or the 
corporate form. In the earliest chartered companies which traded abroad, each voyage was treated as a separate venture, 
on the termination of which ‘divisions’ were paid on the capital and the profits of its own: Scott, English, Scottish and 
Irish Joint-Stock Companies (n 67) vol 1, 153. 
103 Samuel Williston, ‘History of the Law of Business Corporations before 1800’ in Association of American Law Schools 
(ed), Select Essays in Anglo-American Legal History (Little, Brown, 1909) vol 3, 195, 228. 
104 Burnes v Pennell (1849) 2 HL Cas 497 (‘Burnes v Pennell’). 
105 Holdsworth (n 63) vol 3, 215. 
106 Limited Liability Act 1855, 18 & 19 Vict, c 133 (‘Limited Liability Act’). 
107 Prosper Reiter, Profits, Dividends and the Law (Ronald Press, 1976) iii. 
108 Burnes v Pennell (n 104) 524–5. 
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were not permitted to forget’.110 Minutes of the general courts and courts of directors provide insight 
into the formal mechanism of dividend declaration during the period. A recommendation was 
generally made by the committee of treasury to the directors, which they approved and then submitted 
to the general court for ratification.111  
 
The omission of any consideration of directors’ liability by the House of Lords reflects the fact that, 
as a rule, the directors’ resolution was confirmed automatically, without shareholders’ deliberation 
on the issue.112 The process of the Bank of England is worth consulting, as it reflected this accepted 
business practice at the start of the 19th century: 
 
All that generally passes at the court, ordained to be held for considering the state and condition of the 
Corporation, and for declaring of dividends, is, that the Governor says, ‘Gentlemen of the court of Proprietors, 
the court of Directors are of the opinion, that the dividend for the last half-year should be at the rate of seven per 
cent per annum. As many as are of the opinion hold up your hands; as many as are of the contrary opinion hold 
up yours’. Some good-natured Proprietor moves the thanks of the court to the court of Directors for their kind 
communication, which is seconded by another good-natured Proprietor. The court breaks up, and the Directors 
retire to their parlour, and the Proprietors to their respective vocations.113 … Previous to the month of February 
1797, the State and Condition of the Bank was a perfect Riddle and Enigma to every Proprietor, except the Court 
of Directors …114  
 
Whilst this illustrates shareholders’ reliance upon directors to take into account the state of the 
company’s affairs, and to carefully examine its accounts before paying a dividend, it also reminds us 
of the remarkable fact that, until the 19th century, companies were ‘not generally troubled with 
problems concerning undivided profits’.115 The reserve fund was not attested to in the 18th century, 
and accepted business practice was to dispose of the balance of net income as a dividend.116 Shortly 
after the reserve fund appeared in accounting literature,117 model articles empowered directors, before 
recommending any dividend, to set aside out of profits such sum as they thought proper for the 
maintenance and repair of company assets, or to meet contingencies, or for the purpose of keeping 
the dividend at a uniform rate.118  
 
The same model articles provided that it was for the directors to decide the specific dividend, although 
always with the sanction of the company in general meeting.119 However, this thesis is concerned for 
the moment with unincorporated associations, and returns, therefore, to Burnes v Pennell and the 
words of Lord Brougham, who in the course of his opinion agreed with Lord Campbell when he said:  
 
I beg to be understood as going with those who view with the greatest severity the conduct of railway directors 
in declaring dividends which can only be paid out of capital, because I consider that that is, of itself, a most 
vicious and fraudulent course of conduct. It is telling the world that their profits are large, when it may be that 
their profits are nil, or that their losses are large, with no profits. It is a false and fraudulent representation by act 
and deed, much to be reprobated …120 
 
                                                     
110 DuBois, English Business Company (n 12) 292. 
111 Ibid 363. 
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113 A Allardyce, An Address to the Proprietors of the Bank of England (W J and Richardson, 3rd ed, 1798) 10. 
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115 DuBois, English Business Company (n 12) 365. 
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117 The reserve fund is included as a balance sheet account in the model financial statements included after the regulations 
of table B in the Joint Stock Companies Act 1856 (n 109). 
118 Joint Stock Companies Act 1856 (n 109) sch table B item 65. Cf Companies Act 1989 (Cth) sch 3 table A item 89(1). 
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regime. However, many corporations likely retain these and other model articles from table A in their constitutions, which 
is apt to confuse as they reflect the old profits test. 
119 Joint Stock Companies Act 1856 (n 109) sch table B item 63. Cf Companies Act 1989 (Cth) sch 3 table A item 70. 
120 Burnes v Pennell (n 104) 531 (emphasis in original). 
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The joint stock company of which the defendant was shareholder was, of course, an unincorporated 
association.121 The action against the shareholder, for calls due to the company, was brought by an 
assignee of the company’s bankrupt estate and the creditors of the company by a sort of 
subrogation.122  
 
Although ‘[t]he concept of incorporation was early recognised’,123 the most important advantage of 
all those conferred by incorporation — limited liability — was recognised only gradually.124 One 
finds in the year books of the reign of Henry VI that a member of a non-trading corporation was held 
not to be liable for its debts;125 however, not until the latter part of the 17th century was this principle 
recognised also in the case of trading corporations.126 When it was finally recognised, it was prized 
as a means of protecting the company from liability for the private debts of its members,127 a problem 
that had been well known to partnership law.  
 
Since the earliest incorporated trading companies were not established with a permanent or constant 
stock, their charters commonly conferred upon directors the power to levy assessments against 
members sufficient to meet their common expenses.128 Thus if one returns again to the case of the 
East India Company, one sees that the governor sought to obtain an indemnity from such company 
‘leviations’.129 One may regard the power to call on the shareholder of a joint stock company as the 
lineal descendant of the leviation.130 In either case, creditors could subrogate the powers of the 
company against its members, and so force these members to pay.131 
 
However, in Burnes v Pennell, neither the rights of the company, nor the creditor, won the day. The 
House of Lords affirmed a judgement for the appellant shareholder,132 accepting his defence that he 
had been ‘deceived and defrauded’ by the directors, and ‘induced by them to purchase the shares by 
their false representations’.133 The false representations consisted of false financial statements 
published by the directors, and the declaration of dividends, which, ‘as it afterwards appeared, were 
not warranted by the real condition of the company’, and were pointed to as ‘proofs of [its] flourishing 
state’.134 
 
No doubt Burnes v Pennell anticipated many developments in the area of payments of dividends and 
maintenance of share capital, but it remains problematic. In the first place, it is not obvious how 
creditors came to avail themselves of a rule obviously intended to safeguard shareholders and the 
public against gross frauds — although this thesis will propose a probable mechanism when it 
examines Evans v Coventry.135 As noted in a subsequent case, Burnes v Pennell ‘turned on the ground 
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of false representation’.136 It should be understood in the context of the alternate booms and panics 
that the Exchange Alley and the London scene had become familiar with by the end of the 17th 
century, and of ‘the shady side of joint stock enterprise’137 which had captured the imagination of the 
public. Already in 1696, the Commissioners of Trade had put before Parliament a report accusing 
promoters of making false representations about profits — from which it is a natural step to include 
fraudulently made dividends — for the purpose of fictitiously enhancing the price of shares: 
 
The pernicious Art of Stock-jobbing hath, of late, so wholly perverted the End and Design of Companies and 
Corporations, erected for the introducing, or carrying on, of Manufactures, to the private Profit of the first 
Projectors, that the Privileges granted to them have, commonly, been made no other Use of, by the First Procurers 
and Subscribers, but to sell again, with Advantage, to ignorant Men, drawn in by the Reputation, falsly [sic] 
raised, and artfully spread, concerning the thriving State of their Stock: Thus the first Undertakers, getting quit 
of the Company, by selling their Shares for much more than they are really worth, to Men allured by the Noise 
of great Profit, the Management of that Trade and Stock comes to fall into unskilful Hands …138 
 
It should be remembered that we are concerned with the liabilities of shareholders — and of directors 
— to the company’s creditors. However, nowhere did the House of Lords suggest that a shareholder 
could be made liable to creditors for receiving a dividend which was a distribution not based upon 
profits. Nor is it obvious why this would be necessary. All members of a joint stock company are 
members of a partnership, and every partner is liable jointly with the other partners and also severally 
for all debts and obligations incurred by the partnership.139  With respect to a director’s liability, 
Weiner adds ‘[i]t is extremely doubtful whether any court would confer a power to a future creditor 
to hold the officers in a fraud action based on this reliance upon the supposed prosperity of the 
company’.140  If there had been no implied declaration that the company had made a profit, the 
question would be put beyond any doubt. 
 
Weiner is skeptical whether Lord Campbell’s dictum may be referred to ‘any statutory scheme in 
being or contemplated’, or even if he was ‘thinking of the incorporated company’ at all.141 Instead, 
one may surmise that his dictum elevated to the status of a legally enforceable, though implied, term 
of contract that which the court had found to be an accepted business practice between joint stock 
companies and their partners, upon which DuBois had this to say: 
 
Certain generalisations appeared during this period, and seem to have had wide support. Since the figures are for 
the most part wanting, it is impossible to say whether they represented genuine company practice. It was stated 
that the dividend was not to be paid out of capital, nor was it to be declared without a careful examination of 
available accounts. On occasion, it was asserted that the dividend was to be paid out of the income and the profits 
of the organization. In the well-established and sound companies, it is safe to say that these maxims were 
observed.142   
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It is not difficult to imagine that lack of privity could bar a third-party creditor from suing a joint 
stock company upon a dividend or a distribution of capital — each of which is a transaction between 
shareholder and unincorporated association. Some other connection was needed. 
 
2.4 British Company Law: ‘Outdated and Complex’?143 
 
2.4.1 The Early Authorities 
 
We are concerned here with the modern company limited by shares — which is a corporate body, 
formed by simple registration, and draws a line between the corporate liability of the company and 
the personal liability of its members. Unlike the obsolete form it replaced, this new type of corporation 
had a permanent joint stock and paid a monetary dividend to its shareholders.  
 
The joint stock system had since slowly ‘invaded the regulated companies’, which became ‘joint 
commercial enterprises instead of trade protection associations’.144 Thus it remains for us to return 
once more to the case of the East India Company to attempt to trace this ‘hardly perceptible’145 
process.  
 
Although the first East India members could carry on trade privately, the enterprise was found to be 
‘too great a risk for the private trader’,146 and so a joint stock was established to which members could 
subscribe for single voyages. By 1613 the East India trade had matured to the point that the separate 
subscriptions could be merged into one joint stock covering four successive voyages147 and in 1657 
Cromwell introduced a comparatively permanent capital.148 Finally, private trading was completely 
forbidden to members in 1693.149  
 
2.4.1.1 Evans v Coventry 
 
This case is the missing link between the dividend test in Burnes v Pennell and the classic capital 
concept as described in Flitcroft’s Case. Decided in 1854,150 it too involved a type of unincorporated 
joint stock company — called a deed-of-settlement company — formed for life insurance and illness 
insurance. In Evans v Coventry, however, the shareholders attempted to limit their liability to what 
they had agreed to contribute to the company, by inserting standard form clauses into each contract 
the company made with a creditor, as well as into the relevant clause of the deed of settlement.151  
 
The courts had recognised that a type of limited liability could be established by contract two years 
earlier, in Hallett v Dowdall.152 However, as in Burnes v Pennell, the Court in Evans v Coventry found 
that dividends had been paid which were not justified by the state of the funds of the company. 
Speaking about the resulting liability — this time of shareholders as well as directors — for the 
payment and receipt of dividends out of capital, Kindersley V-C said: 
 
It does appear to me that the directors had a duty, not only to the persons who were shareholders, but a duty to 
the persons [who were creditors] who effected insurances in this society [the joint stock company] — a duty 
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which imposed on them the necessity of not misapplying the funds of this society — that is, applying them in 
any way not justified by the terms of the deed; still more did it impose upon them the duty of not applying those 
funds in any way, or from any motive which was in itself unjustifiable; and I cannot but hold that all those who 
were directors are liable not only to refund those dividends which they themselves received in respect of their 
shares, but that they are liable to refund all the dividends, as far as any of them personally were parties to the 
declaring of dividends or concurred in it. I must hold that they are liable to make good to the funds of the society 
the dividends which have thus been declared and paid.153 
 
The case of Evans v Coventry decided that, where a joint stock company had contracted, with a 
creditor, for the right to limit the liability of shareholders to the extent of their contributed capital, a 
reciprocal obligation to the creditor arose that the capital would be applied and disposed of only in 
the manner consistent with their contractual agreement. Its lineage in Burnes v Pennell is apparent in 
the description, by Kindersley V-C, of the declaration of dividends as ‘fraudulent towards any person 
who might be induced by that false semblance of prosperity to effect an insurance’ in the company.154 
In Burnes v Pennell, such invalid dividends were held to have induced an investor to purchase shares 
and become a shareholder. In Evans v Coventry, they had induced persons to enter into contracts with 
an insurer and become creditors. 
 
Evans v Coventry is significant for generalising the early capital maintenance law beyond the 
particular question of whether a company could pay dividends out of capital. Turning to the question 
of share buy-backs, Kindersley V-C said:  
 
Now, there was no authority whatever in the deed for the directors to apply the funds of the company in the 
buying up of shares. Not only so, but by every share bought up they relieved some individual from a liability to 
pay up the rest of his contributions to that very fund and that very property which was to be charged with the 
payment to the persons effecting insurances [the creditors]. Having then a duty to persons insured, to preserve 
as much as possible the property which was liable to pay these insurances, they had no right to take on themselves 
to discharge any of those persons [the shareholders], or any of those shares of the property, from the liability to 
the persons insured; and to the extent that they have done so, they have made themselves liable …155 
 
Despite this sound dictum, Kindersley V-C seems not to have been prepared to rely exclusively on 
the idea that, at common law, creditors have a right to insist upon a company keeping its capital for 
the purposes of its business. His Honour referred again to the fraudulent motive of the purchase, 
surmising — perhaps somewhat speciously, but consistent with Burnes v Pennell — that the purpose 
of the share buy-back was that the shares ‘should not get into the market and appear to be sold, 
because persons might be afraid of continuing in the society’ and so impair the company’s 
creditworthiness.156 
 
However, to such degree that both portions of his Honour’s judgement referred to the objects of the 
company’s deed one sees the case anticipated the doctrine of ultra vires. The ground had been well 
prepared, therefore, for the modern company limited by shares. 
 
2.4.1.2 Cases on the Protection of Corporate Creditors under Express and Implied Contracts  
 
The application, to the modern company limited by shares, of the unincorporated joint stock 
companies authorities discussed earlier in this chapter is best appreciated within the context of the 
contractual and quasi-contractual nature of the rights of creditors. Modern company law has been the 
subject of much philosophical speculation amongst jurists, including amongst them Posner, who 
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suggests that ‘the primary utility of corporation law lies in providing a set of standard, implied 
contract terms, for example, governing credit, so that business firms do not have to stipulate these 
terms anew every time they transact’.157 This contractual theory of corporate personality first received 
explicit judicial support in the dividend case Macdougall v Jersey Imperial Hotel Co Ltd, during 
which Wood V-C said: 
 
The bill avers that there are no profits, and that interest has been paid, or is about to be paid, out of capital ... On 
grounds of public policy, and on every principle, not only of honesty as regards the public generally, but of the 
interests of this company itself, I feel bound to prevent this proceeding. This is not in accordance with the contract 
entered into with the Legislature on behalf of the public, whereby it was determined that the shareholders should 
be liable to a certain defined amount, and no more, to the creditors of the company; and not in accordance with 
the contract between the parties, whereby each shareholder was protected against creditors to the extent of the 
contributive liability of all the others.158     
 
The Court had analogised the statutory rights of creditors — an implied contract in the case of the 
early modern company limited by shares — with their status as it had been in the old unincorporated 
deed-of-settlement company, in which they were provided by express contract. The same analogy 
was followed by Jessel MR in the case of Re National Funds Assurance Co [No 2],159 which also 
dealt with an incorporated association. In a passage which referred to Evans v Coventry with approval, 
his Lordship said he did not think it was easy ‘to distinguish the case’ of Evans v Coventry ‘on the 
ground of express contract with the directors that the capital should be forthcoming’.160 His Lordship 
thought ‘there was such a contract here; if not, there was an implied contract’.161 Put another way, 
between the contracts of the creditor of the deed-of-settlement company and the creditor of the 
modern company limited by shares, the Court could find only a distinction without a difference. 
Describing the basis and the terms of this contract, Jessel MR went on to say in his judgement: 
 
The limited company trades upon the representation of being a limited company with a paid-up capital to meet 
its liabilities. It is wholly inconsistent with that representation that the company, having its capital paid up, should 
pay it back to its shareholders, and give the creditors nothing at all. It appears to me, therefore, that the right of 
the creditors is clear, and I think it can be enforced … by one of them …162 
 
Jessel MR would have opportunity to reconsider the implied contract between corporate creditor and 
company in Flitcroft’s Case — and held he ‘entirely adhered’ to his earlier decision.163 However, let 
us examine what his Lordship said there and in what connection:  
 
A limited company by its memorandum of association declares that its capital is to be applied for the purposes 
of the business. It cannot reduce its capital except in the manner and with the safeguards provided by statute, 
and looking at the [Companies Act 1877],164 it clearly is against the intention of the Legislature that any portion 
of the capital should be returned to the shareholders without the statutory conditions being complied with. A 
limited company cannot in any other way make a return of capital, the sanction of a general meeting can give no 
validity to such a proceeding, and even the sanction of every shareholder cannot bring within the powers of the 
company an act which is not within its powers … One reason is this — there is a statement that the capital shall 
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be applied for the purposes of the business, and on the faith of that statement, which is sometimes said to be an 
implied contract with creditors, people dealing with the company give it credit.165 
 
Flitcroft’s Case marks a landmark and a turning point. Although previous decisions had not referred 
to any statutory scheme proposed or in existence, this case placed reliance on legislation as well as 
an implied contract. The case hinted that, from this point on, the government would shape the 
development of business practice in this area. The following facts are, however, incontrovertible: that, 
in its original formulation, the capital concept was based on an express contract between contributory 
and company, before it was pressed into service on behalf of initially an express and later an implied 
contract between company and creditor; and the central role that the unincorporated joint stock 
enterprise played in this important part of company law history.  
 
2.4.2 Early Statutory Safeguards   
 
By the time Guinness v Land Corporation of Ireland166 was decided, the courts seem to have become 
discreetly cautious about relying on implied contract, instead scouring the relevant provisions of the 
Companies Act 1862167 for some new, revisionist foundation upon which to rebuild the edifice of the 
capital concept as an assurance fund for creditors. It is, accordingly, an opportune moment to survey 
the salient features in the development of the rules of British company statutes governing the capital 
of the modern company limited by shares.  
 
2.4.2.1 Joint Stock Companies Act 1844168 
 
We have seen that the modern company limited by shares traces its descent from the joint stock 
company — which is an unincorporated association — and that from the common law of contract 
and partnership initially the capital concept and later limited liability were developed by this device. 
It should, therefore, come as little surprise that not only did courts in the early authorities look to the 
business practices of these commercial associations, but that so too did Parliament. 
 
The earliest Act which needs concern us, the Joint Stock Companies Act 1844, did little to alter the 
common law rights of the shareholders and creditors of joint stock companies beyond providing for 
general incorporation by provisional and complete registration and placing such rights upon a 
statutory footing.169 The now incorporated joint stock company was explicitly authorised under the 
Act to ‘declared Dividends out of the Profits of the Concern’;170 shareholders, however, remained 
individually liable for corporate debts under s 25, which provided: 
 
on the complete Registration of any Company being certified … such Company and the then Shareholders 
therein, and all the succeeding Shareholders, whilst Shareholders, shall be and are hereby incorporated … and 
such Company shall continue so incorporated until it shall be dissolved, and all its Affairs wound up; but so as 
not in anywise to restrict the Liability of any of the Shareholders of the Company, under any Judgment, Decree, 
or Order for the Payment of Money which shall be obtained against such Company, or any of the Members 
thereof, in any Action or Suit prosecuted by or against such Company in any Court of Law or Equity; but every 
such Shareholder shall, in respect of such Monies, subject as after mentioned, be and continue liable as he would 
have been if the said Company had not been incorporated …171 
 
Section 66 went further: 
 
                                                     
165 Flitcroft’s Case (n 55) 533. 
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every Judgment and every Decree or Order which shall be any Time after the passing of this Act obtained against 
any Company completely registered under this Act, except Companies incorporated by Act of Parliament or 
Charter, … in any Action, Suit, or other Proceeding prosecuted by or against such Company in any Court of Law 
or Equity, shall and may take effect and be enforced, and Execution thereon be issued, not only against the 
Property and Effects of such Company, but also, if due Diligence shall have been used to obtain Satisfaction of 
such Judgment, Decree, or Order, … then against the Person, Property, and Effects of any Shareholder for the 
Time being, or any former Shareholder of such Company, in his natural or individual Capacity, until such 
Judgment, Decree, or Order shall be fully satisfied … 
 
This express imposition of liability, on shareholders for corporate debts, need not pose a conceptual 
problem for us when it is borne in mind that the profits test preceded both the general introduction of 
limited liability and the modern company limited by shares. Before the law had been roused to the 
protection of creditors, it was already concerned with the vulnerability of investors and contributories. 
The capital concept had been an innovation of the joint stock company, which was a species apart 
from the company incorporated by royal charter or statute, and the Joint Stock Companies Act 1844 
essentially preserved this distinction after joint stock companies were incorporated.   
 
Providing support for this interpretation, Cooke says: 
 
When, in 1844, [the deed-of-settlement company] was taken over from equity by statute law there were long 
established canons of construction, and the parliamentary draughtsmen of 1844 were not building on new 
principles, but on ancient foundations. The structure of the joint stock company was plain to them, but limited 
liability they thought an ornamental device, which had no real importance on the legal form. It did not, in their 
view, affect the process of incorporation one way or another; it was a convenient piece of mechanism in some 
deeds of settlement, by which the company, at the inconvenience of informing third parties, could limit the 
liability of its members.172 
 
Put another way, for the joint stock company, lately taken over by statute, limited liability had yet to 
advance beyond the voluntary act of contracting and invade the general incorporation laws. 
 
2.4.2.2 Limited Liability Act 1855 
 
Though an important milestone, this statute would have made an imperfect candidate for the Court’s 
undertaking in Guinness v Land Corporation of Ireland; that is, to put the doctrine of capital 
maintenance firmly upon a statutory rather than common law basis. Firstly, a word on limitation of 
liability, the provisions for the granting of which the Act grafted onto the Joint Stock Companies Act 
1844, only to have it repealed less than a year later and incorporated into ‘one of the first modern 
Companies Acts’173 — the Joint Stock Companies Act 1856.174 This thesis shall consider the Joint 
Stock Companies Act 1856 in detail later in relation to early colonial Australian companies legislation. 
 
The Limited Liability Act 1855 left undisturbed what Cooke calls an ‘economico-legal stratification 
covering several centuries of deposits’175 — that is, the old concept of the company ‘as a system of 
contracts and expectancies’176 — and it ‘preserved in fossil form’177 the law’s treatment of joint stock 
enterprises as essentially unlimited liability companies. If it had not, then the repeal of ss 25 and 66 
of the Stock Companies Act 1844 would have sufficed to grant the shareholder of the joint stock 
company limited liability upon incorporation. What the Act instead provided was a convenient 
‘mechanism by which a Joint-stock Company could give a general notice’,178 that its shareholders 
                                                     
172 C A Cooke, Corporation, Trust and Company: An Essay in Legal History (Manchester University Press, 1950) 138–
9. 
173 Gower (n 58) 48. 
174 Joint Stock Companies Act 1856 (n 109). 
175 Cooke (n 172) 40. 
176 Ibid. 
177 Ibid. 
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had elected to avail themselves of the pre-existing ‘theory of the present law’ whereby ‘individuals 
might limit their liability as much as they pleased’.179 Speaking about the theoretical basis for this 
repurposing of the old common law doctrine of contractual limitation of liability, Edward Cardwell 
(President of the Board of Trade) said: 
  
That was not a mere idea or theory, for it was acted upon every day by many of the most influential Companies 
in the City of London. The Insurance Companies all acted upon that law, because, from the nature of their 
business, it was possible for them to enter into a separate written contract with each of their customers … But in 
the multiform transactions of most other Companies it was impossible to give a specific notice to each customer 
… What they had to do was to construct a system of specific notice by which every Joint-stock Company that 
desired to limit its liability should be able — not to give a separate special notice to each individual customer, 
for that had been proved to be impossible — but to frame a general form of notice which should be understood 
to operate, and which should secure to them all the benefits resulting from limited liability.180 
 
Appending the word ‘limited’ to the Company’s name ‘would at least be a clear notice to persons 
dealing with them that they proposed some limit to their liability’.181  
 
2.4.2.2.1 Dividends: Only to be Paid out of Profits or Not to Be Paid if Company Insolvent? 
 
Before the enactment into law of the Limited Liability Act 1855, the Companies Clauses 
Consolidation Act 1845182 had already attempted to regulate dividend payments;183 however, it 
applied only to public utility companies — that is, joint stock companies which had been 
incorporated, for a public purpose, not by registration but by statute. We have seen that such creatures 
of Parliament must be regarded as a genus distinct, in the family of corporations, from the modern 
company limited by shares. However, with respect to dividends, the Limited Liability Act 1855 added 
that: 
 
If the Directors184 … shall declare and pay any Dividend when the Company is known by them to be insolvent, 
or any Dividend the Payment of which would to their Knowledge render it insolvent, they shall be jointly and 
severally liable for all the Debts of the Company then existing, and for all that shall be thereafter contracted, so 
long as they shall respectively continue in Office; provided that the Amount for which they shall all be so liable 
shall not exceed the Amount of such Dividend …185 
 
Corporate insolvency is only as old as the Joint Stock Companies Act 1844, and the company 
incorporated by registration. Winding up was dealt with by a separate Act186 passed that year, which 
subjected companies to the law and practice in bankruptcy.187 A company was insolvent if it fell 
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within the description of a company unable to meet its pecuniary engagements188 — that is, if it was 
unable to pay its debts.189  
The meaning of insolvency had been much considered in the case of De Tastet v Le Tavernier,190 
where the authorities cited and commented upon came down on the side of a cash flow rather than a 
balance sheet test. The earliest authority was an Anonymous Case,191 which was first mentioned in a 
note to Moss v Smith,192 and arose under the Bankrupts Act 1806.193 In it Lord Ellenborough held 
‘that the insolvency mentioned in the statute must mean a general inability in the bankrupt to answer 
his engagements’.194 The question arose again in Teale v Younge,195 this time upon the meaning of 
the term ‘insolvent circumstances’ in the Bankrupts Act 1745,196 which marked the first use of the 
term by Parliament, and in that case the Court held that ‘the legislature cannot have meant a state of 
complete insolvency’;197 for it did not appear to the Court how ‘in one case out of fifty’ a state of 
utter and complete insolvency could be established.198 In De Tastet v Le Tavernier, Lord Langdale 
was similarly concerned about the burden such interpretation would have thrown upon courts and 
judges, stating: 
 
It is clear that the statute would, in this respect, have been inoperative, if a man could not have notice of the 
insolvency of another without knowing at the time that the whole of his property, when converted into money 
and realised, would be insufficient to pay his debts; and I must, therefore, consider whether [the plaintiff] had 
notice of the insolvency … within the meaning of the terms insolvent, or insolvent circumstances, as interpreted 
by the Judges whom I have named.199 
 
It should be noted that balance sheet considerations were not unknown to the common law. Another 
authority cited in De Tastet v Le Tavernier was Shears v Rogers,200 in which it had been contended 
that, to render a deed void under the Fraudulent Conveyances Act 1571 of Elizabeth I (‘Statute of 13 
Elizabeth’),201 a party had to be in insolvent circumstances.202 In the latter case, Littledale J referred 
to something not unlike a dual solvency and net assets test when he observed ‘the question whether 
a party be or be not insolvent is to be determined, not only by taking an account of his debts and 
credits, and striking a balance, but also by looking to his conduct and the general state of his 
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affairs’;203 and Patterson J applied a type of balance sheet test when he held that ‘the statement of 
assets and debts … shew [sic] that’ the defendant was insolvent.204 
 
The dual solvency and balance sheet test has been known for some time to many foreign 
jurisdictions,205 but has only recently had a direct presence in Australian companies legislation.206 In 
many of these jurisdictions, a company may not be ‘solvent’ unless the value of its assets is greater 
than the value of its liabilities;207 in others a company may satisfy a ‘liquidity’ test if it appears that 
the company will be able to pay its debts as they become due in the ordinary course of business,208 
but not a ‘solvency’ test unless its assets are greater than its liabilities.209  
 
It should be noted that Weiner is doubtful210 whether the dividends provision of the Limited Liability 
Act 1855, prohibiting the payment of dividends whilst a company is insolvent, says anything more 
than did the Statute of 13 Elizabeth.211 It certainly imposes no profits test — although a dividend 
presupposing profits was implied by the Joint Stock Companies Act 1844212 — but it does seem to 
anticipate the current solvency test during an era when the law was focused on false representation. 
 
2.4.2.2.2 False Starts and Dead Ends: Minimum Capital Requirements 
 
The history of the Limited Liability Act 1855 is revealing when one considers capital.    
 
In its initially proposed form, the minimum safeguards relating to capital, which the Limited Liability 
Bill 1855 provided, were that the capital of every company which came within its operation should 
be of the nominal amount of £20,000213 (£1,768,000 in 2011 terms),214 that the subscription contract 
should be signed to the extent of £15,000215 (£1,326,000 in 2011 terms)216 and that 20 per cent of that 
amount (or £3,000 in 1855, which would have been the equivalent of some £265,200 in 2011)217 
should actually be paid up.218   
 
However, during parliamentary debate, a consensus was reached that the right of association and 
freedom of contract — that is, ‘that men might contract as they pleased, provided it was a contract in 
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which each party had a perfect knowledge of the whole state of the case’219 — must be the principle 
upon which limited liability was based. Arguing from this principle against minimum capital 
requirements, Lowe said: 
 
All they had to do … was to insure that persons should know on what grounds they were contracting, that they 
should have complete notice of that, and then he contended that people should be left to act as they pleased, 
without being fettered in any way. But was that principle carried out? Was not the Bill encumbered with all 
manner of restrictions beyond that particular one? … Why limit it to capital of any particular amount? Parliament 
did not do so with partnerships of unlimited liability. In any such case they left people to do as they pleased; and 
why should they make such a restriction here? The only difference between the two cases was that with regard 
to unlimited liability you knew that you had to deal with a man liable for all he was worth, whilst in the other 
case, the individual was only liable for that which he had guaranteed. Now, all you wanted to know was the sum 
for which persons professed to deal — whether it was for all they were worth, or merely the amount of their 
guarantee …220 
 
Another objection, by Cardwell, reflected the old common law assumption that capital maintenance 
rules had been intended as a safeguard against the false representations of directors and promoters, 
and not necessarily creditor protection, and that for this purpose minimum nominal capital 
requirements were counterproductive: 
 
The object, of course, was to include none but respectable Companies, and it was supposed that a capital of 
£20 000 would insure something like respectability; but he believed there were many Companies in rural towns 
for small purposes — such as gas works and local improvements which, if they raised themselves to a nominal 
capital of £20 000, must evidently do so with the sole object of availing themselves of the privileges of the 
proposed Bill, inasmuch as so large a sum would never be required for the legitimate purposes of the Company. 
But take the case of a set of swindlers engaged in a fraudulent Company desiring to avail themselves of the 
benefits of the law at the same time that they evaded its provisions: all that they would have to do would be to 
sign their names at the registrar’s office for £15 000; to obtain for a temporary purpose the sum of £3000, and 
their object would be gained.221 
 
Facing such objections, the Bill was amended to remove the minimum nominal capital requirement,222 
which left the remaining provisions for a minimum percentage of issued and paid up capital largely 
toothless. One may well consider whether this should be a matter for some regret. The arguments of 
Viscount Palmerston223 and Lord St Leonards224 — who did not think it was advisable to adopt the 
proposals of Cardwell and Lowe, but were prepared to reduce the amount of capital from £20,000 to 
£10,000 — illustrate that prescribing a minimum to what the nominal value may be ensures that there 
in fact exists a body of shareholders who have placed a reasonably sufficient value of assets at risk in 
the company and prevents the process of incorporation from being abused as an instrument for the 
formation and establishment of bubble schemes. Put another way, it ensures that incorporation is used 
for the purpose of carrying on an undertaking in association with others, whilst striking against the 
incorporation with limited liability of very small, or one-person, under-capitalised enterprises. A 
minimum capital requirement also provides a means of ensuring the establishment and maintenance 
in the company of an adequate margin of assets over and above the ‘bare solvency margin’225 required 
to meet creditors’ claims, as a protection against potential losses.  
 
However, such safeguards may only have been illusory. Lord Cranworth opposed any fixing of a 
minimum of capital on the ground that it would tend to prevent creditors who had dealings with these 
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companies from looking after their own interests, by giving them a false impression as to the capital 
of such companies.226 Since the capital which is adequate for an enterprise may only be determined 
in relation to the particular purpose and magnitude of the undertaking, there could be little scope for 
any minimum capital requirements. Lowe went further, maintaining that, instead of a small capital 
being the badge of fraud, a large capital was such.227  
 
When Parliament had the opportunity to reconsider the theory of limited liability in the Joint Stock 
Companies Act 1856, the government’s endorsement of what Cardwell had described as ‘the principle 
of caveat creditor’228 led to the removal of even the minimum issued and paid up capital safeguards. 
None have been reintroduced in British companies legislation. 
 
2.4.2.3 Companies Act 1862 
 
This Act repealed previous companies legislation229 and did not contain the dividends provision 
included in the Limited Liability Act 1855 concerning insolvency. It was drafted according to a plan 
which British companies legislation has followed ever since,230 consisting of mandatory provisions 
and optional appendices in the form of schedules and tables — similar to the provisions of the 
Corporations Act which apply as replaceable rules.231 In Table A,232 the Act contained a model set of 
regulations for management of a company limited by shares which, so far as they had not been 
excluded or modified by the company’s own articles of association, would be deemed to be the 
regulations of the company.233 
 
The statute’s only reference to dividends occurs in Table A, which provides that ‘no dividend shall 
be declared except from profits arising out of the business of the company’.234 The regulation can 
provide no rule of law per se, just as a company’s own articles of association cannot. This poses a 
problem, which Weiner attempts to rationalise by saying: 
 
the fact that it is optional does not necessarily imply that a company not adopting it is free to pay dividends 
otherwise than out of profits, for the Act may be interpreted as implying that while all companies may pay 
dividends only out of profits, those companies that adopt Table A are further restricted to profits arising from 
the business of the company.235  
 
With respect, that is a somewhat tortured construction requiring us to ignore the long relationship 
between the profits test and ultra vires dating back to the old deed-of-settlement companies. The 
better view is that dividends may not be paid out of capital because capital has not been produced 
from the business of the company. Put another way, the location of the profits test amongst the list of 
optional regulations for internal management of a company should put us in mind of the common law 
freedom of contract and its obverse in the principle of equity which prohibits false representations.  
 
However, in Guinness v Land Corporation of Ireland, the Court of Appeal looked not to what the 
Companies Act 1862 had to say about a company’s articles of association, but about its memorandum. 
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In the case, the Court found that a provision of the company’s articles was invalid, as it had purported 
to make part of the capital available for payment as a dividend on another part of the capital. This 
was a purpose ‘not within the objects of the company as defined by the memorandum’,236 nor was it 
‘incidental or conducive to the attainment of those objects’.237 
 
Bowen LJ drew a conclusion that capital could not be redirected from the commercial purposes of a 
company limited by shares by inference from two statements it was required to include within its 
memorandum: 
 
The [Companies Act 1862] requires the memorandum to state the objects of the company238 and the amount of 
capital with which the company proposes to be registered.239 … [W]hat is the effect of the statement of the 
amount of capital in the memorandum, having regard to the other sections of the Act? [Section 38] provides … 
no contribution shall be required from any member exceeding the amount if any unpaid on the shares in respect 
of which he is liable as a present or past member; that the capital of the company as mentioned in the 
memorandum is to be the fund which is to pay the creditors in the event of the company being wound up. From 
that it follows that whatever has been paid by a member cannot be returned to him. … [I]t also follows that what 
is described in the memorandum as the capital cannot be diverted from the objects of the society.240  
 
The emphasis on an external document of the company reflects Lowe’s earlier concern for perfect 
knowledge between freely contracting parties. To such extent as this construction derives the concept 
of capital, as an assurance fund for creditors, from the interaction between the shareholder’s limitation 
of liability and the company’s representations in its memorandum, it resembles the situation this thesis 
considered with the old deed-of-settlement companies. The Court of Appeal did give effect to an 
intention of Parliament prohibiting the payment of dividends out of capital. However, this intention 
must be understood in the context of an accepted business practice which had long since regarded the 
payment of dividends out of capital as uncommercial and thus deceptive conduct. 
 
2.4.3 The Capital Maintenance Doctrine Coming into Maturity 
 
The outline of history draws a bright line in the common law from the earliest origins of the rules 
governing the declaration of dividends, in an era when only shareholders could be heard to complain, 
to the modern concept of capital as an assurance fund for creditors, and the refusal to allow any 
reduction to ‘the capital yardstick’.241 It is fortunate that the foundations of the common law of capital 
maintenance were so well laid, for this thesis has seen that Parliament’s intervention could be clumsy 
and statutory provisions vague. The courts were concerned primarily with vulnerable parties unable 
always to command the production of financial information — many of the early creditor protection 
cases involve customers who had purchased insurance policies — by contrast, diverse objects and 
interests competed for Parliament’s attention. The courts continued to attempt to relate the capital 
concept to companies legislation in a series of cases on buying back shares which followed the 
dividends cases; their decisions are confused and conflicting.  
 
James LJ should, with respect, not be criticised too harshly for his dictum in Teasdale’s Case242 that 
‘[t]here is no doubt that a company may give itself the power to purchase its own shares, to take 
surrenders of shares, and to cancel the certificates of shares’.243 In that case, it was thought 
significant244 that the person whose shares were bought by the company remained liable for a year as 
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a past shareholder;245 certainly this might suggest that the capital was not diminished in the same 
sense as it might be when a past shareholder is no longer liable to the amount, if any, unpaid on shares 
at the date of discharge. Indeed, on the facts of the case, the Court found that the amount of capital 
raiseable on the shares was actually ‘materially increased by the arrangement’, so that the creditors 
of the company ‘appear to have been benefited by it’!246 
 
In the subsequent case of Hope v International Financial Society,247 James LJ appears to have 
repudiated his earlier dictum, whilst at the same time conceding that the surrender of shares is another 
matter entirely, and may be lawfully made in circumstances where the shares could have been 
properly forfeited for a default in payment of a due call: 
 
I am reported to have said in Teasdale’s Case that the power to purchase shares would be good. I am not quite 
sure whether that was not too wide a deduction from the cases to which I was then referring, and certainly it was 
not necessary for the decision of the case. But however that may be, when the company deals with an individual 
shareholder, and does what appears to be right under the circumstances, viz to accept the surrender from the 
shareholder who cannot pay, and to release him from further liability, that might be good, although incidentally 
and to a small extent it may be said to diminish the capital.248 
 
In the case which gave rise to the these observations, the Court of Appeal, affirming Bacon V-C, held 
invalid a special resolution that the directors should have power to apply a company’s assets to 
purchase shares from shareholders willing to sell them. James LJ said that either this was ‘a purchase 
of shares in the sense of trafficking in shares, which is a purchase not authorized by the memorandum 
of association’, or it was ‘an extinguishment of the shares, and therefore a reduction of the capital of 
the company’249 not made in compliance with the provisions of the Companies Act 1867.250  
 
The Companies Act 1862 had not made provision for the reduction of capital. This deficiency was 
addressed by later statutes. In all cases, application to the court for an order confirming reduction was 
necessary251 and any creditor would be entitled to object.252 
 
In Re Dronfield Silkstone Coal Co [No 1],253 the Court of Appeal held that a person whose shares had 
been purchased by a company several years previously could not be made a contributory. Its 
reasoning was disapproved of in the case of Trevor v Whitworth,254 but the House of Lords went short 
of actually saying that the judgment of the Court of Appeal had been erroneous, ‘looking at the 
circumstances which intervened subsequent to the purchase, and prior to the company’s winding 
up’.255  
 
The leading case on the doctrine of capital maintenance is Trevor v Whitworth. In it, the House of 
Lords definitively answered, in the negative, the question whether a company could purchase its own 
shares. Relying on the provisions of the Companies Act 1862,256 Companies Act 1867257 and 
Companies Act 1877,258 it was held that companies legislation did not permit the reduction of capital 
except in the manner prescribed by the statutes, and the Lords relied chiefly on this omission: 
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In the case of a company limited by shares, the Act of 1862 requires that the amount of its capital, and the shares 
into which it is divided, shall be set forth in the memorandum of association; and s 12, which prescribes the 
extent to which the conditions contained in the memorandum may be modified, empowers the company to 
increase but not to diminish its capital. That limitation has been so far relaxed by the Act of 1867 as to permit a 
company to reduce its capital, with the sanction of the Court, after due notice to creditors, upon such terms as 
the Court may think fit to impose. The Act of 1877, upon the preamble that doubts had been entertained whether 
the power of reduction given by the preceding Act extended to paid-up capital, enacts … that the word ‘capital’, 
as used in that Act, shall include paid-up capital. That declaration clearly expresses the will of the legislature 
that neither the paid-up nor the nominal capital of the company shall be reduced otherwise than in the manner 
permitted by the statutes.259 
 
2.5 Colonial Australian Law and Practice 
 
Despite various legislative incursions, the rule in Trevor v Whitworth still forms the basis of many 
aspects of company law in Australia. The case has been preserved like an old plank in Theseus’s 
ship260 which has never been taken away to be replaced with a new and stronger timber. 
 
Summarising the common law of capital maintenance in ANZ Executors & Trustee Co Ltd v Qintex 
Australia Ltd,261 McPherson J casually cites Trevor v Whitworth when he says that neither dividends 
paid out of capital, companies purchasing their own shares nor the unrestricted return of capital 
require specific statutory prohibition. Allowing them to be done in a manner noncompliant with the 
statutory conditions for an authorised reduction of capital, says his Honour, would be ‘contrary to the 
plain intention’ of the British Companies Act 1862, thus inconsistent with Parliament’s grant of ‘the 
right of trading in corporate form with limited liability’.262 
 
For the most part, the implications of this 19th century legal artefact, at the heart of the modern law 
on corporate finance in Australia, are never questioned. One of the few exceptions may be found in 
the words of Bryson J, writing curially that:  
 
The principles of law relating to the incapacity of a limited company to return subscribed capital … appear to be 
so deeply entrenched in company law now that they should not be related strictly to implications from the terms 
of current company legislation, which in fact differs substantially in context from the legislation considered in 
Trevor v Whitworth, particularly with respect to limitations on the objects for which a company may employ its 
funds. As a historical fact legislation relating to those limitations … were quite important for the evolution of 
this part of the law, but the law is now independent of its origins ...263 
 
With this description one can have no quarrel. But can one relate the doctrine of capital maintenance 
to the terms of early companies legislation?  
 
According to Kavass, the history of Australian companies legislation is for the most part a fairly 
faithful repetition of the most recent history of British companies legislation.264 Occasionally, the 
Australian legislatures were inclined to travel down a different path, and Kavass lists as examples 
statutes enabling the formation of limited liability partnerships, which were enacted by some of the 
Australian colonies in the early 1850s, and the concept of no-liability companies, introduced in the 
1870s.265 However, he calls these sparks of originality an exception to the general rule, maintaining 
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that in general the Australian legislatures were content merely to adopt and transcribe British 
companies legislation.266 
 
2.5.1 Earliest Statutory Antecedents 
 
The Bankers’ Contracts Confirmation Act 1839 (NSW)267 was the first Act of general application 
relating to joint stock companies in colonial Australia, and bears an obvious familial relationship to 
the British Trading Partnerships Act 1841.268 This Act was deemed also to be in force in the colonies 
of Victoria269 and Queensland.270 It gave the government’s imprimatur to ‘divers Associations and 
Copartnerships consisting of more than six members or shareholders’, which had been formed ‘for 
the purpose of being engaged in and carrying on the business of banking and divers other trades and 
dealings for gain and profit’.271 Such reference to the scope of company activity and the interests of 
shareholders — not to mention the motive of dividing profits — hints at the same rationale that 
supports the doctrine of ultra vires and capital maintenance. 
 
We saw that the British Companies Clauses Consolidation Act 1845 contained the earliest statutory 
rule that a company could not make a dividend whereby its capital stock would be in any degree 
reduced. Enacted for the regulation of statutory corporations and not the modern company limited by 
shares, courts have nonetheless dealt with dividends cases as though the provision represented the 
common law on dividend payments. South Australia introduced legislation upon similar lines in the 
Joint Stock Companies Ordnance 1847 (SA), although the other colonies never followed its example.  
 
2.5.2 Attainment of Limited Liability 
 
The British Joint Stock Companies Act 1856 can lay claim to being the first modern companies Act, 
and this fact may be confirmed by the great number of innovations that it introduced. One must take 
care to place this extraordinary statute at the crossroads of British companies legislation, where it 
stood with a foot on either side of the line dividing both the Joint Stock Companies Act 1844 and 
Limited Liability Act 1855 from the Companies Act 1862.  
 
The Act was drafted upon the same plan, of sections and schedules of tables and forms, as the British 
Companies Act 1862, and the Table B of the former would eventually become the latter’s famous 
Table A. It eliminated both provisional registration and the deed of settlement, which it replaced with 
the memorandum and articles of association,272 and included winding up provisions within its 
sections. 
 
We looked at winding up in the context of the solvency test for dividends provided for in the British 
Limited Liability Act 1855. Under the British Joint Stock Companies Act 1856, directors remained 
liable for paying a dividend knowing the company to be insolvent.273 The latter Act made no 
significant change to the construction of the term ‘insolvent’ — which had been used by the 
Parliament as early as 1745274 — for it provided that a company could be wound up by a court 
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whenever it was unable to pay its debts.275 Cases decided in the British and Australian courts after 
the passing of the Act continued to favour a cash-flow solvency rather than net assets test.276 Put 
another way, insolvent circumstances meant ‘not merely being behind the world, if an account were 
taken, but insolvency to the extent of being unable to pay just debts in the ordinary course of trade 
and business’.277 Of course, all solvency tests enquire, in one way or another, whether a company can 
pay its debts.278 However, in many foreign jurisdictions, including Canada, South Africa and New 
Zealand, a company may not satisfy the solvency test unless its assets are greater than its liabilities.279 
When the United States Code defines the term ‘insolvent’ it does so by describing it as the ‘financial 
condition such that the sum of such entity’s debts is greater than all of such entity’s property, at a fair 
valuation’.280 The connection between a company’s debts and the cash flows or assets with which 
they are to be repaid is often very different, and it is here that the source of the confusion lies. 
 
The Act was not without confusion. Although nearly all the minimum capital safeguards, which had 
survived the purges of the drafting committee to make it into the British Limited Liability Act 1855, 
had been excised — there was no minimum percentage paid up capital — a provision remained that 
the company be wound up in insolvency if three fourths of the capital was lost or became unavailable. 
281 Such capital adequacy test appears to have more in common with the balance sheet test, although 
encompassing difficulties which fall short of insolvency in any sense. The test clearly reflected the 
view of share capital as an assurance fund for creditors. 
 
In the second place, Table B included the first statutory prohibition on dividends paid from amounts 
other than profit in its model articles!282 Whereas the dividends provision in the British Joint Stock 
Companies Act 1844 contained a positive statement authorising a dividend out of the profits of a 
company,283 Table B was expressed negatively and prohibited any dividend from being paid unless 
the profits test was satisfied.  
 
South Australia,284 Western Australia285 and Tasmania286 each enacted statutes which resembled the 
British Joint Stock Companies Act 1856 — though South Australia did so crudely and 
simplistically.287 The South Australian statute is particularly interesting, since it adopted the ideas of 
the British Joint Stock Companies Act 1844 and Limited Liability Act 1855 but, as a product of local 
draftsmanship, bore no texture resemblance to either.288 These were the earliest colonial Australian 
statutes which made it possible to obtain incorporation by registration and gave incorporators the 
option of forming a limited liability company.289  
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They introduced the first dividends provision in Australia to focus on solvency,290 long predating the 
director’s duty to prevent insolvent trading on payment of dividends in s 588G of the Corporations 
Act and beating the Corporations Amendment (Corporate Reporting Reform) Act 2010 (Cth) to the 
punch by almost a century and a half. Under the provisions, directors would be personally liable for 
the amount of the dividend paid when the corporation was insolvent. Any company could be wound 
up by a court whenever the company was unable to pay its debts291 or three fourths of the capital of 
the company had been lost or became unavailable.292 As with their British counterpart, model articles 
were appended to the Western Australian and Tasmanian statutes which cautioned business that the 
payment of dividends from amounts other than profit would not be condoned.293 
 
2.5.3 The First General Companies Acts Consolidations 
 
Australian current companies legislation descends from the British Companies Act 1862, which we 
have seen was used, in Guinness v Land Corporation of Ireland, by the Court of Appeal to found the 
concept of capital as a fund for the protection of creditors. The enactments which appear to have been 
based on this Act include the Companies Act 1863 (Qld),294 Companies Statute 1864 (Vic),295 
Companies Act 1864 (SA),296 Companies Act 1869 (Tas),297 Companies Act 1874 (NSW) and 
Companies Act 1893 (WA).298 The New South Wales and West Australian statutes appear also to 
have been based on the British Companies Act 1867, the statute which first enabled a company to 
reduce its capital under strictly defined conditions.  
 
Schedule 1 of the colonial Australian statutes reproduced the same model set of regulations as the 
British Companies Act 1862, including the prohibition on paying dividends out of capital.299 All 
companies were presumed to have adopted the articles in sch 1 but, if they preferred, they could reject 
or modify any provision of the table.300 
 
2.5.3.1 Court-Sanctioned Reduction of Capital: Does it Recognise the Presumption of a Rule 
against Capital Reduction?  
 
The New South Wales and Western Australian Acts required that, in the case of a company where 
the liability of the shareholders was limited to the amount unpaid on their shares, the memorandum 
should contain the amount of the capital with which the company proposed to be registered, divided 
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into shares of a certain fixed amount.301 The Acts provided that such a company might increase its 
capital and divide it into shares of larger amount than the existing shares, or convert its paid-up shares 
into stock, but that ‘save as aforesaid and save as is hereinafter provided in the case of a change of 
name no alteration shall be made by any company in the conditions contained in its memorandum of 
association’.302  
 
Such corporate name change referred to the process by which a company could lawfully reduce its 
capital by appending ‘and reduced’ to its name for a period.303 Experience had obviously shown that 
circumstances might occur in which a reduction of the capital would be expedient. Provision was 
therefore made enabling a company to reduce its capital with the sanction of the court,304 after it had 
given due notice to creditors,305 and upon such terms as the court might think fit to impose.306  
 
We may well say, as Lord Herschell did in Trevor v Whitworth, that nothing could be clearer than 
these ‘carefully-worded provisions’ in demonstrating how ‘inconsistent with the very constitution of 
a joint stock company, with limited liability, the right to reduce its capital was considered to be’;307 
nor is there much need now to challenge such a construction. To do so would, in the words of the 
High Court of Australia in Australasian Oil Exploration Ltd v Lachberg, offend against a 
‘fundamental principle of company law that the whole of the subscribed capital of a company … shall 
remain available for the discharge of its liabilities’308 — put another way, the doctrine of capital 
maintenance — unless diminished by expenditure upon the company’s objects or by means 
sanctioned by statute. Such principle was ‘beyond question’ and it was ‘unnecessary to refer to the 
many authorities which have restated it over many years’.309 It should be noted that the principle is a 
concept narrower than the rules prohibiting the reduction of capital alluded to in Lord Herschell’s 
decision, although both are linked. Whilst any capital reduction may impair the maintenance of 
capital, not all transactions which may impair capital maintenance offend against the rules prohibiting 
the reduction of capital — for example, payment of a dividend when assets are of less value than the 
original capital. 
 
Though largely settled, the doctrine of capital maintenance and the rules prohibiting the reduction of 
capital would continue to evolve. The case of Australasian Oil Exploration Ltd v Lachberg is 
interesting, for example, because the company attempted unsuccessfully to avoid the reduction of 
capital prohibition by selling its assets to another company, in return for the purchase price being paid 
directly to its shareholders. The authorities during the following 35 years reflected the adoption of 
developments in accounting practices,310 and were summarised first in the Uniform Companies 
Acts311 and ultimately in the former s 254T and ch 2J of the Corporations Act. The subsequent history 
of the adoption of these case law developments by the company law, the circumscribing of the scope 
of the funds from which companies could elect to pay dividends by the development of Australian 
Accounting Standards, and the enactment in 2010 of a new dividends provision, belongs to the recent 
history of this branch of company law and must be dealt with in another chapter.  
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2.6 Summary and Some Concluding Remarks 
 
Received knowledge312 tells us that the doctrine of maintenance of capital exists and operates for the 
protection of creditors of a company limited by shares, not the company’s shareholders.313 This is a 
convenient fiction and not at all reflective of the history of the doctrine. 
 
Before a company could be registered with limited liability, before specific statutory prohibition of 
the reduction of share capital, even before incorporation, there were already some things that directors 
and shareholders could not do. They could not authorise dividends to be paid out of capital, or the 
company to buy back its own shares, or the unrestricted return of capital to shareholders.  
 
These things were fraudulent misrepresentations, but what misrepresentations? In the first place, they 
were the false statements, put forth to the public at large, that the affairs of a company were in a very 
prosperous and flourishing state, which had led persons joining the company to become its 
shareholders. Declaring a large dividend at a time when the affairs of the company were in a very 
embarrassed state had been held to be a fraudulent practice before,314 but in Burnes v Pennel the 
House of Lords went further, declaring any dividend paid out of capital to be fraudulently made. 
 
This chapter has explored much of the history of commerce and the merchant enterprise which led 
first to the business practice and then to the assumption at law that a dividend should be paid out of 
profits. This was a revolution linked to the growth of circulating capital and the rise of joint stock 
company, which brought along with it the deed of settlement, a permanent stock divided into 
transmissible and transferable shares,315 a management entrusted to directors and the participation of 
a public often considered gullible in the shadow of the South Sea Bubble.   
 
Some of these developments were reflected in chartered and statutory corporations, but in cases more 
numerous, the unincorporated association was the prime mover of this innovation. So too with the 
repurposing of the doctrine of maintenance of capital for the protection of creditors.  
 
The struggle for limited liability is well covered elsewhere,316 but it was well worth revisiting to show 
that the freedom to contract has left its indelible mark both on it and the early common law rules 
governing the maintenance of capital. In Evans v Coventry the Court of Chancery considered that not 
only shareholders but creditors too might be persuaded by the declaration of a dividend as to the 
prosperity of an insurance company, and that on such faith they could be induced to enter into a 
contract with a company unable to meet its obligations.  
 
The law of fraudulent conveyance had come as far as it could; how fortunate, then, that the doctrine 
of ultra vires was ready to continue carrying the torch. Ultra vires was a much more flexible doctrine, 
able to generalise the company dividend restriction into a common law prohibition on the return of 
capital applying irrespective of the form of the return. The general introduction of limited liability 
had made every creditor a party to the company’s memorandum of association. The cases which 
followed referred less and less to the contract, first entered into separately with each creditor and later 
by Parliament on behalf of the public, and more and more to the scope of its objects as described in 
its memorandum. It was to the latter that the House of Lords referred exhaustively in Trevor v 
Whitworth after reviewing the general companies legislation and holding that a return of share capital 
to a shareholder is illegal. 
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This chapter reviewed the legislation as well, and illustrated a pattern in the Australian colonies of 
repetition of this history. These legislative developments were not very significantly challenged until 
par value shares were abolished and the reduction of capital provisions were liberalised by Company 
Law Review Act 1998 (Cth). But the debates which would eventually lead to that statute and from it 
to the one we have today belong to the subject of the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER 3: CURRENT AUSTRALIAN APPROACH  
 
3.1 General 
 
The current dividends provision continues to undergo reform. Submissions closed at the end of March 
2013 on exposure draft legislation intending to ‘further clarify the test for payment of dividends’.317 
Until 28 June 2010, s 254T of the Corporations Act and its predecessors provided that a dividend 
could ‘only be paid out of profits’ of a company.318 Since then, the dividends provision has been 
redirected to focus on more flexible requirements including an ‘assets greater than liabilities’ test and 
what could be considered, at least in the opinion of some commentators,319 company solvency, 
although such description of the ‘no material prejudice to creditors’ test may ultimately be too 
simplistic and misleading. 
 
The draft Explanatory Memorandum to the Corporations Legislation Amendment (Remuneration 
Disclosures and Other Measures) Bill 2012 (Cth) states that the exposure draft contains measures to 
amend the current dividends provision to allow companies to either declare or pay a dividend, to link 
the provision more closely to company solvency and to allow non-reporting entities to calculate net 
assets with reference to financial records when applying the ‘assets greater than liabilities’ test.320 
What the exposure draft legislation also proposes, although without any comment which specifically 
outlines the reasoning behind the move, is the removal of the current dividend provision’s 
requirements for ‘fair and reasonable to shareholders’ and ‘no material prejudice to creditors’ tests.321 
Unfortunately, the legislature’s summary ignores serious defects and unintended consequences in the 
exposure draft legislation, the further consideration of which forms part of the subject of this chapter. 
 
The first section of this chapter deals with the old profits test and its shortcomings, most of which 
have likely been preserved in the current and proposed dividends provisions. The next section 
introduces the key problems with the 2010 reforms, including the problems which have been 
identified by the federal government and, perhaps more importantly, the problems which remain 
unidentified. The remainder of the chapter evaluates the proposed dividends provision in the exposure 
draft legislation, and concludes that reform of a larger and more ambitious scope is needed urgently 
to address the concerns of companies, creditors and shareholders.   
 
  
                                                     
317 Ripoll (above n 35). 
318 Cf Corporations Act 1896 (Vic) s 48(1); Corporations Act (n 3) s 254T, later amended by Corporations Amendment 
Act 2010 (n 38) sch 1 item 7. The former s 254T stated the profits test in a single sentence: ‘[a] dividend may only be 
paid out of profits of the company’; however, the original rule read that ‘[n]o dividend shall be payable to the shareholders 
of any company except out of the profits arising from the business of such company’: Corporations Act 1896 (Vic) s 
48(1) (emphasis added).  
319 Bowen, ‘Cutting Red Tape’ (Media Release, n 17); Laws of Australia (n 17, (Thomson Reuters) [4.3.1000]. Keith 
Fletcher, the author currently updating Thomson Reuter’s looseleaf service, describes redirecting the focus of s 254T ‘to 
“surplus assets” and “solvency”’ as the major change wrought by the current provision. 
320 Explanatory Memorandum, Corporations Legislation Amendment (Remuneration Disclosures and Other Measures) 
Bill 2012 (Cth) 4 (‘Explanatory Memorandum, Corporations Amendment Bill 2012’). The withdrawn draft Corporations 
Amendment Bill 2014 (n 35), which was released for consultation between 10 April – 16 May 2014, proposed alternative 
amendments for the repeal of the net assets test and the replacement of the current s 254T ‘with a pure solvency test’ in 
terms similar to that a contained in s 95A of the Corporations Act (n 3): Explanatory Memorandum, Corporations 
Legislation Amendment (Deregulatory and Other Measures) Bill 2014 (Cth), as at 10 April 2014, 2 [7]. These proposed 
amendments were omitted from the enacted Corporations Amendment Bill 2014 (n 35), and s 254T remains as amended 
in 2010. 
321 Explanatory Memorandum, Corporations Amendment Bill 2012 (n 320) 9. The ‘fair and reasonable to shareholders’ 
and ‘no material prejudice to creditors’ tests would also have been removed from the alternative proposed s 254T under 
the withdrawn draft Corporations Amendment Bill 2014 (n 35), similarly without any comment. 
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3.2 History and Reasons for the Repeal of the Profits Test 
 
The rule that a dividend ‘may only be paid out of profits’322 is consistent with common law principles 
that were developed and applied by Australian courts before any statutory intervention in the field.323 
The profits test had early been expressed in most articles of association (including the model articles 
of Table A,324 which were included in company legislation by the Australian colonies between 1864–
93, and upon which the replaceable rules are based); however, since adoption of the articles was 
voluntary, this rule did not have the force of statute.325  
 
The first statutory prohibition against paying dividends, except out of profits, was contained in a 
provision enacted for the regulation of no-liability mining companies in the colony of Victoria;326 
however, the Australian courts treated the rule as representing the general common law position 
regarding dividend payments.327 General and direct legislative authority for the proposition that 
dividends may only be paid out of profits was provided with the passing of the Corporations Act 1896 
(Vic),328 which extended the operation of the rule from mining companies to ‘trading companies’. It 
has no statutory counterpart in the United Kingdom, although it reflects the broad principle enunciated 
in the British courts much earlier.329  
 
Tasmania followed the example of Victoria in 1920.330 When the Uniform Companies Acts 1961–62, 
which were based largely on the British Companies Act 1929,331 were adopted by the Australian states 
to supersede state statutes, the states followed Victorian and Tasmanian legislative developments, 
expressly providing that ‘[n]o dividend shall be payable to the shareholders of any company except 
out of profits …’332  
                                                     
322 Corporations Act (n 3) s 254T, later amended by Corporations Amendment Act 2010 (n 38) sch 1 item 7. 
323 See, eg, Phillips v Melbourne & Castlemaine Soap & Candle Co Ltd (1890) 16 VLR 111, 113 (Hood J) (‘Phillips v 
Melbourne & Castlemaine’); Mackie v Clough (1891) 17 VLR 493, 495 (Webb J) (‘Mackie v Clough’). For the British 
cases to which the courts referred see Re National Funds Assurance (n 159); Flitcroft’s Case (n 55); Lee v Neuchatel 
Asphalte (1889) 41 Ch D 1 (‘Lee v Neuchatel Asphalte’). 
324 See, eg, Companies Act 1864 (Vic) sch 1 table A, item 73; Companies Act 1864 (SA) sch 1 table A, item 73; Companies 
Act 1869 (Tas) sch 1 table A, item 73; Companies Act 1874 (NSW) sch 1 table A, item 73; Companies Act 1893 (WA) 
sch 1 table A, item 73. Table A provided that ‘[n]o dividend shall be payable except out of the profits arising from the 
business of the company’. For the British statute upon which these model articles were based see Companies Act 1862 (n 
167) sch 1 table A item 73. 
325 See, eg, Companies Act 1862 (n 167) ss 14, 50. 
326 Corporations Act 1890 (Vic) s 236. Section 236 provided that ‘[n]o dividend shall be payable to the shareholders of 
any company except out of the profits arising from the business of such company’. 
327 Mackie v Clough (n 323) 495 (Webb J). Holding that the directors were liable both under the Companies Act 1890 s 
236, and under the general law, his Honour stated that ‘[t]he English cases to which I have been referred, go on the broad 
principle that dividends are not to be paid out of the capital of a company, and, if they are, the directors are liable to refund 
them. Here we have a statutory provision to that effect; but, even outside the Statute, the directors are liable’. 
328 Corporations Act 1896 (Vic) s 48(1), amending Corporations Act 1890 (Vic) pt 1. 
329 See, eg, Burnes v Pennell (n 104); Re National Funds Assurance (n 159). 
330 Companies Act 1920 (Tas) s 271(1). For the Victorian statute upon which this provision was directly based see 
Companies Act 1915 (Vic) s 277(1). 
331 Companies Act 1929, 19 & 20 Geo 5, c 23. 
332 See, eg, Companies Act 1961 (Vic) s 376(1); Companies Act 1961 (NSW) s 376(1); Companies Act 1961 (WA) s 
376(1); Companies Act 1962 (SA) s 376(1); Companies Ordinance 1962 (ACT) s 376(1); Companies Ordinance 1963 
(NT) s 376(1).  For the Victorian and Tasmanian statutes upon which these provisions were directly based see Companies 
Act 1958 (Vic) s 261(1); Companies Act 1959 (Tas) s 316. 
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3.2.1 Why the Law Was Changed 
 
3.2.1.1 Lack of a Definition of the Term ‘Profits’ 
 
Despite statutory recognition of the profits test by Parliament, company legislation still relies on 
judge-made law for the meaning of ‘capital’ and ‘profits’.333 The lack of guidance about, or a 
definition of, the term ‘profits’ in the Corporations Act was a key concern which led to a move away 
from the profits test.334 Also of key concern were that ‘the legal precedents on this issue are outdated 
and complex and not in line with current accounting principles’.335  
 
The term ‘profits’ had never been comprehensively defined by the courts,336 and required the 
application of complex rules to determine the gain on ‘fixed or capital assets’ and ‘current or 
circulating assets’,337 which made it difficult for directors to understand their legal requirements when 
paying dividends.338 The case of Bond v Barrow Haematite Steel Co339serves as an example. In this 
case Farwell J cautioned that there could be ‘no single definition of the word “profits” which will fit 
all cases’, although his Lordship referred to as persuasive a statement in Marshall’s Principles of 
Economics.340 This work, which was the most influential economics treatise of the time,341 stated that: 
 
when a man is engaged in business, his PROFITS for the year are the excess of his receipts from his business 
during the year over his outlay for his business; the difference between the value of his stock and plant at the 
end and at the beginning of the year being taken as part of his receipts or as part of his outlay, according as there 
has been an increase or decrease of value.342 
 
His Lordship was precluded from adopting this classic statement in its entirety by the authorities 
which were binding on him;343 specifically, that the circulating capital ‘must be kept up’.344 
Marshall’s definition of ‘stock and plant’ would appear to include both fixed and circulating capital; 
however, the general common law position regarding dividend payments struck a distinction between 
the two. Before a dividend could be paid, companies did not need to provide for the replacement of 
capital lost through the decline in value of a fixed asset;345 however, losses of circulating assets had 
to be taken into account before profits available for distribution were ascertained.346 Commenting in 
obiter some seventy year later, Mason J described this ‘obscure distinction’ as one of several 
                                                     
333 See, eg, Webb v Australian Deposit & Mortgage Bank Ltd (1910) 11 CLR 223, 241 (Higgins J) (‘Webb v Australian 
Deposit’); Melbourne Trust Ltd v Commissioner of Taxes (Vic) (1912) 15 CLR 274, 293 (Barton J). 
334 Explanatory Memorandum, Corporations Amendment Bill 2010 (n 1) [3.2]. 
335 Ibid. 
336 See, eg, Webb v Australian Deposit (n 333) 241 (Higgins J). His Honour stated that ‘the meaning of “profits” is not 
rigid and absolute; it is flexible and relative to each company; and in ascertaining the meaning of the word in any context, 
we must consider the whole context’. For the British case to which the Court referred upon established judicial reluctance 
to precisely define ‘capital’ and ‘profits’ see Dovey v Corey [1901] AC 477, 488 (Lord Macnaghten). His Lordship warned 
‘I do not think it desirable for any tribunal to do that which Parliament has abstained from doing — that is, to formulate 
precise rules for the guidance or embarrassment of business men in the conduct of business affairs. There never has been, 
and I think there never will be, much difficulty in dealing with any particular case on its own facts and circumstances; 
and, speaking for myself, I rather doubt the wisdom of attempting to do more.’ 
337 For a British case considering the early authorities see, eg, Ammonia Soda Co Ltd v Chamberlain [1918] 1 Ch 266, 
286–7 (Swinfen Eady LJ). 
338 Explanatory Memorandum, Corporations Amendment Bill 2010 (n 1) 19 [3.2]. 
339 Bond v Barrow Haematite Steel Co [1902] 1 Ch 353, 366 (Farwell J) (‘Bond v Barrow Haematite’). 
340 Ibid. 
341 Roger A Arnold, Economics (Thomson South-Western, 2004) 3. 
342 Alfred Marshall, Principles of Economics (Macmillan, 1890) vol 1, 142. 
343 Bond v Barrow Haematite (n 339) 366 (Farwell J). 
344 Verner v General & Commercial Investment Trust [1894] 2 Ch 239, 266 (Lindley LJ) (‘Verner’). 
345 Lee v Neuchatel Asphalte (n 323) 24 (Lindley LJ).  
346 Verner (n 344) 266 (Lindley LJ). 
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complexities which had emerged in relation to the application of the profits test,347  and the need to 
apply such old and complex case law was a key motivation behind the deletion of the provision in s 
249T that a dividend could ‘only be paid out of profits’ in 2010.348  
 
It is curious that, rather than simplifying and defining the term ‘profits’, the proposal was simply to 
discard it. Additionally, to the extent that the common law rules about what is divisible as profit are 
in disagreement with modern accounting principles, the argument may be made that the profits test 
requires update rather than abandonment.349  
 
3.2.1.2 Increased Volatility of Reported Profits Following Australia’s Adoption of International 
Financial Reporting Standards 
 
What may have ultimately encouraged the government to abolish the profits test was a decline in 
average corporate dividend payments of 25 per cent in 2009,350 the year which immediately followed 
the 2007-08 global financial crisis. A number of Australian reporting entities were prevented from 
paying dividends in 2009 ‘despite healthy cash flows’.351 Accordingly, the 2010 reforms were 
intended to enable 40 per cent of big companies to more easily pay dividends to shareholders.352 
 
The fund from which dividends may be paid has been restricted by changes over time to the nature 
of the accounting principles for the calculation of profits. Company profitability was particularly 
impacted as a result of the adoption of the International Financial Reporting Standards, which are 
linked to realised or, more importantly, unrealised gains or losses on fair value measurements, by the 
Australian Accounting Standards Board in 2005.353 This increasing volatility in the reported profits 
of Australian companies may have little or nothing to do with a company’s real performance or state 
of affairs, and thus little or no impact on the solvency or ongoing operations of the company. Put 
another way, a company with sufficient cash to meet its debts and pay a dividend may be prevented 
from doing so because non-cash expenses, including depreciation of property, plant and equipment, 
and impairment losses on intangible assets such as goodwill, might have eliminated the accounting 
profits of the company.354  
 
Concerns that it is increasingly difficult to understand the ‘true underlying performance’ of a 
company from an examination of its statutory financial reports have driven a trend towards companies 
electing to present ‘non-statutory’ measures of performance.355 In 2009, 84 per cent of ASX 100 
companies presented some form of measure — described variously as ‘underlying profit’, 
‘normalised profit’, ‘EBITDA/EBITA’356 or ‘cash earnings’ — which was different to profits 
                                                     
347 Industrial Equity Ltd v Blackburn (1977) 137 CLR 567, 576 (Mason J) (‘Industrial Equity v Blackburn’). Another 
complexity which his Honour referred to was the question whether the profits test refers to the amount of nominal capital 
which had been paid up or to assets in which the paid-up capital has been invested. Some of the earlier cases seemed to 
turn upon the former view, while the later cases appeared to proceed upon the latter view. 
348 Explanatory Memorandum, Corporations Amendment Bill 2010 (n 1) 19 [3.2]. 
349 Law Council of Australia, Submission to Treasury, Corporations Legislation Amendment (Remuneration Disclosures 
and Other Measures) Bill 2012 Exposure Draft — Proposed Amendments to Section 254T of the Corporation Act, 15 
March 2013, 3 (Submission for ‘Corporations Amendment Bill 2012’). 
350 Patrick Durkin, ‘Dividend Mess To Be Corrected’, The Australian Financial Review, 28 November 2011, 3. 
351 Jason Barnes and Craig Semple, ‘Practical Implications of the New Requirements for Payment of Dividends’ (2010) 
13(10) Inhouse Counsel 119, 119. 
352 Durkin (n 350) 3. 
353 Explanatory Memorandum, Corporations Amendment Bill 2010 (n 1) 19 [3.2]. 
354 See, eg, Australian Accounting Standards Board, Property, Plant and Equipment, AASB 116, 30 October 2009; 
Australian Accounting Standards Board, Impairment of Assets, AASB 136, 1 December 2009; Australian Accounting 
Standards Board, Intangible Assets, AASB 138, 30 October 2010 (‘AASB 138’). 
355 ‘Underlying Profits Survey Report 2008-09’ (Survey Report, KPMG, 4 March 2010) 3 (‘KPMG, “Underlying Profits 
2008–09”’). 
356 EBITDA means earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortisation. 
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calculated under the accounting standards.357 Of the companies which presented one of these non-
statutory measures of performance, 76 per cent presented a measure that showed a better financial 
performance when compared to the accounting standards measure of performance,358 and 35 per cent 
of companies turned their accounting standards losses into non-statutory profits.359    
 
One of the consistencies in the adjustments made to arrive at a non-statutory measure of performance 
includes eliminating the impact of fair value accounting required by the International Financial 
Reporting Standards.360 Among ASX 100 companies, two of the five most common adjustments made 
over 2009-11 were for the ‘impairment of goodwill or other non-financial assets’ and ‘fair value 
movements in financial instruments’.361  
 
The incidence of impairment losses appears to be related to the impact of the economic climate.362 In 
2009, the economic downturn resulted in reassessments of the carrying values of assets, decreases in 
investment property values and negative movements in the fair value of financial instruments.363 This 
was consistent with the guidance of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission, which 
had indicated it would be contacting companies it believed should have incurred write-downs to 
‘better understand their impairment of assets processes’ and ‘determination of fair values’.364 In the 
context of continuous disclosure obligations, it was expected that directors would maintain a strong 
focus on the impact of market movements on asset values.365  
 
Stock market values had fallen by approximately 40 per cent in 2008, which implied a fall in the 
value of assets and the need to carefully examine carrying values, so that directors could ‘fully 
understand the forecasts and valuations being presented to them’ and satisfy themselves ‘that the asset 
values remain sustainable, defendable and supportable’.366 If directors could not, then they had to 
determine the extent of the appropriate write-down.367 However, as economic conditions improved 
in 2010, reversals of impairments, increases in the values or properties and positive movements in 
financial instruments resulted in accounting standards profits increasing at a significantly higher rate 
than underlying profits.368 This historical observation supports the use of non-statutory measures of 
performance to remove some of the volatility associated with accounting standards which are 
increasingly linked to fair value.369 
 
Although it would appear reasonable to expect that the amount of impairment and fair value 
adjustments recognised will featured to a lesser degree as the economy improves,370 non-cash ‘add 
backs’ to accounting standards profits are likely to remain in excess relative to ‘minuses’. As an 
example, despite an improving economic environment, 72 per cent of ASX 100 companies presented 
                                                     
357 KPMG, ‘Underlying Profits 2008–09’ (n 355) 3. 
358 Ibid 2. 
359 Ibid 4. 
360 Ibid. 
361 Ibid; ‘Underlying Profits Report FY10’ (Survey Report, KPMG, 20 January 2011) 5 (KPMG ‘Underlying Profits 
FY10’); ‘Underlying Profits Report 2011’ (Survey Report, KPMG, 20 December 2011) 5. 
362 See, eg, KPMG, ‘Underlying Profits 2008–09’ (n 355) 4. 
363 See, eg, ibid 4, 12. 
364 ‘ASIC Review of 30 June 2008 Reports and Areas of Focus for Upcoming Reporting Period’, (Media Release, No 
218, 3 December 2008)  
<http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/asic.nsf/byheadline/08-218+ASIC+review+of+30+June+2008+reports+and+areas+of+ 
focus+for+upcoming+reporting+period>. 
365 Ibid 
366 Australian Institute of Company Directors, ‘Deciding on Fair Value’ (2009) 7(1) Boardroom Report 1, 1. 
367 Ibid. 
368 KPMG, ‘Underlying Profits FY10’ (n 361) 3. In 2010, ASX 100 companies showed a 60 per cent year-on-year 
improvement in accounting standards profits, compared with only showed a 17 per cent improvement in statutory profits. 
369 Ibid. 
370 Ibid. 
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underlying profits which were higher than accounting standards profits in 2010371 — down only 
slightly from 76 per cent in 2009. The Australian accounting standards require intangible assets to be 
amortised over their useful lives.372 Although companies may chose a revaluation rather than cost 
model, revaluation increases are credited directly to equity under the asset revaluation reserve 
account, whilst revaluation decreases are recognised immediately in the profit or loss.373 This may 
lead to a significant decrease in reported profits, without any counterbalancing improvement during 
periods when the market values of the intangible assets and the company have increased.374   
 
3.2.1.3 Incompatibility with the View that the Capital Maintenance Doctrine has been Discredited 
 
It is clear from the Explanatory Memorandum that the reform of the dividends provision was also 
driven by an inconsistency between the profits test and ‘the trend to lessen the capital maintenance 
doctrine in Australia’.375 This assumption is popular, and it may now be difficult to reverse, but it is, 
with respect, inaccurate and conceptually flawed.  
 
The proposition that dividends must not be paid out of capital, and the law which surrounds it, has its 
origins in the Joint Stock Companies Ordinance 1847 (SA), which related to statutory corporations. 
This was the only statute in Australia to be based on the British Companies Clauses Consolidation 
Act 1845.376 It set out the standard provisions normally included in private Acts of incorporation, 
which were generally obtained by public utilities and railways that required certain compulsory 
powers.377 Such provisions were intended to apply after incorporation by reference into new private 
Acts, thus making the procedure shorter and cheaper.  
 
Section 121 of the South Australian statute provided that ‘[t]he company shall not make any dividend 
whereby their capital stock will be in any degree reduced’, unless by way of return made with the 
assent of all the mortgagees and creditors of the company.378 The legislation proved unnecessary and 
unpopular in South Australia, applying to only one statutory corporation, the Adelaide City and Port 
Railway.379 The British statute, which it was based on, was marginally more popular; its provisions 
were incorporated by reference in at least seven individual private Acts which established public 
utilities and railways in the colony of Victoria.380  
 
The common law on dividend payments may be ‘much more accurately expressed by saying that 
dividends cannot be paid out of capital, than by saying that they can only be paid out of profits’.381 
However, it is difficult to reconcile the aim of capital maintenance, which leads to the inference that 
a company must keep up its capital, with the fact that a company may pay a dividend out of current 
year profits despite having prior year losses which have not been made good by appropriation or 
application of those profits. Indeed, a company may even pay a dividend out of profits achieved in 
                                                     
371 Ibid. 
372 AASB 138 (n 354) [97]. 
373 AASB 138 (n 354) [72]–[87].  
374 See Australian Institute of Company Directors, Submission to the Australian Accounting Research Foundation, 
Payment of Dividends under the Corporations Act 2001 (5 July 2002) 11. 
375 Explanatory Memorandum, Corporations Amendment Bill 2010 (n 1) 19 [3.2]. 
376 Companies Clauses Consolidation Act (n 182). 
377 See generally Kavass, Australian Supplement to Gower (n 264) 21. 
378 Joint Stock Companies Ordinance 1847 (SA) s 121. 
379 Port Adelaide Railway Act 1850 (SA) s 4. 
380 See Melbourne, Mount Alexander, and Murray River Railway Company Act 1853 (Vic) s 16; Melbourne Exchange 
Company Act 1855 (Vic) s 2; Castlemaine Gas Company Act 1859 (Vic) s 8; Bendigo Gas Company Act 1860 (Vic) s 8; 
Collingwood Fitz Roy and District Gas and Coke Company’s Act 1860 (Vic) s 8; Melbourne and Suburban Railway 
Company Act 1862 (Vic) s 42; Melbourne and Hobson’s Bay United Railway Company Act 1865 (Vic) s 1; South 
Melbourne Gas Company Act 1872 (Vic) s 9. 
381 Verner (n 344) 266 (Lindley LJ). 
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some prior year and carried to a reserve, even though it has made losses in the current year or has 
accumulated losses from prior years which subsequent profits have yet to extinguish.382  
 
It is only a matter of prudence, and not law, whether dividends should be paid when the net assets of 
a company are of less value than the original capital.383 Perhaps the shortest way of expressing this 
distinction is to say that the profits test may be seen as a rule prohibiting the reduction of capital, a 
concept which is both narrower and the complement to the capital maintenance doctrine.384 Although 
the capital maintenance doctrine is often considered primarily a creditor protection,385 the rules 
regarding reductions of capital, and particularly constraints on payments of dividends, arose 
historically as an answer to concerns about frauds on shareholders and the public perpetrated by 
directors and management.386 This historical development was traced in Chapter 2. 
 
It would be inaccurate to say that the prohibition on unlawful reductions of capital has been lessened 
by the statutory reforms of the First Corporate Law Simplification Act 1995 (Cth)387 and the Company 
Law Review Act 1998 (Cth).388 As set out in the previous chapter, the better view appears to be that 
the rule remains ‘fundamental to the shape of company law’.389 Statutory law reform introduced 
provisions for the reduction of capital and buying back of shares,390 authorising that which, absent 
such provisions, would offend the rule. However, the presence of such provisions in company 
legislation only confirms that what they authorise would otherwise be prohibited by common law 
principles. 
 
For these reasons, the policy rationale which should be preferred is that which was provided by the 
Australian Accounting Research Foundation (‘AARF’), which was one of the first institutions or 
bodies in the modern era to recommend the adoption in Australia of a solvency test for determining 
the amount available for distribution as a dividend. In a position paper released in 2002, the 
Foundation reasoned: 
 
It is consistent with Australia’s past corporate law simplification in terms of share buy-backs, and capital 
reductions and no par value shares, is consistent with recent trends in overseas jurisdictions and would also 
reinforce directors’ responsibilities in terms of a company’s solvency.391 
 
                                                     
382 Glenville Pastoral Co Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1963) 109 CLR 199, 207–8 (Kitto, Taylor and Owen JJ). 
However, if the directors or the general meeting of shareholders (whichever is the appropriate body), ‘by a positive and 
final decision, apply distributable profits to make good lost share capital’, then the amount of profit is carried to a capital 
account, and loses its identity as a detachable amount of profit; and the company cannot use the amount for the payment 
of dividends, any more than it can use for that purpose share capital. For the British case to which the Court referred see 
Re Hoare & Co Ltd [1904] 2 Ch 208, 213–4 (Romer LJ). 
383 Phillips v Melbourne & Castlemaine (n 323) 113 (Hood J). For the British case to which the Court referred see Lee v 
Neuchatel Asphalte (n 323) 22–3 (Lindley LJ). His Lordship dismissed the idea that anything precludes payment of 
dividends so long as the assets are of less value than the original capital, stating ‘so long as they pay their creditors, there 
is no reason why they should not go on and divide profits, so far as I can see, although every shilling of the capital may 
be lost’. 
384 Cilliers (n 316). 
385 See, eg, Nicron (n 385) 229 (Bryson J). 
386 See, eg, Burnes v Pennell (n 104) 524–5 (Lord Campbell). 
387 The First Corporate Law Simplification Act 1995 (Cth) amended the laws relating to proprietary companies, simplified 
company registers and liberalised the share buy-back provisions by removing the requirement to seek court approval. 
388 The Company Law Review Act 1998 (Cth) made companies limited both by shares and guarantee no longer registrable, 
abolished par value shares and liberalised reduction of capital provisions. 
389Ford’s Principles (n 2, online at July 2012) [18.090.6]. 
390 Corporations Act (n 3) pt 2J.1. 
391 ‘Payment of Dividends under the Corporations Act 2001’ (Position Paper, Legislation Review Board, Australian 
Accounting Research Foundation, December 2002) 3 (‘AARF “Payment of Dividends” (Position Paper)’), replacing 
‘Payment of Dividends under the Corporations Act 2001’ (Discussion Paper, Legislation Review Board, Australian 
Accounting Research Foundation, 2002) (‘AARF “Payment of Dividends” (Discussion Paper)’). 
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3.3 Recommendations of the AARF 
 
The AARF was established in 1966, as the Accountancy Research Foundation, by the Institute of 
Chartered Accountants in Australia (‘ICAA’) and the former Australian Society of Accountants.392 It 
undertook a range of technical and research activities on behalf of the accounting profession as a 
whole, including the development of accounting and auditing standards in the period before they were 
made the sole responsibility of the federal government393 and Australia adopted the IFRS.394 The 
Foundation was finally disbanded in July 2006.395 
 
The 2002 position paper prepared by the Legislative Review Board of the Foundation has strongly 
influenced the Australian debate on reform of the law of dividends. The Foundation’s paper has 
received widespread stakeholder support since shortly after its release,396 a fact which it appears 
Parliament has noticed.397 However, it was not until August 2008 that Treasury undertook ‘targeted 
consultation’ about the Foundation’s recommendation that Australia move away from the profits test 
with key stakeholders, most of whom it found were ‘generally supportive of providing greater 
flexibility for paying dividends while maintaining appropriate safeguards’.398 The federal 
government’s first public reference to the Foundation’s recommendations appeared in the draft 
Explanatory Memorandum to the Corporations Amendment (Corporate Reporting Reform) Bill 
2010.399 
 
Prior to the 2010 reforms, there were some stakeholders who were vocal in their opposition to the 
proposed abolition of the profits test.400 The Foundation received submissions from two stakeholders, 
the identities of which it did not disclose, which ‘suggested that there should be an overriding 
principle which does not allow dividends to be paid by companies to exceed the amount of their 
profits’.401 The Foundation did not agree with these stakeholders’ submissions, asserting that there 
could be ‘no inherent or logical reason’ why the doctrine of capital maintenance should be retained 
for the purpose of the payment of dividends, and describing the profits test which the stakeholders 
had defended as ‘an artificial test which is based on an antiquated principle’.402 With respect, the 
profits test is far from artificial, having developed organically as part of the practices observed by at 
least those well-established and sound joint stock enterprises of the 18th century;403 and the test was 
enunciated in the early cases, specifically as a rule of company law preventing dividend payments 
made with the intent to deceive and defraud,404 before the advent of minimum capital requirements 
and the implied statutory prohibition on returning share capital. As Mason J pointed out in Industrial 
Equity Ltd v Blackburn, the profits test ‘was certainly designed to protect creditors and, I think, 
                                                     
392 Garry D Carnegie and Brendan T O’Connell, ‘Understanding the Responses of Professional Accounting Bodies to 
Crises: The Case of the Australian Profession in the 1960s’ (2012) 25(5) Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal 
835, 837. 
393 Ibid 854. The accounting standards become the sole responsibility of the federal government in 2000 and the auditing 
standards followed in 2006. 
394 Ibid. 
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396 See, eg, Group of 100, Submission to the Australian Accounting Research Foundation, Payment of Dividends under 
the Corporations Act 2001 (12 June 2002); Australian Institute of Company Directors, Submission to Treasury, Law 
Reform: Payment of Dividends (5 August 2004); Law Council of Australia, Submission to Treasury, Proposal for Reform 
of Section 254T of the Corporations Act (September 2004). 
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Dividends’ (n 391, Discussion Paper). 
401 Ibid 5 [1.7]. 
402 Ibid. 
403 DuBois, English Business Company (n 12) 363. 
404 See, eg, Stainbank v Fernley (n 314); Burnes v Pennell (n 104). 
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shareholders, more particularly where there is more than one class of shareholder in a company’.405 
What the profits test originally struck against were false statements of affairs and fictitiously 
enhanced share prices. 
 
Taking what is perhaps a dim view of the importance of the capital concept, the Foundation believed 
it irrelevant that the payment of a dividend or other distribution in excess of accumulated profits 
constitutes a return of capital. The Foundation asked: 
 
Why should a company not be permitted to return capital in that way (so long as the company is solvent)? The 
definition of what is capital is important, first, to enable a company to measure its profits for accounting and 
reporting purposes and tax purposes and, secondly, in some cases, to enable the identification of the correct tax 
treatment of distributions in the hands of shareholders. But these reasons have nothing to do with the basic 
question of whether a company should be permitted to make a distribution. That question should be based on 
solvency.406 
 
However, the definition of capital is important not only for the reasons the Foundation listed, but 
because company law treats as fundamentally distinct the categories of corporate assets and profits.407 
A company has a legal personality separate from its shareholders, and its assets are not those of its 
shareholders. Assets can be acquired, held, transferred or otherwise disposed of by a company, but 
assets cannot be appropriated as the fund from which a dividend is declared. The purported payment 
or declaration of a dividend, by way of appropriation of a fund which is in fact paid up and subscribed 
capital, is strictly speaking a transfer of assets (and a transfer of assets may be a misapplication of 
assets), but it is not properly a dividend, for the reasons set out below.  
 
In Flitcroft’s Case, Cotton LJ held that ‘[t]he assets of a company are to be dealt with only for the 
purposes of its business’.408 In the case of Guinness v Land Corporation of Ireland, which was 
decided later that year, a proposed transaction was found objectionable, ‘not on the ground that it is 
a reduction of capital, but that it is a withdrawal of capital from the objects for which the company 
was incorporated, and if it might be done in this case it would be difficult to point out a case in which 
a company might not do it’.409 The distinction that the cases suggest, between profits — which are 
sometimes referred to as ‘the fruit derived from a fund employed and risked in a business’410 — and 
corporate assets, could not have been more clearly stated than it was in Lee v Neuchatel Asphalte Co, 
in which Lindley LJ held that: 
 
The [British Companies Act 1867]411 does not say that dividends are not to be paid out of capital, but there are 
general principles of law according to which the capital of a company can only be applied for the purposes 
mentioned in the memorandum of association. That is a fundamental principle of law, and if any of those 
purposes are expressly or impliedly forbidden by the statutes, the capital cannot be applied for those purposes 
even though there may be a clause in the memorandum that it shall.412   
 
Flitcroft’s Case and Guinness were cited with approval by the High Court of Australia in Tongkah 
Compound NL v Meagher.413 The fundamental principle of law414 expressed by Lindley LJ in Lee v 
                                                     
405 Industrial Equity v Blackburn (n 347) 576 (Mason J). 
406 AARF ‘Payment of Dividends’ (n 391, Position Paper) 5 [1.7], replacing AARF ‘Payment of Dividends’ (n 391, 
Discussion Paper). 
407 St George Bank Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (2009) 176 FCR 424, 444 (Perram J). 
408 Flitcroft’s Case (n 55) 535 (Cotton LJ). 
409 Guinness v Land Corporation of Ireland (n 166) 382 (Bowen LJ). 
410 Liverpool & London Globe Insurance Co v Bennett [1913] AC 610, 619 (Lord Loreburn) (‘Liverpool & London Globe 
Insurance’), quoted in Webb v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1922) 30 CLR 450, 464 (Isaacs J) (‘Webb v Federal 
Commissioner of Taxation’). 
411 Companies Act 1867 (n 250). 
412 Lee v Neuchatel Asphalte (n 323) 23 (Lindley LJ). 
413 Tongkah Compound NL v Meagher (1951) 83 CLR 489, 514 (Kitto J) (‘Tongkah Compound NL v Meagher’). 
414 That is, that ‘the capital of a company can only be applied for the purposes mentioned in the memorandum of 
association’. 
55 
 
Neuchatel Asphalte Co is reflected in Tongkah Compound NL v Meagher in the idea that the assets 
of a company ‘must be taken to be devoted to the objects of the company and to be incapable of 
diversion from those objects’.415 It is because of this fundamental principle that a repayment of capital 
to shareholders may not be made without express statutory authority; and it is the obverse of this 
principle that a distribution of profits could be made even if the company legislation were silent on 
the specific subject. Also consistent with this principle is the fact that both remuneration and interest 
are payable out of the assets of a company, and need no resolution for their payment,416 whereas the 
procedure for reduction of capital must be undertaken in the manner prescribed by statute and 
involves an ordinary resolution of shareholders, with safeguards afforded to creditors and 
shareholders;417 a dividend, which cannot be paid out of assets generally, may be declared or 
determined by the directors without a general meeting.418 The doctrine of ultra vires appears to be 
invoked in the judicial language of the cases referred to above.  
 
Two submissions received by the AARF which favoured retaining the profits test emphasised the 
long line of cases which have held that the term ‘dividend’ means an appropriation of the profits of 
trading.419 The Foundation was not greatly moved by these suggestions, declining to accept this 
definition and attributing its popular acceptance to little more than ‘the historical notions of capital 
maintenance’.420 However, it is not self-evident, as the Foundation appears to suggest,421 that the 
question of whether a company is permitted to make a distribution to shareholders should have 
nothing to do with the amount of the profits of the company. Having regard to the extrinsic materials, 
the policy of the federal government was clearly to dispense with the profits test primarily because 
of the difficulties faced by directors in identifying funds available as distributable profits. There is 
‘no formula which can discriminate in all circumstances what are and what are not profits of a 
trade’.422 However, were it not for the collision of the former s 254T with modern accounting 
principles based on fair value measurements, such policy would probably be seen as unnecessary; 
even so, neither the current nor proposed dividends provisions address the problems caused by the 
accounting standards effectively.  
 
3.4 Key Problems with the Current Dividends Provision 
 
That the reform of the dividends provision has failed to fully live up to its promise may be attested to 
by the 2013 submission of the Law Council of Australia, which states a preference for a ‘return to a 
test similar to the previous drafting of s 254T’ if a ‘simple solvency test’ (that is, whether a company 
is able to pay all its debts, as and when they become due and payable) is not adopted.423 Unfortunately, 
the current dividends provision fails to adequately address all of the concerns which led to the repeal 
of the profits test, and actually introduces several new problems. The current dividends provision 
reads: 
 
(1) A company must not pay a dividend unless: 
 
(a) the company’s assets exceed its liabilities immediately before the dividend is declared and the 
excess is sufficient for the payment of the dividend; and 
(b) the payment of the dividend is fair and reasonable to the company’s shareholders as a whole; and 
                                                     
415 Tongkah Compound NL v Meagher (n 413) 514 (Kitto J). 
416 See Bond v Barrow Haematite Steel Co (n 339) 363 (Farwell J). 
417 Corporations Act (n 3) ss 256B(1)(c), 256C. 
418 See ibid s 254U(1). 
419 AARF ‘Payment of Dividends’ (n 391, Position Paper) 7 [1.11], replacing AARF ‘Payment of Dividends’ (n 391, 
Discussion Paper). 
420 Ibid. 
421 Ibid. 
422 Liverpool & London Globe Insurance (n 410) 620 (Lord Loreburn), quoted in Webb v Federal Commissioner of 
Taxation (n 410) 464 (Isaacs J). 
423 Law Council of Australia, Submission for ‘Corporations Amendment Bill 2012’ (n 349) 1. 
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(c) the payment of the dividend does not materially prejudice the company’s ability to pay its 
creditors. 
 
Note 1: As an example, the payment of a dividend would materially prejudice the company’s ability to pay its 
creditors if the company would become insolvent as a result of the payment. 
Note 2: For a director’s duty to prevent insolvent trading on payment of dividends, see section 588G. 
 
(2) Assets and liabilities are to be calculated for the purposes of this section in accordance with accounting 
standards in force at the relevant time (even if the standard does not otherwise apply to the financial year 
of some or all of the companies concerned).424 
 
The objective of the current dividends provision is to ensure that companies which have the ability to 
pay dividends without causing detriment to ongoing operations are permitted to do so.425 Its aim 
includes granting companies permission to pay a dividend in circumstances where profit has been 
impacted by non-cash revaluations.426 However, it fails to achieve this objective, in part because, 
despite the current s 254T, Australia has yet to move away sufficiently from the profits test. 
 
3.4.1 Dividends May Still Only Be Paid out of Profits at Common Law  
 
There is, at the very least, great uncertainty whether the federal government’s express intention that 
dividends may be paid from ‘amounts other than profit’ has been achieved under the current dividends 
provision. The current s 254T does not contain any positive statement authorising a dividend; it is 
expressed negatively and prohibits any dividend from being paid unless certain conditions are 
satisfied. In a decision which related to the taxation of dividends, the Australian Taxation Office ruled 
that the three specified prohibitions in the current s 254T had been imposed in addition to, rather than 
as replacement for, an inherent requirement that a dividend can only be paid out of profits.427 The 
legal advice obtained from counsel in connection with the preparation of the draft taxation ruling428 
expressed the view that, despite removal of the profits test from the current dividends provision, the 
continued reference to the term ‘dividend’ in the language of the current s 254T incorporates previous 
case law, which has the result that ‘the requirement that there be a profit to be divided in dividends 
remains’.429 Therefore, the 2010 reforms fail to address the problem that a company with sufficient 
cash to pay a dividend may be unable to do so because the accounting profits of the company have 
been eliminated by non-cash expenses.   
 
Unfortunately, the problem set out above has not been identified by the federal government and it is 
not explicitly dealt with in the exposure draft legislation; the profit limitation would not be removed 
by the substitution of the current with the proposed 254T. The stakeholder concerns which were 
identified in the draft Explanatory Memorandum430 focus mainly on practical implications of the 
current dividends provision rather than legal ambiguities. In the first place, the use of the term 
‘declared’ in the current s 254T creates uncertainty about when the test should apply for most directors 
who generally ‘determine’ and fix a time for payment, but do not declare, dividends.431 In the second 
                                                     
424 Corporations Act (n 3) s 254T. 
425 Explanatory Memorandum, Corporations Amendment Bill 2010 (n 1) 59 [10.52]. 
426 Ibid 59–60 [10.52]. 
427 Australian Taxation Office, Income Tax: Section 254T of the Corporations Act 2001 and the Assessment and Franking 
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428 Australian Taxation Office, Income Tax: Section 254T of the Corporations Act and the Assessment and Franking of 
Dividends Paid from 28 June 2010, TR 2011/D8, 21 December 2011, [11]. 
429 Joint Opinion from A H Slater and J O Hmelnitsky, Wentworth Chambers, to the Commissioner of Taxation, 29 
November 2011, 27 (‘Joint Opinion from Slater and Hmelnitsky’). 
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place, over 90 per cent of companies which are not required to prepare audited financial reports,432 
including many small proprietary companies,433 are placed under increased regulatory burden by the 
requirement to calculate assets and liabilities in accordance with accounting standards.434 As set out 
above, the exposure draft legislation at least attempts to deal with both of these practical issues.  
 
3.4.2 The Share Capital Reductions Provision May Prohibit Dividend Payments out of Capital  
 
The only legally ambiguous aspect of the current s 254T admitted to in the draft Explanatory 
Memorandum is that ‘[t]he interaction with the Corporations Act capital maintenance provisions 
(Chapter 2J) remains unclear’.435 The current s 254T and Chapter 2J are expressly linked, since the 
‘fair and reasonable to shareholders’ and ‘no material prejudice to creditors’ tests were intended to 
align the current dividends provision with identical requirements imposed on companies in relation 
to conducting share capital reductions under pt 2J.1 div 1.436 Section 256B(1) of the Corporations 
Act provides that a company may reduce its share capital ‘in a way that is not otherwise authorised 
by law’ if the reduction complies with these two tests and, in addition, ‘is approved by 
shareholders’.437 Part 2J.1 div 1 rewrote the former s 195(1) of the Corporations Law, which required 
the satisfaction of a company’s creditors and the approval of the court, a process which was often 
expensive, time-consuming and inconvenient. 
 
Closely related to the question whether dividends may be paid from ‘amounts other than profit’, is 
the question whether, under the current s 254T, such a reduction of capital may be conducted without 
obtaining shareholder approval. The answer is similarly in doubt. Although Parliament considers that 
the test for paying a dividend is a circumstance where a reduction of capital is ‘otherwise authorised 
by law’,438 both the Australian Securities and Investment Commission439 and the Australian Taxation 
Office440 appear to favour the view that the requirements for approving an authorised reduction of 
capital in pt 2J.1 div 1 would also have to be satisfied for a company to pay a dividend out of capital 
under the current s 254T.  
 
There are a number of tax treatment issues with the current s 254T. For income tax purposes, a 
dividend includes any distribution made by a company to its shareholders, but does not include 
distributions debited against the credit of the share capital account of the company.441 This is wider 
than the company law meaning of the term ‘dividend’, and there is no direct interaction between each 
definitions provision. Taxation assessment and franking issues are beyond the scope of this chapter, 
but it is important to recognise that they are present and unresolved. 
 
                                                     
432 CPA Australia, Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia and Institute of Public Accountants, Submission to 
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3.4.3 The ‘Fair and Reasonable to Shareholders’ Test  
 
The requirement for a ‘fair and reasonable to shareholders’ test in the current s 254T was originally 
introduced into pt 2J.1 div 1 of the Corporations Law, with the 1 July 1998 passing of the Company 
Law Review Act 1998 (Cth).442 Court decisions had interpreted the former s 195(1) of the 
Corporations Law, which required that a capital reduction be voted upon by shareholders and 
confirmed by a court, as providing an important safeguard for shareholders, by ensuring that the 
reduction had to be ‘fair and equitable between different classes of shareholders’.443 After the 
Company Law Review Act 1998 (Cth) abolished the requirement that reductions of capital be subject 
to court confirmation, the interests of shareholders were protected by other safeguards, including the 
requirement that a capital reduction be fair and reasonable to the company’s shareholders as a whole. 
In the Explanatory Memorandum to the Company Law Review Bill 1997 (Cth), the federal 
government stated that the ‘fair and reasonable’ test should be viewed as a ‘composite requirement’; 
perhaps unsurprisingly, the factors that might be relevant for the test include three which can have no 
relevance for dividends: ‘the adequacy of any consideration paid to shareholders’, ‘whether the 
reduction is being used to effect a takeover and avoid the takeover provisions’ and ‘whether the 
reduction involves an arrangement that should more properly proceed as a scheme of arrangement’.444 
Only one factor which was identified may potentially be relevant for dividends, whether some 
shareholders would be deprived of their rights, particularly ‘by stripping the company of funds that 
would otherwise be available for distribution to preference shareholders’.445 
 
The ‘fair and reasonable to shareholders’ test for payment of dividends may be difficult to satisfy for 
proprietary companies which apply the replaceable rule that directors may pay dividends as they see 
fit, subject to the terms on which the company’s shares are on issue;446 or for public companies with 
more than one class of shares, each share of which may not have the same dividend rights, which is 
a situation expressly contemplated by s 254W of the Corporations Act.447 There is some uncertainty 
whether the ‘fair and reasonable’ test allows payment of a dividend to one class of shareholders and 
not to another, particularly in circumstances where such payment may be seen as stripping the 
company of funds that would otherwise be available to be paid to another class in priority in a winding 
up.  
 
To the extent that s 254W defines the dividend rights attached to proprietary and public companies, 
including no liability companies, the ‘fair and reasonable to shareholders’ test seems unnecessary, 
and thus the confusion it introduces avoidable. Section 254W clearly covers the factor of whether a 
dividend payment would have the practical effect of depriving some shareholders of their rights; 
therefore, the provision would appear to make the ‘fair and reasonable’ test unnecessary. It is curious 
that the federal government decided to borrow the test from pt 2J.1 div 1, since this was introduced 
so that a safeguard provided by court confirmation of capital reductions would be available under the 
new rules, albeit in a different way. As with pt 2J.1 div 1, s 254W was also introduced by the Company 
Law Review Act 1998 (Cth).448 However, the latter provision replaced a long-standing regulation in 
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Table A, that all dividends should be paid to shareholders proportionally to the amounts paid on their 
shares, after it was repealed upon the introduction of the replaceable rules.449  
 
3.4.4 The ‘No Material Prejudice to Creditors’ Test 
 
The 2010 reforms did not introduce a simple solvency test; what they actually introduced was a ‘fair 
and reasonable to shareholders’ and ‘no material prejudice to creditors’ test, which is to be 
distinguished from a cash flow test, in combination with a balance sheet test. The meaning of the term 
‘material prejudice’ was considered in the case of Re CSR Ltd,450 in the context of the share capital 
reductions provision, and the joint judgement on this question is worth referring to: 
 
the text of the [Corporations Act] and the explanatory memorandum which accompanied the Bill which 
introduced s 256B into the Act are not particularly helpful. In cl 12.23 it said: ‘Whether prejudice is “material” 
will be a question of judgment to be determined in light of all relevant circumstances [including the particular 
characteristics of the company and the situation of the company’s creditors]’. One is, we think, on safe ground, 
however, in treating ‘material prejudice’ to a company’s ability to pay its creditors as relating to the creation of 
a material as opposed to theoretical increase, in the likelihood that the reduction in capital will result in a reduced 
ability to pay creditors.451 
  
Apart from expressly linking the dividends provision with the share capital reductions provision, 
which would not appear congruent with the objective of allowing dividends to be paid out of capital, 
the key problem with the requirement for a ‘material prejudice’ test in the current s 254T is the 
uncertainty about which solvent circumstances, rather than insolvent circumstances, may be seen as 
‘materially’ increasing the likelihood that the payment of a dividend will result in a reduced ‘ability’ 
to pay creditors.452 Whatever ‘material prejudice’ to a company’s ability to pay its creditors is, it is a 
state which falls short of a company’s insolvency; just as an increased likelihood falls short of a 
probable likelihood, and a reduced ability falls short of an inability to pay. The distinction is one of 
degree, not of kind. Indeed, some commentators have even described the ‘material prejudice’ test as 
a ‘watered-down’ solvency criterion.453 
 
As with the ‘fair and reasonable’ test, the ‘material prejudice’ test was originally introduced into pt 
2J.1 div 1 to replace a safeguard which courts had provided when determining whether to confirm a 
special resolution for the reduction of capital.454 Such unusual and significant transactions had 
required court confirmation, in the words of Williams J, ‘principally to ensure that the creditors are 
not prejudiced’.455 Accordingly, the current capital reductions provision continues to require that the 
impact of a reduction on a company’s assets must not be such as to prejudice the company’s 
creditors.456  
 
In the current s 254T, the ‘material prejudice’ test may be appropriate in circumstances where a 
dividend payment involves the reduction of a company’s share capital; however, the policy 
                                                     
449 Corporations Law (Cth) sch 1 table A item 90(2), as repealed by Company Law Review Act 1998 (Cth) sch 2 item 159. 
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456 Corporations Act (n 3) s 256B(1)(b). See also Corporations Act (n 3) ss 257A(a), 260A(1)(a)(ii). 
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underlying the test is the capital maintenance concept.457 Such policy reflects company law prior to 
the 2010 reforms, which prohibited dividends out of capital otherwise than in accordance with the 
procedure for returning capital in pt 2J.1 divs 1–2. Unfortunately, not only does the ‘material 
prejudice’ test in the current dividends provision fail to lessen the capital maintenance doctrine, but 
it also significantly broadens the scope of the concept, imposing an additional and unnecessary burden 
for routine dividend payments that do not involve a reduction of a company’s share capital, or put 
another way, are paid out of profits.   
 
Such burden is not a trivial one. Corporate lawyers and senior executives have been warned that 
regulatory compliance requirements have inevitably increased,458 and that directors may need to 
undertake considerable work when turning their minds to the ‘material prejudice’ test before 
approving the payment of a dividend.459 As an example, the test has created considerable difficulties 
in the context of the financial assistance prohibition.460 In this context, as in a dividends context, the 
test is unclear; the Explanatory Memorandum to the Company Law Review Bill 1997 (Cth) stresses 
that it is not possible to determine whether a transaction involves material prejudice ‘merely by 
reference to arbitrary rules, such as the percentage impact the transaction will have on the company’s 
profit’.461 Unfortunately, this example can have no relevance for dividends; a dividend is not a charge 
against gross revenue but ‘the share receivable by each shareholder out of the fund of profits by the 
company’.462  
 
The only statutory example of a payment of a dividend which would ‘clearly prejudice’ the 
company’s ability to pay its creditors is where a company would become insolvent as a result of the 
payment.463 However, s 588G already addresses such circumstances. It is not at all clear that the 
existing directors’ duty to prevent insolvent trading is an inadequate protection for creditors where a 
company intends to pay a routine dividend out of profits, nor does it follow that the material prejudice 
test, which was introduced as a share capital reductions safeguard, should apply to dividends which 
are not paid out of capital.   
 
3.5 Difficulties with the Exposure Draft Legislation 
 
Although the ‘fair and reasonable to shareholders’ and ‘no material prejudice to creditors’ tests in the 
current s 254T will not survive the Corporations Legislation Amendment (Remuneration Disclosures 
                                                     
457 See, eg, Macdougall v Jersey Imperial Hotel (n 136) 568 (Wood V-C). In that case, the Court held that a payment of 
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and Other Measures) Bill 2012 (Cth) if enacted into law, both tests will in practice remain for 
dividends paid out of capital, as a result of a company’s need to comply with pt 2J.1 div 1.464     
 
The exposure draft legislation fails to clarify the key ambiguity with the current dividends provision, 
which is the uncertainty whether and if so in what circumstances a dividend may be paid from 
amounts other than current year profit or asset revaluation reserves. The draft Explanatory 
Memorandum explains that the existing requirements in relation to conducting share capital 
reductions under pt 2J.1 div 1 continue to apply under the proposed s 254T.465 If anything, this implies 
an even greater role for Chapter 2J than that described in the Explanatory Memorandum to the 
Corporations Amendment (Corporate Reporting Reform) Bill 2010, which stated only that the share 
capital concept would remain ‘for other purposes, such as the provisions dealing with share buy-backs 
in Part 2J’.466 As set out earlier in this chapter, the need to comply with the capital maintenance 
provision introduces an anomaly and a serious defect in the operation of the dividend provision, the 
effect of which is to preserve the profits test of the common law. Such unintended consequence 
frustrates the objective of the 2010 reforms, which is nowhere repeated in the draft Explanatory 
Memorandum but is that a company with sufficient cash to pay a dividend should not be prevented 
from doing so merely because its accounting profits have been eliminated by non-cash expenses (nor 
because shareholder approval has not been obtained).    
 
3.5.1 Should the Profits Test be Replaced with a Balance Sheet Test, Solvency Test, Both or 
Neither? 
 
A key area of stakeholder concern, which was repeated by the federal government in its 2011 
discussion paper but which has since been omitted from consideration in its draft Explanatory 
Memorandum, is that an ‘assets greater than liabilities’ test may not be an appropriate test for the 
payment of a dividend. According to its critics, such test ‘can have little relationship to solvency 
because it does not take into account the timing and magnitude of flows of funds’;467 in part, because 
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was declared or paid in accordance with the ‘pure solvency test’ in the proposed s 254T and the reduction in share capital 
was an equal reduction, i.e. relating only to ordinary shares and applying to each holder of ordinary shares in proportion 
to the number of ordinary shares they held: withdrawn draft Corporations Amendment Bill 2014 (n 35) sch 1 pt 4. Holders 
of preference shares would have remained subject to ss 256B(1)(b)–(c) of the Corporations Act (n 35) and, thus, precluded 
from receiving a dividend paid out of capital.  
465 Explanatory Memorandum, Corporations Amendment Bill 2010 (n 1) 10 [1.16]. 
466 Ibid 22 [3.14]. 
467 ‘Proposed Amendments’ (n 24, Discussion Paper, Treasury) 5. This criticism appeared to have been taken seriously 
by the drafters of the withdrawn draft Corporations Amendment Bill 2014 (n 35), who proposed the deletion of the net 
asset test and its replacement with an alternative requirement that a company must not declare or pay a dividend unless, 
immediately before the dividend is declared or paid, the directors of the company reasonably  believe that the company 
will, immediately after the dividend is declared or paid, be solvent: withdrawn draft Corporations Amendment Bill 2014 
(n 35) sch 1 item 4. This alternative proposed amendment was welcomed by the Australian Institute of Company 
Directors, CPA Australia and the Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia, the Business Council of Australia, the 
Group of 100, the Governance Institute of Australia and the Law Council of Australia, and the proposed amendment’s 
omission from the enacted Corporations Amendment Bill 2014 (n 35) has been the subject of attention from the 
Governance Institute of Australia, among other stakeholders: Australian Institute of Company Directors, Submission to 
Treasury, Corporations Legislation Amendment (Deregulatory and Other Measures) Bill 2014 (12 May 2014) 2–3 [3]; 
Business Council of Australia, Submission to Treasury, Corporations Legislation Amendment (Deregulatory and Other 
Measures) Bill 2014 (May 2014) 2; CPA Australia and Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia, Submission to 
Treasury, Corporations Legislation Amendment (Deregulatory and Other Measures) Bill 2014 (16 May 2014) 1–2; Group 
of 100, Submission to Treasury, Corporations Law Amendments 2014 (14 May 2014) 1; Governance Institute of Australia, 
Submission to Treasury, Corporations Legislation Amendment (Deregulatory and Other Measures) Bill 2014 (16 May 
2014) 8; Governance Institute of Australia, ‘Bill Introduced to Repeal the 100-Member Rule to Call a General Meeting’ 
(Media Release, 24 October 2014); Law Council of Australia, Submission to Treasury, Corporations Legislation 
Amendment (Deregulatory and Other Measures) Bill 2014 (12 May 2014) 3–4. 
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of the application of historical cost to balance sheet values. In its 2002 position paper, the AARF 
stated that the balance sheet test, ‘given its use of historical cost values rather than current values for 
some assets, is not a useful measure and should not be adopted by Australia’.468   
 
Another problem with the balance sheet approach is the recognition of some assets and liabilities at 
fair values which are different from their market values. Under the International Financial Reporting 
Standards, net assets may be susceptible to distortion by non-cash liabilities, in the same manner in 
which profits may be distorted by non-cash expenses. Neither outcome would appear congruent with 
the 2002 recommendation of the AARF to redirect the focus of the modern law of corporate finance 
in Australia on a company’s solvency; both appear to largely defeat the objective of the 2010 reforms. 
For the reasons set out above, both the Law Council of Australia469 and the Australian Institute of 
Company Directors470 have advocated complete removal of the ‘assets greater than liabilities’ test 
and its replacement with a simple solvency test.  
 
Several foreign jurisdictions have already adopted a net assets test for the payment of dividends.471 
However, such tests have rarely required simply that the value of a company’s assets, as would be 
disclosed in its financial report, must be greater than the value of its liabilities, as so disclosed; and 
yet this is, with respect, effectively what the requirement in the current s 254T, to calculate assets and 
liabilities in accordance with the accounting standards,472 amounts to. Directors in foreign 
jurisdictions have often been expressly authorised to rely on any valuations of assets or estimates of 
liabilities that are reasonable in the circumstances.473 Unfortunately, the current and proposed 
dividends provisions omit such authorisation.474 
 
Though it addresses none of the complaints set out above, the exposure draft legislation does provide 
some clarity, as well as some relief for some small proprietary companies, by requiring that assets 
and liabilities may be calculated in accordance with either the accounting standards or with the 
financial records required to be kept under s 286 of the Corporations Act, depending on whether the 
company is required to prepare a financial report or not.475 Key stakeholders have complained that 
linking the current s 254T to the accounting standards places an unreasonable regulatory burden on 
those companies that are not otherwise required to comply with all the standards;476 for example, 
many small proprietary companies, to which the financial reporting and accounting standards 
compliance provisions in pt 2M.3 of the Corporations Act may not apply,477 and non-reporting 
entities, which are required to prepare financial reports, but need only comply with the recognition 
and measurement requirements of the standards.478 Unfortunately, the proposed s 254T only provides 
                                                     
468 AARF ‘Payment of Dividends’ (n 391, Position Paper) 32 [7.3], replacing AARF ‘Payment of Dividends’ (n 391, 
Discussion Paper). 
469 Law Council of Australia, Submission for ‘Corporations Amendment Bill 2012’ (n 349) 1. 
470 Australian Institute of Company Directors, Submission to Treasury, Exposure Draft Corporations Legislation 
Amendment (Remuneration Disclosures and Other Measures) Bill 2012 (14 March 2013) 1. 
471 See, eg, Am Bar Ass’n, Model Bus Corp Act (n 22) § 6.40(c)(2); New Zealand Companies Act (n 22) s 4(1)(b); Canada 
Business Corporations Act (n 22) s 42(b); South African Companies Act (n 22) s 4(1)(a). 
472 Corporations Act (n 3) s 254T(2). 
473 See, eg, Am Bar Ass’n, Model Bus Corp Act (n 22) § 6.40(d); New Zealand Companies Act (n 22) s 4(2)(b); Canada 
Business Corporations Act (n 22) s 42(b); South African Companies Act (n 22) s 4(2)(b)(ii). 
474 Corporations Legislation Amendment (Remuneration Disclosures and Other Measures) Bill 2012 (Cth) sch 1 item 3 s 
254T(4) (‘Corporations Amendment Bill 2012’). 
475 Ibid sch 1 item 3 s 254T(4). 
476 ‘Proposed Amendments’ (n 24, Discussion Paper, Treasury) 5. 
477 See Corporations Act (n 3) ss 292(2), 296(1A). 
478 See ‘Reporting Requirements for Non-Reporting Entities’, (Regulatory Guide No 85, Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission, July 2005) 2 [2]. For the accounting standards which apply to all entities required to prepare a 
financial report, whether they are reporting entities or non-reporting entities, see Australian Accounting Standards Board, 
Presentation of Financial Statements, AASB 101, 10 May 2012; Australian Accounting Standards Board, Statement of 
Cash Flows, AASB 107, 10 May 2012; Australian Accounting Standards Board, Accounting Policies, Changes in 
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relief for the former and not for the latter. For the companies that prepare and lodge special purpose 
financial reports under pt 2M.3, which amount to 70 per cent of all financial reports lodged,479 and 
which are not required to comply with all the accounting standards, the proposed dividends provision 
continues to require that net assets be calculated in accordance with all the standards in force at that 
time.480 
 
Another problem with financial reports is that they do not recognise all assets and liabilities that have 
an economic value. In the words of one commentator, accounting frameworks ‘were always designed 
to generate figures to be read and appreciated in the light of information’, such as the directors’ report 
and the notes to the financial statements, ‘which did not appear on the face of the accounts’.481 For 
this and the reasons set out above, financial reports ‘have never been, and are becoming increasingly 
less, designed to determine the amount appropriate for distributions’.482 Indeed, the Basel II 
Committee has explicitly recognised that financial reports prepared under the International Financial 
Reporting Standards do not provide a sound basis for setting prudential decisions of this sort, recently 
ruling that ‘prudential supervisors need to consider whether financial statement information is 
suitable for their purposes and, when it is not, to make suitable adjustments’.483 This refutes the stated 
position of the federal government that the absence of an express link to the accounting standards 
‘could result in less objectivity and consistency in determining a company’s ability to pay a 
dividend’,484 which has been criticised by key stakeholders.485 
 
Despite the weaknesses of the balance sheet approach set out above, not all stakeholders have stated 
a preference for its replacement with a simple solvency test. CPA Australia and the Institute of 
Chartered Accountants in Australia (‘ICAA’) have consistently advocated a dual solvency and 
balance sheet test, along lines similar to that in place in New Zealand, since the consultations which 
led to the 2010 reforms.486 Their dominant concern appears to be furtherance of the understanding 
reached in the 1988–2010 bilateral discussions between the governments of Australia and New 
Zealand upon the harmonisation and coordination of business law to facilitate closer economic 
relations and advance a trans-Tasman single economic market.487  
 
This understanding commits to an objective ‘in which there is no significant discrimination in the 
Australian and New Zealand markets arising from differences in the policies and regulations of both 
                                                     
Accounting Estimates and Errors, AASB 108, 10 May 2012; Australian Accounting Standards Board, Interpretation of 
Standards, AASB 1048, 29 June 2012. 
479 CPA Australia and Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia, Submission to Treasury, Exposure Draft — 
Corporations Legislation Amendment (Remuneration Disclosures and Other Measures) Bill 2012 (15 March 2013), 5 
(‘CPA and ICAA, Submission to Treasury’). 
480 Corporations Amendment Bill 2012 (n 474) sch 1 item 3 s 254T(4); Explanatory Memorandum, Corporations 
Amendment Bill 2012 (n 320) 10 [1.13], 11 [1.21]. See also CPA and ICAA, Submission to Treasury (n 479) 5. 
481 Jonathan Rickford, ‘Legal Approaches to Restricting Distributions to Shareholders: Balance Sheet Tests and Solvency 
Tests’ (2006) 7(1) European Business Organization Law Review 135, 166. 
482 Ibid. 
483 ‘Supervisory Guidance on the Use of the Fair Value Option for Financial Instruments by Banks’, (Supervisory 
Guidance, Bank for International Settlements, June 2006) 4 [9], replacing ‘Supervisory Guidance on the Use of the Fair 
Value Option by Banks under International Financial Reporting Standards’, (Consultative Document, Bank for 
International Settlements, June 2005). 
484 ‘Proposed Amendments’ (n 24, Discussion Paper, Treasury) 7. 
485 See, eg, Law Council, Submission for ‘Corporations Amendment Bill 2012’ (n 349) 2; CPA and ICAA, Submission 
to Treasury (n 479) 5. 
486 CPA Australia, Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia and National Institute of Accountants, Submission to 
Treasury (5 February 2010) 1 (‘CPA, ICAA and NIA, Submission to Treasury’); CPA, ICAA and IPA, Submission to 
Treasury (n 432, 6 February 2012) 3; CPA and ICAA, Submission to Treasury (n 479) 2. 
487 See Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of New 
Zealand and the Government of Australia on the Coordination of Business Law (2010) <http://www.dfat.gov.au/fta/ 
anzcerta/memorandum_of_understanding_business_law.html> (‘DFAT, Memorandum Between New Zealand and 
Australia’).  
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countries’ and it recognises both ‘the trend towards increasing international convergence of financial 
market and business regulation’ and ‘the benefit of coordination to influence evolving international 
regulatory standards and regimes’.488 The obverse of this benefit is the threat that Australia could be 
left without a voice in the development of international corporate law and finance should it fail to 
achieve appropriate international harmonisation of law and practice. Part of the work programme 
which the countries have jointly determined should be the focus of the business law coordination 
programme in the short term includes the goal that an insolvent should face equivalent outcomes on 
both sides of the Tasman;489 however, the scope for harmonisation includes many areas of companies 
and securities laws, including share capital requirements.490 
 
Disagreement about the costs and potential benefits of legal harmonisation is not new to the debate 
on reform of the dividends provision. Whilst accepting that the harmonisation of legal and accounting 
principles across jurisdictions is sometimes a proper objective, the AARF did not accept in its 2002 
recommendation a submission that it would be inappropriate for the test for payment of dividends in 
Australia to depart from the tests which exist in other key jurisdictions, in particular the United 
Kingdom and the United States, stating that: 
 
the overriding objective should be to propose a test which is workable and which eliminates or reduces the 
distortions and other problems which exist as a result of the profits test. Having concluded that a solvency test 
would be less open to distortions and other problems, and would reflect the fundamental requirement of solvency 
in the case of all company distributions, and that the test would protect shareholders and creditors, we cannot 
accept that harmonisation with other jurisdictions should force us to stick with an out of date test.491  
 
Ironically, harmonisation with key jurisdictions would address some of the problems with the 
Australian approach set out above. Although the federal government states that the first limb of the 
current dividends provision is similar to the balance sheet tests currently in operation in New Zealand 
and Canada,492 the former does not allow for the directors’ overriding appraisal which in those foreign 
jurisdictions weakens, or even removes the rigid connection between financial reports and the 
calculation of distributions with its reference to ‘valuations’493 or ‘the realizable value’494 of the 
company’s assets.   
 
Prior to the 2010 reforms, as today, if a company was not solvent at the time a dividend was paid or 
declared, its directors could be subject to civil penalty orders and criminal consequences for breach 
of their duty to prevent insolvent trading under pt 5.7B div 3.495 However, for many years, the dual 
solvency and balance sheet test, known for some time to many foreign jurisdictions,496 had no direct 
presence in Australian company legislation. Since the 2010 reforms, elements of this test have finally 
begun to enter the Corporations Act, albeit in a confused and inconsistent manner.497 As set out above, 
no balance sheet test applies in respect of share capital reductions and share buy-backs,498 which raise 
                                                     
488 Ibid. 
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Discussion Paper). 
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very similar solvency considerations to dividend payments,499 insofar as each type of transaction 
involves shareholders taking assets out of a company.  
 
3.5.1.1 Early Authorities Favoured a Cash Flow Test 
 
The solvency test for payments of dividends is much older than the 2002 recommendation of the 
AARF; its history is approximately coterminous with both the profits test and the modern registered 
company limited by shares, and it has its Australian statutory origins in the Companies Act 1855–6 
(SA), which provided that: 
 
If the Directors of any Company, which has obtained a certificate of registration with limited liability, shall 
declare and pay any dividend, when the Company is known by them to be insolvent, or any dividend the payment 
of which would, to their knowledge, render it insolvent, they shall be jointly and severally liable for all the debts 
of the Company then existing, and for all that shall be thereafter contracted, so long as they shall respectively 
continue in office; Provided that the amount for which they shall all be so liable shall not exceed the amount of 
such dividend, and that if any of the Directors shall be absent at the time of making such dividend, or shall object 
thereto, and shall file such objection, in writing, with the Clerk of the Company, they shall be exempted from 
the said liability.500 
 
This statute has been described as resembling in effect a ‘more simplified version’501 of the British 
Joint Stock Companies Act 1856.502 Between 1858-9 the colonies of Western Australia and Tasmania 
enacted their own legislation, based on the same British statute,503 which included identical provisions 
imposing personal liability on directors who should ‘declare and pay any dividend’ when a company 
was insolvent.504 Then, as now,505 ‘insolvency’ meant the inability to pay debts as and when they 
became payable, but the matter has never been entirely without confusion.  
 
The birth of corporate insolvency law in the Australian colonies goes back to the passing of the 
Companies Winding Up Act 1847 (NSW), an Act for ‘facilitating the winding up of Joint Stock 
Companies unable to meet their pecuniary engagements’.506 This Act was deemed also to be in force 
in Victoria and Queensland.507 It extended the remedies of creditors ‘against the property of 
incorporated and joint stock companies when unable to meet their pecuniary engagements’, and 
enabled the winding up of their concerns, ‘in the same manner in all respects as if the same were the 
estate of an individual or ordinary partnership’;508 put another way, the Act subjected companies to 
the law and practice in bankruptcy.509  
 
                                                     
499 Law Council, Submission to Treasury (n 459, 2 February 2010) 3. 
500 Companies Act 1855–6 (SA) s 17. For the British statutes the ideas of which this Act adopted see Joint Stock 
Companies Act 1844 (n 68); Limited Liability Act (n 106). 
501 See generally Kavass, Australian Supplement to Gower (n 264) 22. Kavass states that the Companies Act 1855–6 (SA) 
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502 Joint Stock Companies Act 1856 (n 109). Section 14 of the Act provided that directors were to be liable for debts if a 
dividend was paid when the company was known by them to be insolvent. For the first British statutory prohibition see 
Limited Liability Act (n 106) s 9, the Act which the British Joint Stock Companies Act 1856 (n 109) repealed and 
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66 
 
The statute which introduced the modern British ideas of dissolution and winding-up to the colony of 
South Australia was the Companies Act 1854 (SA).510 Although the expression used in a long line of 
cases, and incorporated in these early statutes, was ‘unable to meet its engagements’,511 the expression 
had been changed by the time of the enacting into law of the Western Australian and Tasmanian 
1858–9 company legislation to the more modern ‘unable to pay its Debts’.512  
 
As set out in the previous chapter, the meaning of the term ‘insolvent’ was much considered in the 
case of De Tastet v Le Tavernier,513 which has been referred to by Australian courts as an historically 
important source of the early principles upon the circumstances which constitute insolvency.514 In 
that case, the plaintiff’s counsel marshalled powerful arguments against a liquidity test, which are 
worth referring to at length, stating that: 
 
inability to pay when a man shall be called upon for the payment of his debts is a totally different thing from 
insolvency; for if that proposition be denied — if inability to pay upon demand and insolvency are to be 
considered as convertible terms — the richest man or the wealthiest banking-house in England may, upon this 
construction, be insolvent; for no man, be his resources what they may, is at all times ready to meet all his 
liabilities, and the more extended his operations, and the greater his employment of capital and consequently his 
means of wealth, the less will be his ability to pay all demands at a particular moment.515 
 
Indeed, so compelling did this argument appear that the respondent’s counsel conceded, not only that 
‘embarrassment’ was not to be confounded with ‘insolvency’, which the Court accepted, but also that 
the state of insolvency was of a debtor ‘who, when all his property is realised, has not the means of 
paying his creditors’.516 This latter argument, which implies a net assets test, the Court rejected; 
though the seed of the idea was planted.  
 
The Court established that the test for insolvency was whether a debtor’s ‘means of present payment 
are so crippled, and his embarrassment is so great, that he cannot proceed with or carry on his business 
in the usual course of trade’;517 without reference to whether the whole of the debtor’s property, ‘when 
converted into money and realised, would be insufficient to pay his debts’.518 In the course of citing 
and commenting upon all the authorities, Lord Langdale quoted with approval judicial opinion that 
insolvency meant a debtor ‘is not in a situation to make his payments as usual, and that it does not 
follow that he is not insolvent because he may ultimately have a surplus’;519 or put another way, that 
the debtor ‘is not able to keep his general days of payment; and that he is not to be considered as 
solvent because, possibly, his affairs may come round’.520 Ultimately, the Court favoured a cash flow 
test rather than a balance sheet test. 
 
The controversy set out above is all by way of drawing attention to the similarity between specific 
issues debated in the courts and parliaments of the early half of the nineteenth century and the current 
policy issues and debates about solvency and the balance sheet test. During the introduction of 
incorporation with limited liability by simple registration, the main policy drivers behind the idea that 
directors should be liable for dividends rendering a company insolvent were the importance of the 
                                                     
510 For the British statutes upon which this Act was based see Joint Stock Companies Winding-up Act 1848, 11 & 12 Vict, 
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maintenance of capital and the necessity for companies to keep up sufficient assets in excess of their 
liabilities. Upon this important safeguard, Cardwell’s third reading speech for the British Limited 
Liability Bill 1855 is worth referring to at length; during parliamentary debate the former president 
of the Board of Trade spoke against:  
 
a class of Companies in which the shareholders were always to be found when there were dividends to receive, 
but who, when things went wrong, would disappear, and nothing be heard of them. Under the Bill as it now 
stood there was no safeguard against that state of things, which might, ad libitum, be carried into effect — 
namely, that Companies might be established to any amount, who would call up all their capital, and, having 
thus fulfilled the requirements of the Act, then redistribute the capital among the shareholders in the shape of 
dividends or otherwise; and then you would have a body endowed with corporate powers with no assets and no 
legal liabilities, which could enter the market and get any credit it could by any means obtain. He considered 
that it was eminently dangerous to create bodies without assets or legal liabilities to entrap persons into granting 
them any amount of credit.521 
 
It is curious that in response to the complaints set out above, the House of Lords amended the Bill to 
link the dividends provision, not with a surplus of net assets requirement, but company solvency.522 
The latter option might, with respect, have addressed Cardwell’s concerns more effectively.  
 
3.5.1.2 Modernisation, and ‘Simplification’, of Company Legislation   
 
Similar policy confusion has defined recent Australian reforms to company legislation. As set out 
above, the ‘no material prejudice to creditors’ test in the current s 254T was introduced into pt 2J.1 
divs 1–2  of the Corporations Law with the passing of the Company Law Review Act 1998 (Cth).523 
However, when the Second Corporate Law Simplification Bill 1995 (Cth), which eventually became 
the Company Law Review Act 1998 (Cth), was originally drafted, the exposure draft legislation did 
not contain solvency considerations or measures to protect creditors’ interests from being prejudiced; 
instead it proposed allowing a capital reduction if, after such transaction, a company had net positive 
assets.524 Directors’ liability for company insolvency was to be based only on the insolvent trading 
provisions in s 588G and 588H of the Corporations Law.525  
 
Court decisions had interpreted the former s 195(1) of the Corporations Law, which required that 
capital reductions be confirmed by a court, as providing an important safeguard for creditors, by 
requiring that ‘the impact of the reduction on the company’s assets must not be such as to prejudice 
the company’s creditors’.526 The policy basis expressed by such interpretation is less than clear, as it 
appears to blend balance sheet considerations with a test which falls short of a company’s insolvency. 
The federal government stated that the positive net assets test in the Second Corporate Law 
Simplification Bill 1995 (Cth) was designed to address ‘the risk of these transactions leading to the 
company’s insolvency’527 and, by doing so, would adequately protect the interests of creditors; this 
policy rationale remained unchanged after Parliament dropped the test in its amended Bill and it 
passed as the Company Law Review Act 1998 (Cth).528 Unfortunately, there were no comments which 
specifically outlined the reasoning behind the move from a positive net assets test to a ‘no material 
prejudice to creditors’ test; just as the proposed move from a ‘no material prejudice to creditors’ test 
to a solvency test in the exposure draft legislation similarly draws no comment from the federal 
government. 
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What is all too clear is that Australian company legislation is a patchwork quilt of incongruous, often 
obfuscating, old law, clumsy and confusing provisions, schedules and regulations and improvised 
amendment;529 its dividends and share capital reductions provisions undoubtedly fit the description 
of ‘internally inconsistent and conceptually troubled’.530 As an example, the balance sheet test is 
included in the current s 254T because ‘[t]he revised section 254T does not contain a requirement for 
shareholder approval, and instead includes an additional safeguard not included in Chapter 2J’;531 yet 
no version of s 254T ever required shareholder approval,532 and the Second Corporate Law 
Simplification Bill 1995 (Cth) proposed allowing a capital reduction upon complying with a balance 
sheet test in addition to the requirement for shareholder approval.533  
 
Turning to the example of the second and third limbs of the current s 254T, the ‘fair and reasonable 
to shareholders’ and ‘no material prejudice to creditors’ tests in pt 2J.1 div 1 have been mirrored in 
the dividends provision ‘[t]o maintain the integrity of the regulatory framework’.534 However, these 
tests have their origin in the creditor and shareholder safeguards which were provided by the former 
requirement for court confirmation of capital reductions. Whilst not expressly identified as a policy 
driver in the draft Explanatory Memorandum, the removal of the tests from the proposed s 254T may 
be attributed to a consensus that a solvency test better protects the interests of creditors and 
shareholders than the capital maintenance doctrine does.535 The exposure draft legislation does not 
replace the tests in pt 2J.1 divs 1–2; therefore, it may have the unintended consequence of frustrating 
‘Parliament’s intention to introduce a similar, but not identical, test for paying dividends that operates 
independently from Chapter 2J’,536 lead to some confusion and create additional risk due to the 
significant impact of share capital reductions and share buy-backs on the rights of creditors and 
shareholders. 
 
3.6 Summary and Some Concluding Remarks 
 
There can be no dispute; the current dividends provision is a failure537 and in no way an improvement 
on the old profits test, upon which stakeholders achieved a remarkable degree of consensus both as 
to its shortcomings and the policy which ought to underlie future changes to the law. Of the three 
options identified by the Australian Research Foundation in 2002 for determining the amount 
available for distribution as a dividend,538 a solvency test has received the overwhelming support; but 
a decade later it has been adopted unevenly if at all. 
 
Some of the suggestions which might address the problems identified in relation to the proposed s 
254T are obvious, and one may only speculate why the federal government has not adopted them 
already. At the very least, the dividends provision should explicitly authorise the payment of 
dividends to shareholders from amounts other than profit, rather than prohibiting dividends from 
being paid in three specified circumstances as it currently does, and it should exempt dividends paid 
out of capital from share capital reductions obligations under pt 2J.1 div 1. This would give effect to 
Parliament’s intention in the 2010 reforms of allowing the payment of dividends out of capital; and 
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533 Second Corporate Law Simplification Bill 1995 (Cth) paras 256A(1)(b)–(c). 
534 ‘Proposed Amendments’ (Discussion Paper, Treasury, n 24) 10. 
535 For a review of the case against the capital maintenance doctrine as a means of safeguarding creditors’ interests see 
generally John Armour, ‘Legal Capital: an Outdated Concept?’ (2006) 7(1) European Business Organization Law Review 
5. 
536 ‘Proposed Amendments’ (Discussion Paper, Treasury, n 24) 10. 
537 Austin, ‘New Dividend Law a Failure’ (n 36). 
538 AARF ‘Payment of Dividends’ (n 391, Position Paper) 3, replacing AARF ‘Payment of Dividends’ (n 391, Discussion 
Paper). The paper identified the existing approach, a solvency test and a going concern test. 
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also relieve companies and their officers from being placed at risk of breaching the Corporations Act, 
which may attract criminal penalties,539 as a result of their reliance on the erroneous explanations of 
the operation and effect of the dividends provision provided in the Explanatory Memorandum.   
 
There is no easy fix to many of the other problems. Whether the balance sheet test should be removed 
for the same reasons which supported the removal of the profits test requires a careful analysis that 
has not yet been conducted; there are divergent views on this issue. The AARF, Law Council 
Australia and Australian Institute of Company Directors each recommended a simple solvency test; 
the CPA Australia and the ICAA point out that a dual solvency and balance sheet test follows 
international and particularly New Zealand legislative developments,540 which is consistent with the 
business law harmonisation process forming part of the 1983 Closer Economic Relations Trade 
Agreement between the two countries.541 Unfortunately, a simple solvency approach would risk 
putting Australia further out of step with other significant international capital markets. 
 
Net asset insolvency is not an unfathomable mystery to the lawyers and legal theorists of Australian 
companies law; arguments for it were well known to the courts of the colonies. Balance sheet 
considerations were applied as one of the factors in court confirmations of capital reductions and it 
was originally Parliament’s intention that a positive net assets test replace this safeguard, before the 
1996 election to government of the Coalition and the abandonment of the idea. However, the balance 
sheet test was not declared dead; it was revived with the election of the Labor government for use in 
the 2010 reforms.     
 
There is ‘no new thing under the sun’542 of Australian companies law reform. The ‘economico-legal 
stratification’543 of dividends and share capital reductions provisions in the Corporations Act has 
accumulated more than a century and a half of uniquely Australian case law, drafting and ad hoc 
amendment; the three specified prohibitions of the current s 254T are a family of orphaned clauses 
from the development of pt 2J.1 div 1. Since companies law reform has tended to be improvised and 
uneven, the result has been internal inconsistency and conceptual confusion. As an example, there is 
little reason for the proposed s 254T to apply a solvency test whilst ss 256B and 257A apply a ‘no 
material prejudice to creditors’ test, or for the dividends provision to include a balance sheet test and 
the capital reductions provision not to. These idiosyncrasies are the legacy of a fragmentary and 
haphazard approach; bringing Australia in line with world-class legislation like the Companies Act 
[No 71] 2008 (South Africa) and placing Australia at the forefront of international companies law 
reform will require the courage to pursue a more comprehensive overhaul.  
  
                                                     
539 Corporations Law (Cth) sch 3 item 83. A director contravening the current s 254T may be subject to a maximum 
penalty of 100 penalty units or imprisonment for 2 years, or both. 
540 CPA and ICAA, Submission to Treasury (n 479). 
541 ‘Closer Economic Relations — Background Guide to the Australia New Zealand Economic Relationship’ (Guide, 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1997) 18 (DFAT, ‘Closer Economic Relations’). 
542 See The Holy Bible (1611 ed) [Ecclesiastes 1:9] (‘King James Version’). 
543 See Cooke (above n 172) 40. 
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CHAPTER 4: MAINTENANCE OF CAPITAL: A COMPARATIVE REVIEW 
 
4.1 General 
 
In previous chapters, I introduced, examined and ultimately challenged some important assumptions 
about the traditional maintenance of share capital rules which have been developed and applied by 
the courts and legislatures of Australia and the United Kingdom (including minimum share capital 
requirements, the rule that a dividend may be paid only out of profits and the prohibitions against 
share buy-backs and the reduction of share capital).  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to place the maintenance of share capital rules, and their place in the 
development of shareholder and creditor protection in Australia, into a broader international context. 
By comparing Australia with other countries (both in the western and southern hemispheres) that may 
have made some progress towards an arguably more economically-rational system of regulating the 
distributions of a corporation to its shareholders, the following comparative enquiry into foreign 
jurisdictions aims to illuminate differences, choices and continuities with past and contemporary 
domestic practice, and ultimately suggests some possibilities for law reform at home. 
 
4.2 United States of America 
 
4.2.1 Preliminary 
 
In the United States (as was also the case, historically, in Australia),544 the payment of dividends is 
regulated by state corporation laws,545 both statutory and at common law.546 This is due to the 
operation of what is known in US common law as the ‘internal affairs’ doctrine (effectively codified 
in a ‘Restatement of the Law’ by the American Law Institute, which is generally regarded as 
authoritative). 547 Under the internal affairs doctrine, all rights, duties and obligations of a 
corporation’s directors and shareholders (including those rights, duties and obligations with respect 
to the distributions of a corporation to its shareholders) are regulated by the law of the state under the 
laws of which the corporation was established.548 As a result of state jurisdiction in this area, the 
dividend restrictions which apply to any particular corporation may, and historically have, varied 
considerably from state to state.549 
 
Although historically considerable, the variation in state corporation laws has generally declined since 
1950,550 when the Committee of Corporate Laws of the American Bar Association’s Section of 
Corporation, Banking and Business Law (now called the Section of Business Law) first promulgated 
the Model Business Corporation Act.551 Described as a ‘modern, comprehensible, and rationally 
structured text of law’,552 the Model Act was designed as a general corporation statute to be enacted 
in its entirety by each state. The provisions of the Act (which the Committee has reviewed and revised 
regularly since the Act was first promulgated) have proven remarkably influential in shaping state 
                                                     
544 See, generally, New South Wales v Commonwealth (1990) 169 CLR 482. 
545 In this chapter, a reference to a state or states is a reference to a US state or US states, unless noted otherwise. 
546 KPMG, ‘Feasibility Study on an Alternative to the Capital Maintenance Regime’ (Contract ETD/2006/IM/F2/71, 
European Commission, January 2008) 155–6 [4.2.1.1] (‘Feasibility Study’). 
547 American Law Institute, Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (1971) § 302 cmt (a).  
548 Ibid § 302 cmt (a).  
549 Joseph L Weiner, ‘Theory of Anglo-American Dividend Law: American Statutes and Cases’ 29 Columbia Law Review 
461, 462 (‘American Statutes and Cases’). Weiner warns us that: ‘[o]ne preconception that must be banished is that 
corporations are in all states under an identical restriction in the payment of dividends’. 
550 For earlier efforts to harmonise US corporation laws see, generally, Uniform Law Commission, Uniform Business 
Corporation Act (1928). 
551 Am Bar Ass’n, Model Bus Corp Act (n 22) cmt v. 
552 KPMG, ‘Feasibility Study’ (n 546) 156 [4.2.1.1]. 
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corporation laws.553 At last count, some 30 states and the District of Columbia had each adopted as 
their general corporation statute ‘all or substantially all’554 of the current ‘revised’ Model Act of 1984. 
Three other states still have statutes based on an earlier 1969 version of the Model Act.555 Many more 
have adopted selected provisions of the Act.556  
 
Most state corporation statutes, including the revised Model Act, impose two separate restrictions on 
a corporation’s ability to make any type of distribution (including a dividend) to shareholders. These 
restrictions include a solvency requirement (at least as the concept of solvency is understood at 
Australian common law and in Australian legislation)557 and a capital surplus (i.e. net assets) 
requirement.  
 
In the language of § 6.40 of the revised Model Act: 
 
No distribution may be made if, after giving it effect: 
 
(1) the corporation would not be able to pay its debts as they become due in the usual course of business; or 
(2) the corporation’s total assets would be less than the sum of its total liabilities plus (unless the articles of 
incorporation permit otherwise) the amount that would be needed, if the corporation were to be dissolved 
at the time of the distribution, to satisfy the preferential rights upon dissolution of shareholders whose 
preferential rights are superior to those receiving the distribution.558 
 
Although some state corporation statutes contain a specific dividends provision559 (as distinct from a 
general provision regulating any type of distribution to shareholders, like the provision in the Model 
Act), state statutes generally do not define the term ‘dividend’. Instead, the definition is left generally 
to the US common law.560 The revised Model Act does not define the term either, referring to 
dividends merely as a type of ‘distribution’ to shareholders. 
 
In the definitions section of the revised Model Act,561 the broad term ‘distribution’ is defined as 
including ‘a direct or indirect transfer of money or other property (except its own shares)’562 or an 
‘incurrence of indebtedness by a corporation to or for the benefit of any of its shareholders in respect 
of any of its shares’.563 A distribution, the definition continues, ‘may include a declaration or payment 
of a dividend’ (clearly under the first limb of the definition, i.e. a ‘direct … transfer of money’); or ‘a 
purchase, redemption or other acquisition of shares; distribution of indebtedness; or otherwise’.564 
This reference to dividends characterises the transaction as one of several types of transfer of 
                                                     
553 Michael L Roberts, William D Samson and Michael T Dugan, ‘The Shareholders’ Equity Section: Form Without 
Substance?’ (1990) 4(4) Accounting Horizons 35, 41. 
554 Am Bar Ass’n, Model Bus Corp Act (n 22) cmt ix. The states which have enacted the revised Model Act substantially 
in its entirety include Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, 
Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Oregon, Rhode 
Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin and 
Wyoming.      
555 Ibid. The states which maintain the old Model Business Corporation Act (1969) are Alaska and New Mexico.      
556 Ibid. The notable holdouts are California, Delaware and New York, each of which has adopted certain aspects of the 
revised Model Act, and Colorado, Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New 
Jersey, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania and Texas. 
557 See Corporations Act (n 3) s 95A. 
558 Am Bar Ass’n, Model Bus Corp Act (n 22) §§ 6.40(c)(1)–(2), cmt ix. 
559 See, eg, NY Bus Corp Law § 510 (McKinney 2008); 8 Del Code Ann § 170 (2017). The provision in the New York 
Code that deals with dividends is entitled ‘[d]ividends or other distributions in cash or property’, while that of the 
Delaware Code is ‘[d]ividends; payment; wasting asset corporations’. 
560 Thomson Reuters, Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Corporations (online at 5 November 2014), 58 Stock and 
Stockholders, ‘16 Dividends’ § 5318 (‘Fletcher Cyclopedia, “Dividends”’). 
561 Am Bar Ass’n, Model Bus Corp Act (n 22) § 1.40(6) cmt ix. 
562 For the equivalent provisions of the Australian corporations legislation, see Corporations Act (n 3) pt 2J.1 divs 1–2. 
563 For the equivalent provisions of the Australian corporations legislation, see ibid pt 2J.3.  
564 Am Bar Ass’n, Model Bus Corp Act (n 22) § 1.40(6) cmt ix. 
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corporate assets to shareholders, i.e. a class of transactions considered particularly at risk of resulting 
in prejudice to creditors or to a class of shareholders (and which, therefore, may only be permitted if 
certain rules designed to protect the interests of creditors and preferred shareholders are followed). In 
doing so, the definition also diminishes the distinctiveness of a dividend as the only type of 
distribution not paid out of capital (traditionally, the only permissible type of distribution to 
shareholders, with the exception of a distribution in a liquidation).565 
 
Since dividends are not generally defined by state corporation statutes, it is appropriate to begin a 
comparative review of dividend restrictions in the United States by first examining US common law. 
 
4.2.2 Traditional Common Law Principles 
 
At US common law (as at Australian common law), the proper fund from which a dividend may be 
declared and paid is generally the ‘net earnings’ (i.e. the ‘profits’) of a corporation or its ‘surplus’ 
(about which more later), and dividends cannot legally exceed retained earnings and current profits, 
and so be declared and paid out of the share capital of the corporation.566  
 
Shareholders as well as directors may be bound by these rules.567  
 
4.2.2.1 Common Law Rule that Dividends Are Payable Only From Net Profits or Earnings 
 
The rule that dividends are payable only out of profits was and is well known to the law of dividends 
in the United States.568 It is the natural point at which to begin a comparative review of the US 
jurisdiction. Both text-writers569 and the courts570 have at various times asserted that the restriction is 
so fundamental that it would operate even in the absence of statute. 
 
In the case of Mobile & Ohio Railroad Co v Tennessee (which has been often cited and relied upon), 
571 the US Supreme Court said by way of dicta that the term ‘dividend’, ‘in its technical as well as in 
its ordinary acceptation’, means ‘that portion of its profits which the corporation, by its directory 
[sic], sets apart for ratable [sic] division among its shareholders’.572  
 
                                                     
565 See, eg, Crandall v Lincoln, 52 Conn 73, 1884 WL 1068, 52 Am Rep 560 (1884). 
566 Mobile & Ohio Railroad Co v Tennessee, 153 US 486, 496–7 (Jackson J) (1894) (‘Mobile & Ohio Railroad v 
Tennessee’); Smith v Dana, 77 Conn 543, 60 A 117, 121 (Wheeler J) (1905). 
567 Shields v Hobart, 72 SW 669, 673–4 (Gantt J) (1903); Schulte v Boulevard Gardens Land Co, 164 Cal 464, 468 (Sloss 
J) (1913).  
568 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation v First Heights Bank, FSB, 229 F 3d 528, 540 (6th Cir, 2000). 
569 See, eg, Henry O Taylor, A Treatise on the Law of Private Corporations (John D Parsons, 1877) 119–22 [105]–[106]; 
Victor Morawetz, A Treatise on the Law of Private Corporations Other than Charitable (Little, Brown and Co, 1882) 
346–7 [344]; Victor Morawetz, A Treatise on the Law of Corporations (Little, Brown and Co, 2nd ed, 1886) 410–4 [435]–
[438]; Henry O Taylor, A Treatise on the Law of Private Corporations (Kay & Brother, 1888) 525–9 [565]; Seymour D 
Thompson, Commentaries on the Law of Private Corporations (Bobbs-Merrill Co, 2nd ed, 1910) vol 5, 109 [5305]. 
570 Lockhart v Van Alstyne, 31 Mich 76, 18 Am Rep 156 (Mich, 1875) (‘Lockhart v Van Alstyne’); Mobile & Ohio Railroad 
v Tennessee (n 566) 496 (Jackson J). 
571 The decision in Mobile & Ohio Railroad v Tennessee (n 566) has been cited in 44 US cases and mentioned in a further 
33 cases. For some indication of how often it has been treated in secondary sources, see, eg, Thomson Reuters, Fletcher 
Cyclopedia ‘16 Dividends’ (n 560) §§ 5318, 5329, 5335, 5339, 5340, ‘18 Unlawful Dividends’ § 5419, 60 Taxation, ‘9 
Exemptions from Taxation’ §§ 6955.50–6956, 6959.50; Thomson Reuters, American Jurisprudence (2nd ed, at 5 
November 2014) Corporations, ‘14 Dividends and Other Similar Distributions; Stock Splits’ §§ 998, 1015, 1023–1023, 
1027, 1053, 1132 (‘American Jurisprudence’).    
572 Mobile & Ohio Railroad v Tennessee (n 566) 496 (Jackson J). For a modern case citing this definition with approval, 
refer to the decision of the US Tax Court in Watson v Commissioner, TC (Lexis) 31 (1960). 
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In support of this concept of the dividend, and the rule that no dividend may be paid except out of 
profits, the US Supreme Court cited (with approval)573 the earlier case of Lockhart v Van Alstyne.574 
In that case, which was decided by the Michigan Supreme Court in 1875, a shareholder attempted to 
enforce an agreement entered into with a corporation which required the corporation to pay annual 
dividends, to preferred stockholders, ‘without reference to its ability to pay them from earnings’.575 
The shareholder argued that ‘the word “dividend” means only something to be divided; and to the 
persons who are to participate in the division it is immaterial whence it comes’.576 Cooley J, who 
considered the earlier authorities (both British577 and American),578 could find none where the word 
had been interpreted in accordance with the shareholder’s view, and what his Honour said is worth 
considering at some length: 
 
A dividend to the stockholders of a corporation … is always, so far as we are aware, understood as a fund which 
the corporation sets apart from its profits, to be divided among its members. A corporation of which it is said 
that it is making an annual dividend of ten per centum upon its stock, is supposed to be a prosperous corporation, 
because its gains leave it this clear annual per centage, which it can pay over without impairing its capital. A 
dividend among preference stockholders exclusively, is understood to imply that the sum divided has been 
realized as profits, though the earnings do not yield a dividend to the stockholders in general. We hazard nothing 
in saying that this is the primary and universal understanding of a dividend on stock … This is manifestly the 
view of the court in … every … case in which we have found the word [‘dividend’] employed in any connection 
corresponding to that in which it is made use of here.579 
 
It is significant that what the Court considered and emphasised here was the important role that 
dividends were supposed to play in providing information, to interested stakeholders, about the 
flourishing state of a corporation’s financial position and performance. In support of the rule that no 
dividend may be paid except out of profits, commentators have sometimes asserted (and not entirely 
without reason) that the strongest argument in the rule’s favour ‘is that it accords with the universal 
opinion among laymen’.580 We saw in a previous chapter that, in the United Kingdom, the rule 
originated from the assumption that, when directors declare and pay a dividend, they declare by 
implication that the corporation has earned profits which justify such a dividend, and that, therefore, 
if no such profits have been earned, then the dividend has been fraudulently made.581 As we shall 
shortly see, a very similar assumption was forming on the other side of the Atlantic around the same 
time. 
 
In the earlier Rhode Island Supreme Court case of Taft v Hartford,582 which was cited with approval 
by the Court in Lockhart v Van Alstyne,583 counsel for the defendant (for whom judgement was given), 
obtained the common law rule that dividends may be paid only out of profit by referring to the 
statements of American text-writers, including John Bouvier and Isaac Redfield.584 ‘Dividend’, said 
Bouvier in the first half of the 19th century, was a term ‘applied to the division of the profits arising 
out of bank or other stocks’.585 Later, Redfield wrote in his influential treatise on the law of railways 
that: 
                                                     
573 Mobile & Ohio Railroad v Tennessee (n 566) 496. 
574 Lockhart v Van Alstyne (n 570). 
575 Ibid 1. 
576 Ibid. 
577 Stevens v South Devon Railway Co (1851) 13 Beavan 48, 51 ER 18; Henry v Great Northern Railway Co (1857) 1 De 
Gex & Jones 606; 44 ER 858. 
578 Taft v Hartford, Providence & Fishkill Railroad Co, 8 RI 310 (RI, 1866) (‘Taft v Hartford’). 
579 Lockhart v Van Alstyne (n 570) 159 (Cooley J). 
580 Weiner, ‘American Statutes and Cases’ (n 549) 474. 
581 Burnes v Pennell (n 104) 524–5 (Lord Campbell).  
582 Taft v Hartford (n 578). 
583 Lockhart v Van Alstyne (n 570) 159. 
584 Taft v Hartford (n 578) 321 (Samuel Currey) (during argument). 
585 John Bouvier, A Law Dictionary, Adapted to the Constitution and Laws of the United States of America, and of the 
Several States of the American Union (2nd ed, T J W Johnson, 1843) 485–6, quoted in Taft v Hartford (n 578) 321 (Samuel 
Currey) (during argument).  
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Dividends are only to be declared out of the actual earnings of the company; and if they be declared, when not 
earned, and so virtually payable out of the capital, or which is the same thing, out of money borrowed, and this 
be done for the purpose of increasing the price of shares, or the credit of the company, (and it is difficult to 
conjecture any other motive, unless done under a misapprehension of the true state of the company’s finances,) 
it is a fraud upon the shareholders, and upon the public, also, and any one injured thereby, as we have before 
seen, is entitled to relief, either in equity or at law.586 
 
Remarkably, we have here all but a restatement, by an American text-writer, of the principles which 
were stated less than a decade earlier by the House of Lords in Burnes v Pennell.587 Rather than 
deterring the impairment of share capital, so that the resources of a corporation might remain 
sufficient to meet its outstanding debts, the objective of the dividend restriction was considered by 
Redfield to be deterring the fraudulent misrepresentation of a corporation’s financial situation, which 
might induce a potential shareholder or perhaps a creditor into an association with the corporation, to 
the shareholder’s or creditor’s loss.  
 
This ‘actual fraud’ theory of director and shareholder liability, although influential in the earlier 
development of the rule that no dividend may be paid except out of profit, is deficient when 
considered from the modern perspective of enhanced shareholder and creditor protection.  
 
Under an inflexible application of the ‘actual fraud’ theory, neither a shareholder nor a creditor would 
be able to recover dividends paid out of share capital in circumstances where the dividends had been 
paid and received without fraudulent conduct (i.e. without knowledge that the dividends were 
wrongfully paid otherwise than from profits). As Redfield conceded in the passage above, a dividend 
might be paid out of amounts other than profits in circumstances where the directors were ‘under a 
misapprehension of the true state of the company’s finances’. Referring to the law on arguably 
analogous subjects (such as the sale of real estate or personal property, made in good faith, where a 
fact is equally unknown to both buyer and vendor),588 Redfield concluded that relief could not be 
granted to a suffering party where dividends were paid and received in circumstances involving a 
mutual misapprehension as to the true state of the company’s funds and property.589 ‘To constitute a 
fraud in such cases’, said Redfield, ‘the party gaining the advantage in the bargain should, in some 
way, participate in giving currency to the false estimate of [the company’s] condition, beyond the 
mere fact of repeating the report of the directors, where both parties have equal means of judging its 
correctness’.590  
 
In a shareholder’s or creditor’s action to hold a director liable for the amount of dividends wrongfully 
declared, the parties are unlikely to have been upon an equal footing in respect of their means of 
access to the knowledge of the true prosperity of the company. Accordingly, fraud may reasonably 
be presumed from the suppression of the fact that the affairs of the company were embarrassed.  
 
However, it seldom happens that any such circumstance lies within the knowledge of the shareholders 
who received the wrongfully declared dividend. To compel restitution of dividends received by an 
innocent shareholder, therefore, the law of dividends had to turn from an ‘actual fraud’ to a 
‘constructive fraud’ theory, and the rule against paying dividends when insolvent. 
 
                                                     
586 Isaac F Redfield, A Practical Treatise upon the Law of Railways (2nd ed, Little, Brown and Co, 1858) 597–8 §240.1 
(‘Treatise upon Railways’), cited in Taft v Hartford (n 578) 321 (Samuel Currey) (during argument). 
587 Burnes v Pennell (n 104). 
588 See Joseph Storey, Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence, as Administered in England and America (4th ed, Charles 
C Little & James Brown, 1846) vol 1, 163 §142; James Kent, Commentaries on American Law (2nd ed, O Halstead, 1832) 
Vol 2, 469, cited in Redfield, A Treatise upon Railways (n 586) 61 n 4. 
589 Redfield, Treatise upon Railways (n 586) 61 §41.5. 
590 Ibid. 
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4.2.2.2 Common Law Rule that No Dividend May Be Paid While a Corporation Is Insolvent 
 
At US common law, a shareholder generally has no right to retain a dividend received from a 
corporation which is insolvent at the time that the dividend is declared and paid, or which is made 
insolvent by such payment, and an action may be brought to recover any dividend thus paid.591  
 
The statutes of most states codify this general rule. However, even in the absence of statute, no 
dividend may be paid while a corporation is insolvent or which will render it insolvent.592 This rule 
is founded usually on the theory either that the insolvent payment of a dividend is ‘in fraud of 
creditors’,593 or the theory that the share capital of an insolvent corporation is a trust fund (about 
which more later), for the payment of creditors entitled to a portion of the fund,594 which may be 
followed and recovered back if paid in the way of wrongful dividends to the shareholders.595 
 
4.2.2.2.1 Wrongful Dividends and Fraudulent Conveyances 
 
The rule that no dividend may be paid while a corporation is insolvent or which will render it insolvent 
may be considered (as a matter both of theory and history) a specific application of the general 
doctrine of fraudulent conveyances.596  
 
The doctrine of fraudulent conveyances is not an area originally of the company or corporate law.597 
It applies not only to corporations, or to partnerships, but to debtors generally. Although the doctrine 
invalidates a transfer by a debtor made with the intent to defraud creditors (‘actual fraud’), it also 
invalidates any transfer made without fair consideration by an insolvent debtor, without regard to the 
parties’ actual knowledge and intent (i.e. ‘constructive fraud’).   
 
As a protection for creditors, a constructive fraud theory of director and shareholder liability appears 
much more powerful and elaborate than an actual fraud theory. A shareholder who receives a dividend 
in the bona fide belief that the dividend was paid out of profits will not satisfy the elements of actual 
fraud (even in circumstances where the corporation at the time of the payment was in fact insolvent). 
However, such circumstances may well amount to a constructive fraud.598  
 
In the case of Powers v Heggie,599 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court confirmed that, where 
a corporation is insolvent at the time it declares and pays a dividend to a shareholder, and where the 
creditors of the corporation existing at the time the dividend is declared are not subsequently paid, it 
must necessarily follow that the payment of the dividend is constructively fraudulent as to such 
creditors, without regard to the actual intent of the shareholders.600 Even more remarkably, the Court 
also confirmed that neither ignorance of the corporation’s insolvency, the erroneous assumption that 
the dividend had been paid out of profits nor the shareholder’s good faith in receiving the payment 
could relieve a shareholder from an obligation to return such a dividend.601  
 
  
                                                     
591 McDonald v Williams, 174 US 397, 403–4, 19 S Ct 743, 745–6 (Peckham J) (1899) (‘McDonald v Williams’). 
592 Manning v Campbell, 264 Mass 386, 389, 162 NE 770 (Mass, 1928) Calkins v Wire Hardware Co, 267 Mass 52, 60, 
165 NE 889, 893 (Mass, 1929). 
593 Wabash, Street Louis & Pacific Railway Co v Ham, 114 US 587, 594, 5 Sup Ct 1081, 1084 (Gray J) (1885). 
594 McDonald v Williams (n 591) 400; 744 (Peckham J). 
595 Cf McDonald v Williams (n 591) 404; 745 (Peckham J). 
596 Weiner, ‘American Statutes and Cases’ (n 549) 464. 
597 Thomson Reuters, American Jurisprudence (n 571 online, at May 2015) Fraudulent Conveyances and Transfers, ‘1 In 
General’. 
598 McDonald v Williams (n 591) 401; 744 (Peckham J). 
599 Powers v Heggie, 268 Mass 233, 167 NE 314 (‘Powers v Heggie’). 
600 Ibid 242; 317 (Pierce J). 
601 Ibid. 
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According to Pierce J: 
 
The good faith of the defendant [shareholder] in receiving the dividends, his belief that they were earned and 
paid out of profits, his absence of knowledge that the corporation was insolvent or that the payment of the specific 
dividends would defeat, delay or defraud any existing creditor of the corporation, could not change the fact that 
the dividends received were mere gifts, nor operate to relieve him from the obligation to return them to the 
corporation or to its creditors on demand.602  
 
The Court’s observation that a dividend payment is a type of transfer of cash or property by a 
corporation to its shareholders made in the absence of consideration for the transfer (i.e. a voluntary 
conveyance) is highly important. It reflects the earliest origin of what in Australia is known as an 
‘insolvent and voidable transaction’603 in the law of fraudulent conveyances. 
 
From the perspective of protecting creditors, the advantage of the above constructive fraud concept 
that a shareholder may not retain a dividend received from a corporation which is insolvent is that the 
rule will more often allow an action against the shareholder than one where actual fraud is an essential 
element. Because directors often have access to information about a corporation’s financial affairs 
and management which the corporation’s shareholders do not, an actual fraud theory is only really 
effective at allowing actions against directors for the wrongful payment of dividends. However, an 
action against the directors may be unattractive for various reasons, including the inability of the 
directors to restore the financial condition of the company. On the other hand, an innocent shareholder 
may be able to compensate the corporation by repaying the dividend declared and paid while the 
corporation was insolvent. Shareholder liability may, however, be considered a double-edged sword. 
At US common law, neither the fact that a receiver of an insolvent corporation may be given a 
statutory right of action against the company’s guilty directors to recover dividends wrongfully 
declared and paid, nor the fact that the directors would be financially able to respond to such action, 
if it were pursued, will exonerate an innocent shareholder.604  
 
The modern law of fraudulent conveyances may be traced as far back as the law of the Roman Empire, 
and the collections of laws and legal interpretations of the Corpus Juris Civilis. In the 6th century, 
Justinian I, encouraged by the success of his first great experiment, the Codex Constitutionum (which 
had collated and systemised the imperial constitutions then in force), appointed a commission of 16 
eminent lawyers to set about the task of simplifying and digesting the writings of the most 
authoritative jurists of the first three centuries of the empire. The results, which they published in 533, 
and which Justinian enacted as a lawbook that became known as the Digest or Pandects, gave a very 
detailed treatment of the law of fraudulent conveyancing existing at the time.  
 
In Book XLII of the Digest, an extract of the Roman jurist and imperial official Ulpian605 states:  
 
where a donation is fraudulently made to anyone, there should be no inquiry as to whether the person to whom 
the article was given was aware of the nature of the transaction or not, but only whether the creditors were 
defrauded. He who was ignorant of the fraud is not understood to have been injured by it, as he only loses a 
source of gain, and no loss is inflicted upon him. Against those, however, who have experienced the generosity 
                                                     
602 Ibid. 
603 See Corporations Act (n 3) pt 5.7B divs 2, 3. For a discussion of the regime established by the Corporate Law Reform 
Act 1992 (Cth), which informed the regime in divs 2 and 3 of the Corporations Act, see David S Morrison and Colin J 
Anderson, ‘Uncommercial Transactions: Developments in the New Regime’ (1999) 7(4) Insolvency Law Journal 184. 
604 Powers v Heggie (n 599) 245; 318 (Pierce J). 
605 Born in Tyre, Phoenicia, Domitius Ulpianus annotated the works of Papinian (who posthumously became the definitive 
authority on Roman law) under the emperor Lucius Septimus Severus, was master of petitions to the emperor Caracalla 
(who reigned from 198 to 211), and under the emperor Severus Alexander was praetorian prefect from 222 to 228, when 
he was murdered by his officers. 
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of one whom they did not know to be insolvent, an action should only be granted to the extent to which they 
have become pecuniarily benefited, and no farther.606 
 
This is one of the earliest judicial statements which declares an act fraudulent of creditors in the 
absence both of actual knowledge and fraudulent intent. The statement (and particularly its use of the 
word ‘fraud’), will perhaps occasion less confusion for a lay reader if he or she observes, as Max 
Radin suggests, that the Latin root of the word fraus:607  
 
does not really mean ‘fraud’ at all in the sense of ‘deceit’ — at any rate, not deliberate fraud. The word for that 
is dolus. The word fraus means ‘prejudice’ or ‘disadvantage’ and it is used in that sense in a number of idiomatic 
expressions and formulas in legal as well as quite generally in non-legal writers.608   
 
Accordingly, at Roman law, a voluntary transfer made without adequate consideration by an insolvent 
debtor was a set of facts from which a fraud of creditors could always be inferred, and a person had 
no right to retain property so transferred. 
 
Later, in the common law jurisdictions of the United Kingdom and the United States, the law of 
fraudulent conveyances found its earliest roots in the English Statute of 13 Elizabeth.609 Colonial 
fraudulent conveyance legislation ‘more or less repeated the words’ of the Act’s provisions, and, after 
the American Revolution, the Act ‘was re-enacted in some states’ while in others ‘the courts 
considered it as part of the common law in force’.610  
 
In 1918, the US Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, which essentially restated the Statute of 13 
Elizabeth and codified ‘the “better” decisions’611 applying to the Act, was promulgated by the 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Today, almost all states have replaced that 
Act with the Uniform Voidable Transactions Act (formerly Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, which 
was first promulgated in 1985).612 The Uniform Voidable Transactions Act and its predecessors make 
voidable two classes of transfer. Firstly, a transfer made by a debtor ‘with actual intent to hinder, 
delay or defraud any creditor’.613 Secondly, (as at Roman law) a voluntary transfer made by an 
insolvent debtor without adequate consideration.614 In the latter case, ‘the intent to defraud is 
presumed to exist as matter of law’.615 
 
                                                     
606 Justinian et al (eds) ‘Concerning Restitution Where Fraudulent Acts Have Been Committed against Creditors’, tr SP 
Scott in SP Scott, The Civil Law (Central Trust Co, 1932) vol 9, 273. 
607 From which Old French took fraude and Middle English ‘fraud’. 
608 Max Radin, ‘Fraudulent Conveyances at Roman Law’ (1931) 18(2) Virginia Law Review 109, 111. 
609 The Statute of 13 Elizabeth (n 201) provided that: 
Covinous [i.e. ‘of the nature of covin; collusive; fraudulent deceitful’] and fraudulent feoffments [in feudal law, a 
grant of ownership of freehold property], gifts, grants, alienations, conveyances, bonds, suits, judgments and 
executions, as well of lands of tenements as of goods and chattels … devised and contrived of malice, fraud, covin 
[i.e. a ‘fraudulent action of any kind to the injury of another; fraud, deceit, treachery’], collusion or guile, to the end, 
purpose and intent, to delay, hinder or defraud creditors and others … shall be utterly void, frustrate and of no effect. 
Statute of 13 Elizabeth (n 201, definitions quoted from the Oxford English Dictionary (online ed, March 2015)). 
610 Paul J Hartman, ‘A Survey of the Fraudulent Conveyance in Bankruptcy’ (1963-64) 17(2) Vanderbilt Law Review 
381, 382. 
611 Uniform Law Commission, Uniform Voidable Transactions Act (1985, amended 2014) 1 prefatory note (‘Unif Law 
Comm’n, Unif Voidable Transactions Act (2014)’). 
612 The Uniform Voidable Transactions Act has been adopted in Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, 
Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, 
Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New 
Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South 
Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, U.S. Virgin Islands, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming. 
613 Unif Law Comm’n, Unif Voidable Transactions Act (n 611, 2014) § 4(a)(1). 
614 Ibid § 4(a)(2). For the original statute on which this provision is based see Statute of 13 Elizabeth (above n 201) s 6. 
615 Re Eric, 25 F Supp 211, 212 (Patterson J) (D NY, 1938). 
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An examination of the Uniform Voidable Transactions Act is called for not only because of the 
historical and conceptual relationship between a dividend paid while a corporation is insolvent and a 
voluntary conveyance, made without consideration, by a debtor who is insolvent. In 1979, the 
committee appointed by the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws to undertake a 
study of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act (with a view to preparing the draft of the revision 
which became the Uniform Voidable Transactions Act) received a proposal from the Committee on 
Corporate Laws of the Section of Corporations, Banking and Business Law (itself engaged in revising 
the Model Business Corporation Act) recommending ‘that the Conference review provisions of the 
Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act with a view to determining whether the Acts are consistent in 
respect to the treatment of dividend distributions’. 616 The Uniform Voidable Transactions Act 
operates independently of the shareholder distribution provisions of state corporation laws, and 
compliance with state corporation laws does not guarantee that a distribution will not be voidable 
under the fraudulent conveyance laws. 617 Accordingly, the benefit in having a consistent treatment 
of the law of dividends at corporate law and at the law of fraudulent conveyances is obvious. 
 
The definition of ‘insolvency’ in fraudulent conveyance law which is contained in the Uniform 
Voidable Transactions Act is adapted from the definition of the term at bankruptcy law contained in 
the United States Bankruptcy Code.618 The fraudulent conveyance provision reads: 
 
(a) A debtor is insolvent if, at a fair valuation, the sum of the debtor’s debts is greater than the sum of the 
debtor’s assets.  
(b) A debtor that is generally not paying the debtor’s debts as they become due other than as a result of a bona 
fide dispute is presumed to be insolvent. The presumption imposes on the party against which the 
presumption is directed the burden of proving that the nonexistence of insolvency is more probable than its 
existence.619 
 
Here there is stated a clear and logical relationship between an insufficiency of assets and a lack of 
cash or credit. At fraudulent conveyance law, an inability to pay one’s debts is accepted as strong (but 
not necessarily conclusive) proof that a debtor is insolvent in the sense of insufficiency of net assets, 
although the reverse is probably not true. This stands in diametrical opposition to the relationship 
between the two different meanings of insolvency at Australian common law. 
 
This discussion begs the question of whether, for the purpose of the rule at corporation law that no 
dividend may be paid while a corporation is insolvent, ‘insolvency’ means an inability to pay debts 
as they mature, or an excess of liabilities over assets. Unfortunately, few earlier cases considered this 
question,620 and those that did were confused. 
 
A good example of such confusion may be seen in the case of the United States Smelting Co v 
Hofkin,621 which was decided in the early 20th century. In this case, the shareholders of a corporation, 
knowing that a large sum of money would ‘very shortly thereafter’ become due and payable to a 
creditor under a number of contracts with the corporation, declared in their role as directors of the 
corporation a dividend of 500 per cent of the share capital.622 ‘Almost immediately afterwards’, the 
directors placed the affairs of the corporation under the management of a receiver, and, being ‘almost 
without assets’ there was ‘nothing left for creditors’.623  
                                                     
616 Unif Law Comm’n, Unif Voidable Transactions Act (n 611, 2014) 1 prefatory note. 
617 Ibid §4 cmt. 
618 United States Bankruptcy Code, 11 USC (2013) § 101(32)(a). Under the Bankruptcy Code, the term ‘insolvent’ is 
defined as the financial condition of an entity ‘such that the sum of such entity’s debts is greater than all of such entity’s 
property, at a fair valuation’. 
619 Unif Law Comm’n, Unif Voidable Transactions Act (n 611, 2014) § 2. 
620 Weiner, ‘American Statutes and Cases’ (n 549) 465. 
621 United States Smelting Co Picher Lead Co v Hofkin, 261 F 546 (1919). 
622 Ibid 547. 
623 Ibid. 
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At first instance, the US District Court observed that there was no statutory definition of 
insolvency.624 For the greater part of his decision, and in the following extract, Dickinson J appears 
to favour a meaning of insolvency which refers to an inability to meet debts immediately demandable: 
 
Every director is presumed to know, because he must know, that the right of stockholders to dividends is 
subordinated to the rights of creditors. The right of the one does not begin until the rights of the other are assured. 
This, of course, does not mean an absolute assurance; but it does mean a reasonably well founded business 
expectation that the obligations of the corporation will be met. The financial condition of the corporation enters 
into it; there also enters the distinction between obligations which are presently payable debts or which time 
alone will ripen into debts and contingent obligations or executory contracts out of which no debt is expected to 
arise otherwise than as a possibility more or less remote.625 
 
Later in his judgement, however, his Honour discusses insolvency in the sense used in the United 
States Bankruptcy Code, stating that ‘the balance sheet showed surplus earnings justifying the 
payment of a dividend. This is … justification for the payment of a dividend.’626 
 
4.2.3 Legislative Background 
 
4.2.3.1 Pre-revolutionary Corporations and Unincorporated Joint Stock Companies 
 
The early, pre-Revolutionary corporation of 16th–18th century America was closely bound to the work 
and undertaking of the English colonisation of the New World.627 The first corporation in America 
(chartered by Sir Walter Raleigh, the famous English explorer, and incorporated under the name of 
‘Governour and Assistants of the Citie of Ralegh in Virginia’)628 was established in 1587, two decades 
before the establishment of the first permanent English settlement at Jamestown Colony, located near 
present-day Williamsburg, Virginia. It was followed by colonising corporations established by the 
royal charters granted to the colonies of Virginia in 1609,629  Massachusetts in 1620 and 1629,630 
Connecticut in 1662,631 Rhode Island in 1663632 and Georgia in 1732.633  
 
Prior to the 19th century, the law of dividends in America was developed exclusively by the dividend 
regulations of colonial charters and private statutes, and by the ‘large body of actual practice 
precedents evolved from the every-day business of an increasing number of corporations’.634 From 
such business practices, the first dividends provisions of general application, which constitute the 
basis of modern American dividend law, were to develop. 
 
The dividends provision of the Second Charter of Virginia is perhaps illustrative of the actual business 
practice of the American colonising corporation.635 In 1609, the charter of the Virginia company 
established a ‘periodic’ joint stock, which was to be maintained for a period of seven years, at the end 
of which ‘all the profits as well as the land’ (i.e. the profits and share capital) ‘should be distributed 
                                                     
624 Ibid. 
625 Ibid 550. 
626 Ibid 550–1. 
627 Donald Kehl, ‘The Origin and Early Development of American Dividend Law’ (1939) 53 Harvard Law Review 36, 
41. 
628 Richard Hakluyt, The Principal Navigations, Voyages, Traffiques and Discoveries of the English Nation (James 
MacLehose, 1904) vol 8, 386. 
629 Benjamin Perley Poore, The Federal and State Constitutions, Colonial Charters, and Other Organic Laws of the 
United States (Government Printing Office, 1877) vol 8, 1893. 
630 Ibid 921, 932. 
631 Ibid 252. 
632 Ibid 1595. 
633 Ibid 369. 
634 Kehl (n 627) 36. 
635 Ibid 43. 
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among the shareholders according to their holdings’.636 Under this system, there were no limitations 
upon the fund from which dividends could be paid. The venture terminated with a complete division 
of investment and profit. 
 
Unable to obtain from the Crown a charter of their own, and prevented by rough seas and storms from 
reaching the territory that had been granted to them in Virginia, the Pilgrims who disembarked from 
the Mayflower in Plymouth, Massachusetts, in 1620 (where they established the first permanent New 
England colony), decided to finance their historic voyage by forming an unincorporated joint stock 
company with a similar dividends provision to the Virginia company.637 Unlike the ‘merchants of 
London, and adventurers to Virginia’ who ventured their money in Raleigh’s lost colony (or the ‘late 
of London gentlemen’ who ventured their persons),638 many of the Mayflower’s Pilgrims were men 
and women ‘without considerable means’, and the sum necessary for their venture was larger than 
they could expect from the donations of philanthropists.639 The motive behind their fundraising was 
not so very dissimilar to a modern start-up company’s initial public offering. The Pilgrims signed a 
constitution in the form that ‘the persons transported & the adventurers shall continue their joynt 
stock & partnership together, the space of seven years’640 during which time ‘all profits & benifits 
that are got by trade, traffick, trucking, working, fishing, or any other means by any person or persons, 
remaine still in the comone stock until the division’.641 At the end of the seven years, ‘the capitall & 
profits, viz the houses, lands, goods and chatles’, would be ‘equally devided betwixte the adventurers, 
and planters’.642  
 
So far this thesis has considered only colonising corporations, not trading corporations. According to 
Donald Kehl,643 only three trading corporations were formed in America in the 17th century,644 and 
‘very few additional colonial charters were granted between the beginning of the 18th century and the 
opening of the American Revolution in 1765’.645 However, while instances of pre-Revolutionary 
corporations (whether colonising units or trading corporations) were few in number, the number of 
unincorporated ‘associations, partnerships, societies, groups of “undertakers” [and] “companies”’ 
which were ‘formed for a great variety of business purposes’ were many.646  
 
In 1741, the colonial government’s suppression of the unincorporated Massachusetts Land Bank 
(under the auspices of the infamous Bubble Act)647 created considerably more public controversy than 
the affairs of any pre-Revolutionary corporation.648 Established by a number of colonists (‘the greater 
                                                     
636 John P Davis, Corporations — A Study of the Origin and Development of Great Business Combinations and of their 
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part’ of whom were, like the Puritans of the Mayflower, ‘men of small means’)649 during the last year 
of the administration of Governor Jonathan Belcher of the Province of Massachusetts Bay, the Land 
Bank was an experiment ‘in the way of furnishing a currency secured by real estate, redeemable in 
the future in commodities’.650 In respect of dividend distributions, the Land Bank’s articles provided 
that: 
 
at the end of five years [at a meeting of the Partners] there shall be a Dividend made of so much of the Profits as 
shall be agreed on by a major Part of the Directors, concurring with a major Part of the Partners then present; 
and from that Time there shall be a Dividend at every annual Meeting; Provided always that in all such 
Dividends, care be taken that there still remain in the Stock double the Principal paid in from Time to Time as 
aforesaid.651 
 
This then was the first American prohibition against payment of dividends except out of profits.652 
However, it was a dividend regulation which was soon to be replicated. Fascinatingly, it also specified 
a minimum share capital and net assets requirement — no dividend was payable unless the net assets 
of the bank remained double the amount of share capital.  
 
The establishment of the Massachusetts Land Bank aroused the hostility of a number of Boston 
merchants, and, that same year, and in opposition to the Land Bank, the merchants established a Silver 
Bank, which would issue its own notes redeemable at future periods in coined sterling silver or 
gold.653 The articles of the Silver Bank provided that: 
 
at the Expiration of the aforesaid Term of Fifteen Years, [the Directors] shall deliver and pay to each Subscriber 
or Undertaker, his Executors or Administrators, his proportionable Part of all the nete [sic] Profits of the aforesaid 
Emission of Notes, and of their letting or hiring out the Silver or Gold aforesaid, or any other way arising from 
the Company’s Interest as aforesaid.654 
 
Therefore, as in the cases of Burnes v Pennell and Evans v Coventry in the United Kingdom, 
unincorporated joint stock companies shaped the development of early business practice in the United 
States. 
 
4.2.3.2 Early Bank Corporations 
 
The Treaty of Paris,655 which concluded the American Revolution and recognised the independence 
of the United States, removed the Bubble Act as an obstacle to incorporation. Clearly, there must had 
been considerable unsatisfied demand for the chartering of corporations, for, whereas the total number 
of business charters granted prior to the American Revolution was just seven,656 during the period 
1781–85 there were 11 such incorporations.657 There were twice as many business charters granted 
during 1786–90 as there had in the previous five years, and more than five times as many granted 
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during 1791–95 as there had been during 1786–90.658 By the end of the 18th century, 335 charters had 
been granted for business corporations,659 90 per cent of which were incorporated after 1789.660 
 
The rapid increase of corporate enterprise in the field of business (which was allowed to occur by the 
demise of the Bubble Act and the increased ease with which people could petition for a charter) shifted 
the main driver behind development of American dividend law beyond the orbit of unincorporated 
associations, and into that of special charters granted to businesses. The first of these charters which 
this thesis shall examine is that of the Bank of North America. As early as 1779,661 Alexander 
Hamilton, one of the most prominent statesmen of America’s Revolutionary generation,662 pressed 
upon Robert Morris the imperative demand of establishing a commercial bank to tide over 
Revolutionary finances which were faltering as a result of the war’s disruption of foreign mercantile 
relationships.663 An American merchant and a banker who came to be known as ‘the financier of the 
Revolution’, Morris presented to the Confederation Congress in 1781 his plan for a national bank 
which would serve the needs both of the government and commerce.664 Section 8 of the plan 
authorised the board of directors to ‘dispose of the Money and Credit of the Bank for the Interest and 
Benefit of the proprietors, and make from time to time such Dividends, out of the Profits, as they may 
think proper’.665 Congress voted approval of the plan and resolved to formally incorporate the bank 
on 26 May 1781.666  
 
Here then was an early American charter limiting dividends to profits. The origins of this dividends 
limitation were the provisions for payment of dividends out of profits which had been included in the 
articles of American joint stock companies such as the Land Bank and the Silver Bank. 
 
When Hamilton wrote the constitution of the Bank of New York in 1784,667 the charter of the Bank 
of North America inspired the content of its articles.668 Article 17 of the Bank’s constitution provided 
that ‘such a dividend on the profits of the Bank as a majority of all the directors shall determine to 
make, shall be declared at least fourteen days previous to the general election’,669 and that ‘all 
subsequent dividends shall be made half yearly’.670 For six years the Bank of New York then traded 
as an unincorporated joint stock company, until receiving a charter in 1791.671 
                                                     
658 Ibid 22–3. 
659 Ibid 22. 
660 Ibid 8. 
661 Alexander Hamilton, Henry Cabot Lodge (ed), The Works of Alexander Hamilton (G P Putnam’s Sons, 1904) vol 1, 
ii, 116, 162, 223. 
662 Alexander Hamilton contributed conspicuously to the Constitutional Convention in 1781 as New York delegate, was 
major author of the Federalist papers published between 1787 and 1788, and became first secretary of the Treasury, where 
he was the foremost champion of a strong central government for the new United States. In 1804, he was killed in a duel 
with Aaron Burr. 
663 Adolph Oscar Eliason, The Rise of Commercial Banking Institutions in the United States (PhD Thesis, University of 
Minnesota, 1901) 55–6. Cf Letter from Robert Morris to Congress, 29 July 1782, in Journals of the Continental Congress 
— 1744-89 (Library of Congress, 1782) vol 22, 432. 
664 Lawrence Lewis, A History of the Bank of North America (J B Lippincott, 1882) 27. 
665 Robert Morris, Plan for Establishing a National Bank in the United States of North America (1781) s 8, in Journals of 
the Continental Congress — 1744-89 (Library of Congress, 1781) vol 20, 545; Lewis (n 664) 128. 
666 Journals of the Continental Congress — 1744–89 (Library of Congress, 1781) vol 20, 546. 
667 Henry W Domett, A History of the Bank of New York — 1784–1884 (G P Putnam’s Sons, 1884) 11 (‘History of the 
Bank of New York’). 
668 Indeed, William Seaton, the cashier of the Bank of New York, was empowered to visit Philadelphia with a letter of 
introduction from Hamilton, to study the methods of banking business practiced by the Bank of North America: ibid 15.  
669 Alexander Hamilton, Constitution of the Bank of New York (1784), in John C Hamilton (ed), The Works of Alexander 
Hamilton (G P Putnam’s Sons, 1850) vol 2, 332 (‘Constitution of the Bank of New York’); Domett, History of the Bank 
of New York (n 667) 14. 
670 Hamilton, Constitution of the Bank of New York (n 669) art 17; Domett, History of the Bank of New York (n 667) 14. 
671 An Act to Incorporate the Stockholders of the Bank of New York, ch 37, 1791 NY Laws, in Laws of the State of New 
York (Greenleaf, 1792) vol 2, 360. Section 6 of the Act provided that ‘it shall be the duty of the directors to make half-
yearly dividends of so much of the profits of the said bank, as to them, or a majority of them, appear advisable’. 
83 
 
  
The model for the dividend regulation which was to appear in the majority of American special 
charters comes from the draft charter of the Bank of the United States,672 which Hamilton submitted 
for the consideration of the House of Representatives in 1790.673 The dividend limitation of this plan, 
which was enacted the following February, provided that ‘[h]alf yearly dividends shall be made of so 
much of the profits of the bank, as shall appear to the directors advisable’.674 Thus far, dividend 
regulations in America had focused on profit limitations. However, in November 1791,675 a general 
meeting of the shareholders of the Bank of the United States was convened and voted to adopt an 
ordinance and bylaw which specifically forbade the payment of dividends from capital, and imposed 
liability on directors for contravention of the regulation. Section 10 provided: 
 
That in case the board of directors shall at any time make a dividend exceeding the profits of the bank and thereby 
diminish capital stock, the members assenting thereto shall be liable in their several individual capacities for the 
amount of the surplus so divided.676 
  
Ever since, the profits limitation and maintenance of capital have remained inextricably linked. 
 
4.2.4 Present Law 
 
4.2.4.1 Model Business Corporations Act  
 
The current law of dividends which is contained in the ‘financial provisions’ of the revised Model 
Act reflects ‘a modernization of the concepts underlying the capital structure and limitations on 
distributions of corporations’ which began with amendments in 1980 to the 1969 version of the Model 
Act.677 These amendments radically simplified and restructured the rules regulating contributions of 
share capital by shareholders, by eliminating the concepts of ‘par value’ and ‘stated capital’678 (as 
they have now also been eliminated, in Australia) in §§ 18–19 (captioned ‘Consideration for Shares’ 
and ‘Payment for Shares’, respectively) and replacing them with the provisions relating to the 
‘simpler and more flexible structure’ in § 6.21 (‘Issuance of Shares’). 
 
In 1984, further modernization occurred when the Committee on Corporate Laws published a 
complete revision of the Model Act. Much more will not be said about the elimination of the 
traditional concepts underlying the capital structure of corporations. The other important change 
which was made by the 1980 revisions to the financial provisions of the Model Act was the 
reformulation of the statutory standards governing distributions. The Committee on Corporate Laws 
blamed the failure of these statutes to provide significant protection against distributions of capital to 
shareholders on the inadequacies of the artificial and arbitrary concepts of ‘par value’ and ‘stated 
capital’ provided under older statutes.679 With this apportioning of blame one can have no issue, nor 
need one seriously doubt that ‘the net effect of most statutes’ (in spite of the best efforts of both 
legislators and the courts for more than a century and a half), ‘was to permit the distribution to 
shareholders of most or all of the corporation’s net assets’ (i.e. out of profits and capital) ‘if the 
shareholders wished this to be done’.680  
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Less persuasive is the further argument of the Committee on Corporate Laws, that, ‘to the extent 
[creditors] are led to believe’ that any statutory structure embodying ‘par value’ and ‘legal capital’ 
concepts provides protection for creditors, ‘these provisions may be affirmatively misleading’.681 
With respect, it is hard to imagine what protection, if any, creditors believed they were provided by 
an arbitrary doctrine which established a minimum price for shares. Nonetheless, along with ‘par 
value’, the financial provisions of the revised Model Act sweep away the elaborate provisions 
establishing a ‘stated capital’, ‘capital surplus’ or ‘earned surplus’ which were found in the old 
statutes, and retain only restrictions on distributions built around the equity insolvency and balance 
sheet tests. These restrictions, which the revised Model Act contains in § 6.40, have not been amended 
since they were first adopted. This thesis examines the restrictions in this section. 
 
4.2.4.1.1 ‘Distribution’ — the Scope of § 6.40 
 
Arguably, the most radical departure which the Model Business Corporations Act makes from the 
law of dividends (as the law is currently understood in Australia) is in its rational redefinition of the 
concept of a distribution to shareholders.  
 
The definition of a dividend, in the United States682 as in Australia, has long been an issue of 
contention. Although earlier an argument was made that the definition of a dividend implies neither 
more nor less than the rateable division of a company’s property among its shareholders683 (which is 
a definition which agrees more closely with the common understanding of dividend in either a 
voluntary or involuntary winding-up), the better view is probably and has long probably been that a 
dividend is a payment made by a company to its shareholders out of the company’s profits. 
Nonetheless, a ‘dividend’ paid wrongfully out of amounts other than profits may also be a dividend. 
This is necessarily the position at US tax law, where the form which a ‘constructive’ or ‘disguised’ 
dividend may take is arguably ‘limited only by human ingenuity’.684 At US tax law, every distribution 
that is not an expenditure for the corporation’s benefit (eg a purchase, a loan, the repayment of a debt 
or ‘an ordinary and necessary business expense’) ‘must be a dividend’, for, in the words of Posner J, 
‘if it does not benefit the corporation it must benefit the shareholders’.685 Such reasoning is clearly 
founded more upon the economic substance of a dividend than its legal form, but there are few reasons 
the law of dividends cannot be regulated by the same rational principles. Indeed, it is no longer 
possible to ignore this once heterodox argument, especially given the proliferation of the (many, ever 
increasing and new international standard) modern companies statutes which make no reference to 
profits in their dividends provisions, and either expressly or by implication allow the payment of a 
‘dividend’ out of capital. 
 
In the Model Business Corporations Act,686 any outflow of economic benefits from a corporation to 
the corporation’s shareholders that is greater than whatever inflow may be associated with that 
transaction is defined as a ‘distribution’.687 According to the official comment, the definition of 
distribution in the Model Act includes ‘virtually all transfers of money, indebtedness of the 
corporation or other property to a shareholder in respect of the corporation’s shares’.688 Every type 
of dividend, share buy-back and distribution of share capital falls within this definition.  
 
                                                     
681 Ibid. 
682 Mobile & Ohio Railroad v Tennessee (n 566) 496. 
683 Lockhart v Van Alstyne (n 570) 1. 
684 Thomson Reuters, Florida Jurisprudence — Forms Legal and Business (at September 2014) 28 Business Corporations, 
‘6 Shares of Stock; Dividends’ §374. 
685 United States v Mews, 923 F 2d 67, 68 (7th Cir, 1991) (Posner J). 
686 Am Bar Ass’n, Model Bus Corp Act (n 22) § 1.40(6).  
687 See Bayless Manning and James J Hanks, Legal Capital (Foundation Press, 4th ed, 2013) 187.  
688 Am Bar Ass’n, Model Bus Corp Act (n 22) § 6.40 cmt 6–57 [1]. 
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The definition of ‘distribution’ is also broad enough to capture both the declaration and payment of 
periodical dividends and a ‘dividend’ in liquidation. The official comment groups both transactions 
together in the same category, stating that a ‘distribution’ includes ‘cash or property dividends, 
payments by a corporation to purchase its own shares, distributions of promissory notes or 
indebtedness, and distributions in partial or complete liquidation or voluntary or involuntary 
dissolution’.689 ‘Distribution’ is not defined in ch 6 of the Model Act, where the rules regulating 
shares and distributions to shareholders can be found. Instead, the meaning of ‘distribution’ is found 
in the Act definitions which are contained in the general provisions of ch 1.690  This organisation is 
logical. While both periodical dividends and a dividend in liquidation fall under the same definition 
of ‘distribution’ (i.e. they both result in a net outflow of benefits from a corporation to its 
shareholders), distributions in liquidation are not subject to the distribution limitations of § 6.40691 
(as they should not be, there are many circumstances where there will not be sufficient funds to 
discharge all creditor claims in a liquidation).    
 
Except for the payment of creditor claims and distributions to shareholders in liquidation upon 
dissolution of a corporation,692 every distribution (i.e. every type of dividend, share buy-back and 
distribution of share capital) is regulated under the same rule by the Model Act, because (rationally) 
the Model Act regulates all distributions under the same ‘single, uniform’693 rule. Not only may this 
reduce inconsistency, complexity and confusion, but it may allow the rules regulating distributions to 
shareholders to serve their original purpose ‘of protecting creditors and senior security holders from 
payments to junior security holders’ (i.e. creditors), which the Committee on Corporate Laws asserts 
has ‘long been recognized by practitioners and legal scholars’ as a failure of the maintenance of share 
capital concepts of par value and stated capital.694  
 
4.2.4.1.2 ‘Equity insolvency’ Test 
 
The first prohibition in § 6.40(c) against making a distribution to shareholders applies to a corporation 
which is, or as a result of the distribution would become, ‘insolvent in the equity sense’.695 
 
‘Equity insolvency’, the condition of a debtor who is not paying his or her debts as they become due, 
is so named because, in the United States at least, received knowledge says that the concept was 
developed over ‘hundreds of years’ by the equity jurisdiction of the British Court of Chancery696 (NB 
the term has nothing to do with ‘equity’ in the financial accounting sense.) Certainly, the concept has 
long been familiar among the US courts of equity. In the earlier case of Attorney-General v Bank of 
Niagara,697 the New York Court of Chancery described an ‘insolvent’ bank as a bank that was ‘not 
able to meet its engagements’.698 The Court went on to illustrate its point by observing that ‘all the 
banks of this state were insolvent during the late war, as all of them suspended payment’.699  
 
The classic case, however, was decided a year earlier by the US Circuit Court. In Wood v Dummer,700 
a bill in equity was brought by the plaintiff creditors of a banking corporation against the corporation’s 
                                                     
689 Ibid. 
690 Ibid § 1.40(6). 
691 Ibid. 
692 Ibid § 14.09. 
693 Ibid § 6.40 cmt 6–57 [1]. 
694 Ibid § 6.21 cmt 6–25. 
695 Ibid § 6.40 cmt 6–58 [2]. 
696 Committee on the Judiciary, Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub L No 95-598, Senate Report No 95-989 (1978) 34. 
697 Attorney-General v Bank of Niagara, Hopk Ch 354, 361 (NY Ch, 1825). 
698 Ibid. 
699 Ibid. During the War of 1812, which had ended just a decade earlier, New York had been invaded by some 14,000 
troops under the Canadian governor-in-chief George Prevost, and Buffalo, New York’s second largest city, had been left 
in smouldering ruins — which may have made payment of some debts as they matured impractical to say the least. 
700 Wood v Dummer, 30 F Cas 435 (CC D Me, 1824) (‘Wood v Dummer’). 
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shareholders, for payment of the banknotes held by the creditors upon the ground of an asserted 
‘fraudulent dividend by the stockholders with a knowledge of their insolvency’701. So much, at least, 
was denied by the defendant shareholders, and, as the Court found, ‘not in the slightest degree 
established in the proofs’.702 If the bill was to stand at all, said Story J, ‘it must be simply on the fact, 
that the defendants have the funds [of the old bank] in their possession’, and ‘that the corporation is 
insolvent’703 (i.e. the shareholders had received the funds while the corporation was insolvent). Only 
in insolvent circumstances, thought his Honour, did equity grant the creditors of a bank the right to 
recover dividends paid to shareholders when the shareholders were not guilty of fraud.704  
 
Unfortunately, the question whether the corporation was insolvent was disposed of all too briefly. 
However, the test appears to be insolvency in the equity sense, for Story J found that the answers 
submitted by the defendants admitted the insolvency of the corporation because they showed ‘that in 
fact no sufficient funds for payment of its debts are in existence’.705 
 
So far, the decision reminds us very much of the doctrine of fraudulent conveyances. In Wood v 
Dummer, as is also the case at fraudulent conveyances law, the defence that the shareholders ‘have 
been guilty of no fraud’ was found unpersuasive.706 Fraudulent conveyance law states that where a 
person who for no consideration receives a payment from a debtor who is unable to pay his or her 
creditors (each of whom did provide fair consideration), the creditors have a claim against the 
innocent person for the amount of the payment. However, Story J went further, asking why a dividend 
paid by an insolvent corporation to its shareholders should be considered a transaction without 
consideration. The answer was that the shareholders ‘have no right to any thing but the residuum of 
the capital stock, after payment of all the debts of the bank’707 (i.e. its profits).  What his Honour said 
is worth considering at some length, for in combining the concepts of fraudulent conveyances with 
limited liability he founded the ‘trust fund’ theory of share capital: 
 
It appears to me very clear upon general principles, as well as the legislative intention, that the capital stock of 
banks is to be deemed a pledge or trust fund for the payment of the debts contracted by the bank. The public, as 
well as the legislature, have always supposed this to be a fund appropriated for such purpose. The individual 
stockholders are not liable for the debts of the bank in their private capacities. The charter relieves them from 
personal responsibility, and substitutes the capital stock in its stead. Credit is universally given to this fund by 
the public, as the only means of repayment. During the existence of the corporation it is the sole property of the 
corporation, and can be applied only according to its charter, that is, as a fund for payment of its debts, upon the 
security of which it may discount and circulate notes. Why, otherwise, is any capital stock required by our 
charters? If the stock may, the next day after it is paid in, be withdrawn by the stockholders without payment of 
the debts of the corporation, why is its amount so studiously provided for, and its payment by the stockholders 
so diligently required?708 To me this point appears so plain upon principles of law, as well as common sense, 
that I cannot be brought into any doubt, that the charters of our banks make the capital stock a trust fund for the 
payment of all the debts of the corporation. The bill-holders and other creditors have the first claims upon it; and 
the stockholders have no rights, until all the other creditors are satisfied. They have the full benefit of all the 
profits made by the establishment, and cannot take any portion of the fund, until all the other claims on it are 
                                                     
701 Ibid 436 (Story J). 
702 Ibid. Justice Story spends a considerable part of his judgement commenting on the defects of the plaintiff’s bill, which 
was ‘drawn in a very loose and inartificial manner’. His Honour excused the bill’s defects for ‘the fact, that chancery 
proceedings have, hitherto, but in a slight degree engaged the attention of the bar’ in the District of Maine. 
703 Ibid 437 (Story J). 
704 Ibid. 
705 Ibid. 
706 Ibid 439 (Story J). 
707 Ibid. 
708 His Honour was here referring to the rules which regulate contributions by shareholders, an often overlooked but 
historically important area of the corporate law. If the maintenance of share capital may be described as the law’s end, 
and the prohibition against reductions in share capital its means of achieving it, then the shareholder’s obligation to pay 
in or pay par is the condition precedent without which neither can achieve their object. Put another way, a corporation 
must first have a share capital to maintain. For this reason, ‘[i]t is generally agreed that shareholders have an obligation 
to pay for their shares’, and, in the words of Manning and Hanks, ‘everyone knows that bonus shares, discount stock and 
watered stock were traditionally viewed as Bad Things, frowned upon by the law’: Manning and Hanks (n 687) 51. 
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extinguished. Their rights are not to the capital stock, but to the residuum after all demands on it are paid. On a 
dissolution of the corporation, the bill-holders and the stockholders have each equitable claims, but those of the 
bill-holders possess, as I conceive, a prior exclusive equity.709 
 
If determining the equity insolvency of a corporation were as simple as identifying whether the 
corporation’s unpaid debts had begun to fall due, little more would need to be said about this matter. 
Unfortunately, as was alluded to above in the discussion of insolvency in dividends cases, the 
principles are confusing. Rarely does a description of equity insolvency distinguish itself entirely 
from bankruptcy (i.e. balance sheet) insolvency, and even more rarely still is the relationship between 
the two related yet distinct concepts precisely defined, as it is in the Uniform Voidable Transactions 
Act.  
 
As an example, Wood v Dummer refers to the non-existence of a ‘sufficient amount of funds’ with 
which the corporation can meet its liabilities,710 which suggests a net assets test. Bayless Manning 
and James Hanks note that the equity insolvency requirement in the revised Model Act considers 
whether a corporation ‘would not be able to … as they become due’ pay its debts, and they suggest 
that the choice of these words ‘point to the future as well as the present’.711  
 
As commentators have observed, equity insolvency ‘is current liquidity of the going enterprise’712 
while bankruptcy insolvency (about which more later) looks to the future — or, at least, this would 
be the case if the concepts were not so often confused. The official comment states that, ‘[i]n most 
cases involving a corporation operating as a going concern in the normal course’ information which 
is ‘generally available’ will make it abundantly clear ‘that no particular inquiry concerning the equity 
insolvency test is needed’.713 This raises more questions than it answers. When will the existence of 
‘normal operating conditions’ be inconclusive as to this test? While the Committee on Corporate 
Laws concedes that ‘normal operating conditions’ are of themselves a ‘strong indication’ (but not 
proof) ‘that no issue should arise’ under the equity test, the language appears to leave the door ajar 
for balance sheet considerations, and, indeed, these cannot be ignored by the board of directors, as 
‘neither a balance sheet nor an income statement can be conclusive as to this test’.714. However, the 
official comment adds that what will normally be decisive is, ‘in the case of a corporation having 
regularly audited financial statements’, the absence of ‘any qualification in the most recent auditor’s 
opinion as to the corporation’s status as a “going concern”’, coupled with a lack of subsequent adverse 
events.715  
 
Generally, one would expect that this would require the board to consider the appropriateness of 
going concern assumption for a period of at least, but not limited to, twelve months from the balance 
sheet date, however: 
 
Judgments must of necessity be made on the basis of information in the hands of the directors when a distribution is 
authorized.  They should not, of course, be held responsible as a matter of hindsight for unforeseen developments. This 
is particularly true with respect to assumptions as to the ability of the corporation’s business to repay long-term 
obligations which do not mature for several years, since the primary focus of the directors’ decision to make a 
distribution should normally be on the corporation’s prospects and obligations in the shorter term, unless special factors 
concerning the corporation’s prospects require the taking of a longer term perspective.716 
 
                                                     
709 Wood v Dummer (n 700) 436–7 (Story J). 
710 Ibid. 
711 Manning and Hanks (n 687) 187. 
712 Ibid. 
713 Am Bar Ass’n, Model Bus Corp Act (n 22) § 6.40 cmt 6-58 [2]. 
714 Ibid. 
715 Ibid. 
716 Ibid § 6.40 cmt 6-59 [3]. 
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4.2.4.1.3 Balance Sheet Test 
 
The second requirement in § 6.40(c) is that, after giving effect to any distribution, a corporation’s 
assets equal or exceed its liabilities. 
 
The net assets test in the revised Model Act is unique in one important respect. If a corporation has 
issued shares with preferential rights upon liquidation, then, for the purposes of calculating the 
corporation’s total assets less its total liabilities, the amount which would be needed to satisfy the 
preferential rights, were the corporation to be liquidated at the time of the distribution, is deemed a 
liability (unless the articles provide otherwise).717 The effect of this provision is to provide the 
corporation and its prospective incorporators the choice whether to extend to senior equity security 
holders the same protection which the provision provides to creditors. 
 
4.2.4.2 Significant States  
 
4.2.4.2.1 Delaware 
 
At common law in Delaware, a dividend is a type of distribution to shareholders ‘out of earnings, 
profits or undivided surplus constituting a return to the [shareholders] upon their investment’.718 
 
Subject to any restrictions contained in its certificate of incorporation, the directors of a corporation 
may declare and pay a dividend to shareholders in two different circumstances, and from either of 
two sources. A shareholder (but not a creditor)719 has standing to sue derivatively for wrongful 
declaration of dividend.720 
 
4.2.4.2.1.1 Dividends May Be Paid Out of Net Assets in Excess of Capital Contributed by 
Shareholders 
 
In the first circumstance, a dividend may be paid out of a corporation’s ‘surplus’.721  
 
In Delaware, a corporation’s ‘surplus’ is not its capital, or its net assets, it is the excess of the 
corporation’s net assets over its capital.722 Usually, courts in Delaware have defined a corporation’s 
capital as the par value of all shares the corporation has issued and sold with a par value,723 ie the 
fund contributed by shareholders. 
 
Some commentators have described this rule as a balance sheet solvency test.724 However, clearly the 
rule requires more than balance sheet solvency in the sense that a corporation’s total assets exceed its 
total liabilities, i.e. that the value of a corporation’s property would be sufficient, if the corporation 
were to be dissolved, to pay all debts owed to the corporation’s creditors. Instead, the rule requires 
that a corporation’s total assets exceed its total liabilities plus the capital contributed by shareholders, 
i.e. it requires that a corporation’s property would be sufficient to pay all debts owed to the 
                                                     
717 Am Bar Ass’n, Model Bus Corp Act (n 22) § 6.40(c)(2) cmt 6-58 [3]. 
718 CCH, Balotti and Finkelstein’s Delaware Law of Corporations and Business Organizations, vol 1 (online at 1 June 
2017) 5 Stock and Dividends, ‘5.26 Nature and Source of Dividends and Reserves; Nimble Dividends’ (‘Balotti and 
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719 Harff v Kerkorian 347 A 2d 133 (Del 1975). 
720 8 Del Code Ann § 327 (2017). 
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722 Ibid § 154. 
723 Feldman v Cutaia, 2006 Del Ch Lexis 70 (Del Ch Apr 5, 2006); Klang v Smith’s Food & Drug Centres, 702 A 2d 150 
(Del 1997). 
724 Robert Stearn and Cory Kandesti, ‘Delaware’s Solvency Test: What Is It and Does It Make Sense? A Comparison of 
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corporation’s creditors plus the amount that would be needed, if the corporation were to be dissolved 
at the time of the dividend, to return to shareholders the capital the shareholders contributed.  
 
The rule that dividends may be paid out of surplus may be understood as an exception, although a 
limited one, to the prohibition against paying a dividend out of capital. This is because the rule 
distinguishes between capital contributed by shareholders, out of which a dividend may not be paid, 
and the value of the corporation’s property representing ‘earnings accumulated over the entire life of 
the corporation, ie, earned surplus’725 out of which dividends may be paid. 
 
Louis Finger observes that the reason for this requirement in the General Corporation Law ‘has long 
since disappeared’.726 The share capital, as shown by the par value, was shown on the financial 
statements which were ‘relied on by customers and financial institutions that extended credit to the 
corporation’.727 It was generally understood that this share capital, would be kept intact if possible, 
and that in any event no distribution would be made to shareholders who would in any way impair or 
infringe on this share capital. This gave rise to the “trust fund” and “holding out” theories applied by 
courts in a variety of situations where relief was sought because of violations of this recognized 
restriction.  
 
However, with the advent of the recognition of the validity of no par value shares, and the increasing 
use by creditors of covenants in loan agreements and other creditors’ agreements containing financial 
restrictions of all kinds on the corporation, including limitation on the circumstances under which the 
corporation could use its funds to pay dividends or other distributions to stockholders or to repurchase 
its own shares, the division of the corporation’s net equity between capital and surplus has become 
for such creditors ‘a matter of academic interest only’.728  
 
Delaware courts have observed that ‘there is no particular method of calculating surplus. In the 
absence of bad faith, fraud, or an abuse of discretion, the Court of Chancery does not substitute its 
concept of wisdom for that of the directors, but instead defers to the boards measurement of 
surplus.’729 That is, ‘[u]nder Delaware law, when directors have engaged in the judgment-laden 
exercise of determining whether funds are legally available, a dispute over that issue does not devolve 
into a mini-appraisal’, and for a plaintiff to overturn a board’s judgment as to the amount of funds 
legally available, the plaintiff must prove that ‘the board acted in bad faith, relied on methods and 
data that were unreliable, or made a determination so far off the mark as to constitute actual or 
constructive fraud.’730 
 
4.2.4.2.1.2 Dividends May Be Paid Out of Net Profits — But Only If Net Assets are Sufficient to 
Satisfy Preferential Rights of Shareholders Superior to Those Receiving the Dividend 
 
In the second circumstance, ‘in case there shall be no … surplus’ from which to pay a dividend (i.e. 
where a corporation’s capital has been diminished by losses or by depreciation in the value of the 
corporation’s property), a dividend may be paid only out of a corporation’s ‘net profits’ for the fiscal 
year in which the dividend is declared and/or the preceding fiscal year. 731  
 
However, a dividend may not be paid out of net profits if the corporation’s capital has been diminished 
to an amount less than ‘the amount of the capital represented by the issued and outstanding stock of 
                                                     
725 Weinberg v Baltimore Brick Co, 114 A 2d 812, 815 (Del 1955).  
726 CCH, Balotti and Finkelstein’s (n 718) ‘5.22 Determination of Amount of Capital and Surplus’. 
727 Ibid. 
728 Ibid. 
729 Teachers’ Retirement System of Louisiana v Anschutz, CA, 9 (Del Ch Jun 1, 2004). 
730 SV Investment Partners, LLC v ThoughtWorks, Inc, 7 A 3d 973, 988 (Del Ch 2010). 
731 8 Del Code Ann § 170(a)(2) (2017). 
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all classes having a preference upon the distribution of assets’.732 Put another way, a dividend may 
not be paid out of a corporation’s net profits if the payment of such a dividend would impair the 
capital (in the sense of net assets)733 which would be available, if the corporation were to be dissolved 
at the time the dividend was declared and paid, to satisfy the preferential rights of the corporation’s 
shareholders superior to those shareholders receiving the dividend.734 In effect then, this is a profits 
test subject to a balance sheet test plus a limited maintenance of capital requirement. 
 
4.2.4.2.1.3 Does Delaware Impose a Solvency Requirement on the Payment of Dividends? 
 
Delaware does not impose a cash flow solvency requirement for payment of a dividend.735 However, 
this does not necessarily mean that the directors of a corporation cannot be held liable if the 
corporation is insolvent or would be rendered insolvent by payment of a dividend. 
 
One of the first Delaware cases which addressed the insolvency exception was Asmussen v Quaker 
City Corpation. In Asmussen, a plaintiff creditor sought to hold the directors of an insolvent 
corporation personally liable after they had allowed the corporation to distribute its assets to certain 
creditors but not to the plaintiff. The court noted that ‘the risks of liability on the part of honest 
directors ... are so great and hazardous, that ... the courts should not subject them to these risks’ by 
strictly applying the trust fund doctrine in these particular circumstances. Thus, the directors were not 
held to be ‘trustees’ of the corporation’s assets for the benefit of all of the corporation’s creditors. 
 
Shortly thereafter, the Court of Chancery affirmed the Asmussen decision in Pennsylvania Co for 
Insurance v South Broad Street Theater Co.736 In Pennsylvania Co, the court held that directors of an 
insolvent corporation may not prefer their own claims over other creditors. However, the court 
claimed to base its decision upon principles of ‘common honesty’, not principles of trust. In fact, the 
court concluded that the trust fund doctrine was ‘nothing more than a particular expression of the 
fundamental principle which good morals exact, that men should act in honesty and fairness.’ 
Pennsylvania Co, therefore, affirmed and expanded upon the principles enunciated in Asmussen. 
 
While Delaware has historically rejected a strict application of the trust fund doctrine, the exact 
standard to which directors are held and the level of protection afforded to their business decisions 
has never been clearly articulated. An additional ambiguity arises from recent Delaware court 
decisions which potentially recognize an increased duty to creditors upon insolvency. Consequently, 
a director of a financially troubled Delaware corporation may face personal liability for good faith 
decisions which he believed met the requisite level of care. 
 
4.2.4.2.2 Maryland 
 
In Maryland, the directors of a corporation are permitted to make a distribution in two circumstances.  
 
In either circumstance, however, and unlike in Delaware, no distribution may be made if, after the 
distribution, the corporation would not be able ‘to pay indebtedness of the corporation as the 
indebtedness becomes due in the usual course of business’.737 In the case of Lerner v Lerner 
Corporation,738 the Maryland Court of Special Appeals noted that § 2-311 of the Corporations and 
Associations Article was similar to § 6.40 of the Revised Model Corporation Act, which provides 
that ‘in determining whether the equity insolvency test has been met, certain judgments or 
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733 Morris v Standard Gas & Electric Co, 63 A 2d 577, 581 (31 Del Ch 20, 1949). 
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735 See Stearn and Kandesti (n 724) 172. 
736 Pennsylvania Co for Insurance v South Broad Street Theater Co, 174 A 112 (Del Ch 1934). 
737 2 Md Code Ann Corps & Assoc § 2-311(a)(1)(i) (LexisNexis, 2017). 
738 Lerner v Lerner Corporation, 122 Md App 1, 711 A 2d 233 (1998) (‘Lerner’). 
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assumptions as to the future course of the corporation’s business are customarily justified, absent 
clear evidence to the contrary.’739 In particular, the Court observed that the directors ‘may utilize a 
cash flow analysis based on a business forecast and budget for a sufficient period of time and a draw 
[a] conclusion that the corporation can reasonably expect to satisfy known obligations as they mature 
over that period.’740  
 
Other methods of addressing a corporation’s financial difficulties or uncertainty with regard to its 
liquidity and operations when paying a dividend, not mentioned by the Court but mentioned in the 
Official Comments to the Revised Model Corporation Act include considering the likelihood that 
current and future demand for a corporation’s products or services will generate funds over time 
sufficient to satisfy its current and reasonably anticipated obligations as they mature, or the likelihood 
of refinancing the corporation's short-term indebtedness based on its financial condition, future 
prospects and the general availability of credit to similar businesses. 
 
A distribution which violates the rules below will not necessarily be voided entirely by the courts but 
may be voided only to the extent that the distribution exceeds what could have been made without 
rendering the corporation insolvent.741 
 
4.2.4.2.2.1 Distribution May Be Made If Net Assets Are Sufficient to Satisfy Preferential Rights 
of Shareholders Superior to Those Receiving the Dividend 
 
In the first circumstance, a distribution may be made if, after the distribution, the corporation’s total 
assets would not be less than the sum of the corporation’s total liabilities plus, unless the charter 
permits otherwise, the amount that would be needed, if the corporation were to be dissolved at the 
time of the distribution, to satisfy the preferential rights of shareholders superior to those shareholders 
receiving the distribution.742 Although this is obviously a balance sheet test, Maryland law permits 
the board of directors to apply a ‘fair valuation’ or other reasonable method to the calculation of a 
corporation’s assets and liabilities, rather than limiting the determination to the financial 
statements.743 
 
As in Delaware, Maryland’s balance sheet test clearly goes further than balance sheet solvency, as it 
requires that the value of a corporation’s property would be sufficient, if the corporation were to be 
dissolved at the time of the distribution, to pay all debts owed to the corporation’s creditors plus return 
to shareholders superior than those shareholders receiving the distribution the capital they 
contributed.  
 
In Maryland, the value of a corporation’s property need only be sufficient to return to shareholders 
superior than those shareholders receiving the distribution the capital the shareholders contributed, it 
need not be sufficient to return to every shareholder the capital every shareholder contributed, nor 
need it be made only out of profits. In Delaware, if the value of a corporation’s property is sufficient 
only to return to shareholders superior than those shareholders receiving the dividend the capital the 
shareholders contributed, then the dividend may only be paid out of net profits. 
 
  
                                                     
739 Am Bar Ass’n, Model Bus Corp Act (n 22) § 6.40(c)(1) cmt 6-58[3]. 
740 Thomson Reuters, Fletcher Cyclopedia (n 560) 11 § 5336. 
741 Lerner (n 738). 
742 2 Md Code Ann Corps & Assoc § 2-311(a)(1)(ii) (LexisNexis, 2017). 
743 Ibid § 2-311(b). 
92 
 
4.2.4.2.2.2 Distribution May Be Made Out of Net Earnings — No Net Assets Requirement 
 
If a corporation’s total assets would be less than the sum of the corporation’s total liabilities plus 
superior preferential rights after giving effect to the distribution, a distribution may only be made 
from the corporation’s ‘net earnings’ for the fiscal year in which the distribution is made or the 
preceding fiscal year, or from the sum of the corporation’s ‘net earnings’ for the preceding eight fiscal 
quarters.744  
 
This is a profits test without either the balance sheet test or the limited maintenance of capital 
requirement of Delaware. 
 
4.3 Canada 
 
The previous section of this comparative study considered the alternative approaches to the law of 
dividends and the maintenance of share capital both historically and as they are currently practiced in 
the United States, which is perhaps the most internationally influential foreign jurisdiction. The 
remaining jurisdictions which will be examined were all influenced greatly by the United States, and 
particularly by the United States’ Model Business Corporations Act which is written and revised by 
the Committee on Corporate Laws of the American Bar Association.  
 
4.3.1 Preliminary 
 
As in Australian and the United States, Canada has a federal system of government, in which 
jurisdiction is divided and shared between the federal government and various subnational 
governments, of which there are ten provincial (Ontario, Quebec, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, 
Manitoba, British Columbia, Prince Edward Island, Alberta, Saskatchewan and Newfoundland and 
Labrador) and three territorial (Yukon, the Northwest Territories and Nunavut).745  
 
Canada’s federal corporations statute is the Canada Business Corporations Act,746 and its corporate 
finance provisions, including its dividend laws, are found in pt V of this statute. In Ontario, the 
business corporations statute is the Business Corporations Act.747 This chapter mostly deals with the 
Canada Business Corporations Act and the Business Corporations Act, but will also consider the 
corporation statutes of the four western provinces (Alberta, British Columbia, Manitoba and 
Saskatchewan).748 
 
Ontario’s Business Corporations Act was based on the Canada Business Corporations Act.749 The 
Canada Business Corporations Act was influenced significantly by an earlier Ontario Business 
Corporations Act750 (Ontario’s current Business Corporations Act is the second specialised business 
corporations statute enacted in Ontario),751 which was itself influenced significantly by the United 
States’ Model Business Corporations Act.752 
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4.3.2 Traditional Common Law Principles 
 
At common law in Canada, a company may make distributions to its shareholders from only two 
sources, retained income or capital.753 The former is ‘frequently called’754 or ‘in essence’755 a 
dividend. The latter, which is a distribution but not a dividend,756 may only be made if authorised by 
statute.   
 
However, in the Ontario High Court decision in Re Carson,757 Wells J said the following regarding 
the meaning of the term ‘dividend’: 
 
The word “dividend” is not a word of art or one which under prior decisions of the Courts has any precise, 
definite or rigid meaning. As it has been said, it is a broad generic term and must be construed in its normal and 
ordinary meaning as one of the words of the English language. Primarily the word “dividend” means that which 
is to be divided. … The word apparently includes the action of dividing among a number of persons, distribution 
of profits or assets.758 
 
Accordingly, it may be difficult to avoid the conclusion that ‘there is no definite and defined meaning’ 
attached to the word ‘dividend’ in Canadian cases, except that ‘in customary parlance’ a dividend 
implies a payment to a shareholder in his or her capacity as a shareholder.759 
 
Although the modern Canadian corporations legislation provides a dual solvency and net assets 
requirement for the payment of dividends, three themes recur throughout the first stage of 
development of the dividend restriction in Canada: profits, impairment of assets and fraud.  
 
The earlier Canadian cases reflected the idea that the profits of a business represent the fund from 
which dividends may be paid.  
 
In Foundry Co v Murney,760 which is perhaps the earliest Canadian authority on the dividend 
restriction (and which was decided in 1850, less than a year after the British case of Burnes v 
Pennell),761 the plaintiff company brought an action for calls against one of its shareholders. At the 
trial of the cause, three shareholders were called as witnesses for the plaintiff; but the defendant 
shareholder contended that, ‘owing to their obvious personal and pecuniary interest’,762 none of the 
witnesses were admissible, and, therefore, there was no evidence with which to charge the defendant.  
 
Considering the nature of the shareholders’ interest in a company, Macaulay CJ distinguished 
between the profits of the company, which a shareholder has the right to a share of in the form of 
periodical dividend payments, and its capital, which may only be returned to the shareholder after the 
affairs of the company are fully wound-up. His Honour said in obiter that: 
 
the present action is not for a debt contracted in the ordinary course of the plaintiffs’ business, but to enforce 
payment of calls upon stock subscribed for by the defendant. If recovered, the witnesses [i.e. the shareholders] 
will have no right to participate in the distribution thereof, it will form part of the capital funds, and their only 
interest will be contingent upon whatever effect the sum recovered may have upon the profits and gain of the 
company, and, consequently, upon their shares in the dividends. The money is not to go to them; and if the affairs 
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of the corporation were wound up, it would be returned to the defendant. If the plaintiffs’ affairs prosper, they 
will derive no benefit except contingently in the shape of dividends, without any right to the capital sum 
contributed by the defendant. If the business is unsuccessful, the result of this suit will not increase or diminish 
their liability to sustain loss, which is limited to the amount of their own stock, respectively …763 
 
In the Canadian cases which followed Marmora Foundry Co v Murney, a dividend was held to 
presuppose profits in some shape.764  
 
Thus it is curious that, in the 1872 case of Parker v McQuesten, when a plaintiff sued a director of a 
bank, alleging that the director had falsely and fraudulently misrepresented the condition of the bank 
in a report the director had made to the shareholders, one of the matters the plaintiff complained of 
was that the directors ‘knew and believed at the time’ that the company ‘was not only not in a position 
to pay the dividend they were declaring’, but that ‘the capital of the bank itself had been considerably 
impaired’.765 Although the profits made out of the business had been found to have arisen ‘fairly and 
properly’, and the dividends were paid out of the profits, many of the debts recorded as assets in the 
financial statements were ‘hopelessly bad debts’ and ‘worthless’, and ‘ought to have been written off’ 
long before.766 Put another way, the sufficiency of assets to pay the dividends was impugned, 
notwithstanding sufficiency of profits. 
 
Unfortunately, the plaintiff could not show that the directors in fact ‘well knew’ that the company 
‘was in an unsound condition’, and that they ‘ought not to have declared any dividends out of their 
profits’,767 and so the action failed. Thus the Court narrowly missed the opportunity to give the assets 
of a company the same importance it had previously given to its profits in determining whether a 
dividend may legally be paid. 
 
Although the plaintiff failed to show that his action could be maintained, Parker v McQuesten is 
significant for first suggesting that a dividend could be fraudulently declared. The suggestion was 
confirmed unequivocally in Long v Guelph Lumber Co. Considering the authorities in the British 
courts, the Upper Canada Court of Common Pleas commented on ‘the extraordinary results’ which 
would be involved if a company was permitted to pay a dividend out of an amount other than profits, 
in respect of ‘the fraud upon the public as to the real position and standing of the company’, ‘the 
destruction of the assets of the company’, and ‘the want of harmony which would be occasioned 
between the different classes of shareholders’.768  
 
According to the Court, a dividend paid out of an amount other than profits must necessarily be 
forbidden by ‘honesty and good faith to the public’, and condemned by public opinion, and was for 
this reason ‘opposed to public policy and void’.769 
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The Supreme Court of Canada had the opportunity to revisit the issue of capital impairment in 
Montreal Street Railway v Ritchie. In a short decision, the Court found that a shareholder had a right 
to restrain a company and its directors from declaring and paying a dividend ‘based on a false and 
exaggerated estimation of the assets’.770 
 
In the Québécois case of Banque d’Épargne v Geddes, a director who knowingly paid dividends out 
of fictitious profits and submitted false financial statements to shareholders, by virtue of which the 
shares became artificially inflated, was held liable to pay to the company the amount of dividends so 
paid.771 However, by the end of the 20th century, the fraudulent misrepresentation theory of 
improperly paid dividends was in decline, and with it declined the importance of profit.772 
 
The next period of the development of the dividend restriction in Canada was driven by solvency. 
 
4.3.3 Legislative Background 
 
4.3.3.1 Interim Report of the Select Committee on Company Law, Ontario, 1967 
 
The 1967 Report of the Lawrence Committee was the result of a selected committee appointed by the 
Ontario Legislative Assembly to ‘review the Corporations Act of the province of Ontario and related 
Acts and regulations … and to consider the principles of the incorporation, operation, management 
and dissolution of corporations’.773 The effort resulted in the Ontario Business Corporations Act, SO 
1970, c 25.774 The Lawrence Committee appeared to consider its work no less radical a modernisation 
than the US Committee of Corporate Laws, describing the task which it undertook as being ‘to 
examine fully and consider the fundamental principles of corporation law in its general aspects’, 
adding that ‘[t]o our knowledge, never before in Canada has any legislative committee attempted a 
research and study of that nature’.775 It is for this reason a good point to begin our enquiry. 
 
The Lawrence Committee emphasised the significant influence of the US approach, noting that ‘[o]f 
all the materials of the various countries whose law and experience we reviewed, no materials 
received a closer examination and consideration than the federal and state laws of the United 
States’.776 
 
Although the Lawrence Committee has little to say about the law of dividends, it is of interest for 
recommending ‘the abolition of the rule in Trevor v Whitworth’777 and the enactment of provisions 
to grant a corporation the power to, ‘subject to any restrictions contained in its charter, purchase its 
own common shares out of surplus unless the corporation is insolvent or would thereby be made 
insolvent’.778  
 
The Committee put forward two main lines of argument in support of this recommendation. It 
considered that the principle of capital maintenance, upon which was originally formulated the rule 
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in Trevor v Whitworth, was a poor safeguard for creditors, and there were ‘many legitimate and useful 
reasons’ why a company should be entitled to purchase its own shares: 
 
For example, companies may wish to purchase outstanding common shares in order to provide for incentive, 
bonus or stock option plans without being required to extend their equity base to provide the required shares. 
Purchase of outstanding common shares is a feasible method whereby a company could contract its equity base 
as the financial requirements of the company may dictate. The right to purchase common shares could also 
facilitate mergers and acquisitions in some cases and certainly provides a much needed flexibility for closely-
held companies and their shareholders in the event of the death or retirement from the business of one of the 
principal shareholders.779 
 
Taking a progressive perspective, the Committee observed that ‘the experience in the United States 
with the right to purchase common shares’ and ‘[o]ver fifty years of experience in Ontario with 
redeemable preference shares’ would indicate that, ‘provided adequate safeguards exist, there need 
be no apprehension concerning the protection of the rights of creditors and others in permitting 
companies to purchase their shares’.780 
 
The Committee also indicated that self-purchases could be used to eliminate share fractions or to 
collect or compromise debts owed to the company. 
 
The Committee recommended enactment of provisions comparable to the then New York Business 
Corporation Law which granted companies, subject to any restrictions contained in their charters 
(memorandum and articles) the power to purchase their own shares out of “surplus” (meaning realised 
profits less any accumulated past losses, which were otherwise available as dividends) unless the 
corporation was insolvent or would thereby be made insolvent. The Committee further recommended 
that companies be permitted to purchase their shares out of capital (subject to the solvency test) if the 
purchase was made for certain specific purposes such as eliminating fractions of common shares or 
collecting or compromising indebtedness to the company. It also recommended that reacquired shares 
might either be retained as issued but unallotted “treasury shares” or be cancelled at the option of the 
directors, except that cancellation would be obligatory where shares were acquired out of capital. The 
power of a company to purchase its shares would be exercised by directors, subject to any obligation 
on their part to act in good faith and in the best interests of the company. The Committee placed no 
limits on the number of shares that might be purchased. 
 
4.3.3.2 Proposals for a New Business Corporations Law for Canada 
 
In the report which it delivered in April 1971, Robert Dickerson’s Committee described the law of 
dividends in Canada as having been ‘in a confused mess for years’.781 
 
The 1971 Dickerson Report set out the principles for a new federal Business Corporation Law. The 
report recommended that companies be given a share buy-back power, though it would be necessary 
to prevent abuses such as market manipulation, unfair discrimination amongst shareholders or insider 
trading. 
 
In the area of the law of dividends, the objective of the Dickerson Report was not ‘to change the law 
so much as to clarify it by stating in one short section what must now be extracted from a mass of 
confusing case law’.782 
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Purchases would be allowed out of funds available for payment of dividends, subject to a solvency 
test. The acquired shares would be cancelled and either the authorized share capital would be reduced 
or the shares would become authorised but unissued capital. The Committee did not support the 
treasury share concept. 
 
Provisions enabling companies to purchase their shares have been adopted in the federal sphere and 
the provinces of Ontario, British Columbia, Manitoba, Alberta, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and 
Saskatchewan. The federal Canada Business Corporations Act, 1975, and the Ontario Business 
Corporations Act, SO 1970, are representative of the Canadian legislation.  
 
Under these provisions, the self-purchase power is subject to the articles of association of the 
company, each company may determine who shall exercise the power, and self-purchases may be 
undertaken by on-market acquisitions, pari passu offers to all shareholders or selective purchases. 
Solvency, but not source of funds requirements apply. Acquired shares must be cancelled and either 
the authorized share capital reduced or the shares restored to the status of authorised but unissued 
capital. Acquired shares cannot be held as issued but unallotted treasury shares. 
 
The Dickerson Report harshly criticised the ‘confused mess’ which the law of dividends had been 
left for years as a result of provisions like that of the predecessor to the current provision, s 83 of the 
Canada Corporations Act, RSA 1952, c C-53 Act.  
 
Section 83(2), for example, uses a double test by saying that dividends should not be paid if the 
payment would render the company insolvent or if the company's capital would be impaired. There 
are at least two ways of viewing insolvency and the section does not say which is to be used. The 
concept of impairment of capital is singularly imprecise, particularly in view of case law saying that 
dividends can be paid out of current profits without first making up previous losses (as in Ammonia 
Soda Co v Chamberlain [1918] 1 Ch 266). 
 
The Dickerson Report therefore sets out a straightforward formula for determining whether a 
corporation can pay a dividend. This requirement was a solvency test, the same as that in s 5.08, that 
is propounded.  
 
4.3.4 Present Law 
 
Robert Yalden notes that ‘the CBCA does not say much about dividends’.783  
 
The only Canadian requirement applicable to payment of a dividend is a dual liquidity and balance 
sheet solvency test.784  
 
Under s 42 of the Canada Business Corporations Act,785 a corporation shall not declare or pay a 
dividend if there are reasonable grounds for believing that: 
 
(a) the corporation is, or would after the payment be, unable to pay its liabilities as they become due; or 
(b) the realizable value of the corporation’s assets would thereby be less than the aggregate of its liabilities and 
stated capital of all classes.786 
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The first test is ‘a liquidity test’787 requiring that a dividend may not be paid if it would result in a 
corporation being unable to pay its debts as they fall due. The second test is a test of whether a 
corporation could pay all of its liabilities and return all capital contributed by shareholders if its assets 
were liquidated. 
 
A corporation’s directors are ‘the initial gatekeepers’788 tasked with ensuring the above requirement 
is met. Section 118(2)(c) of the Canada Business Corporations Act provides that a director may be 
personally liable if he or she votes for or consents to a resolution authorising the payment of a 
dividend where there were reasonable grounds for believing that the corporation was insolvent or 
would become insolvent on the payment of a dividend.  
 
A shareholder may be made to return a dividend paid contrary to s 42. Under ss 118(4) and (5), a 
director may apply to a court for an order compelling a shareholder to pay or deliver to the director 
any money or property that was paid or distributed to the shareholder contrary to s 42. A contravention 
of s 42 is an offence punishable on summary conviction.789 
 
4.4 New Zealand and South Africa 
 
4.4.1 Earlier History of the Dividend Restriction in New Zealand  
 
There were no cases decided in New Zealand in the nineteenth century in which a court made 
reference to the company dividend restriction. 
 
In New Zealand, the first law regulating the payment of dividends appeared in a pre-1854 ordinance 
which provided for the management of savings banks.790 The enactment of this ordinance followed 
the opening of the first savings bank to be established in New Zealand, which was called the Auckland 
Savings Bank.791  
 
The colony of New Zealand, and a Legislative Council (which issued ordinances rather than passed 
Acts), had been established by authority of Queen Victoria just six years prior, under letters patent 
issued on 16 November 1840.792 In the ‘dividends’ provision of its Savings Bank Ordinance 1847 
(NZ), the Legislative Council provided that: 
 
If at the close of any year a surplus over and above one hundred pounds shall remain after such interest and all 
such salaries charges and expenses as aforesaid shall have been paid, including any debt due to the Colonial 
Government in respect of advances made by the said Government in aid of the funds of any such Bank for the 
payment of interest as hereinbefore provided, the said Trustees may and shall cause such surplus to be divided 
among and placed to the credit of the several persons having deposits in such Bank in proportions corresponding 
with the amount of the respective sums standing to their credit at the close of the preceding year and with the 
number of months in such year during which such sums may have remained inserted in the names of the several 
depositors.793 
 
The provision was remarkable for several reasons. It described as a ‘dividend’ a transaction which 
was essentially a division of profits or gains earned by the banking operation (less £100, which was 
to be added to a reserve fund). However, the bank to which the provision refers was not a company 
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limited by shares, or any other type of body corporate (with perpetual succession and a common seal), 
but an unincorporated trust. Any real estate mortgaged to the bank was conveyed to the bank’s vice 
president,794 all moneys and securities which the bank owned were vested in the vice president795 (the 
governor of New Zealand was the bank’s president),796 and every legal action which was instituted 
on behalf of or against the bank was carried on in the name of the bank’s accountant as the nominal 
plaintiff or defendant.797 The savings bank paid dividends not to its shareholders, of which there were 
none, but to its depositors.  
 
Three years later, after further letters patent were issued dividing the colony into the provinces of 
New Ulster and New Munster,798 the Legislative Council passed a general ordinance authorising the 
governor-in-chief of New Zealand to grant charters of incorporation to banking companies.799 The 
Bank Charters Ordinance 1851 (NZ), which was the first law in New Zealand to regulate a trading 
company, provided that the dividends to shareholders should be made ‘out of profits only, and not 
out of the capital of the Company’.800 
 
The Bank Charters Ordinance 1851 (NZ) is remarkable for several other reasons. Although there was 
no minimum capital requirement to incorporate a banking company, the whole of the company’s 
capital had to be fixed and set forth in its charter, subscribed wholly within eighteen months,801 and 
paid up wholly within four years.802 There was a type of balance sheet requirement, although it was 
a maximum net liability rather than a net asset requirement. The liabilities of the company were not 
permitted at any time to exceed ‘three times the amount of the paid-up capital’, with the addition of 
the amount of ‘such deposits as may be made with the Company’s establishment by individuals in 
specie or Government paper’.803 There was even a type of solvency requirement, both cash flow (the 
company was prohibited from deferring its liabilities beyond sixty days) and balance sheet, with 
partially limited liability imposed on the shareholders of an insolvent company: 
 
(5) Suspension of specie payments on demand at any of the Company’s establishments for such period as may 
be prescribed in the Charter, but in no case exceeding sixty days within any one year, either consecutively 
or at intervals, shall forfeit the Charter of the Company. 
(6) In the event of the assets of the Company being insufficient to meet its engagements, the shareholders shall 
be responsible to the extent of twice the amount of their subscribed shares (that is, for the amount subscribed 
and paid up and for an additional amount equal thereto).804 
 
In 1852, a New Zealand Parliament, originally called the ‘General Assembly’, was established,805 and 
empowered to make laws for the peace, order, and good government of New Zealand.806 Also 
established were the provinces Auckland, New Plymouth, Wellington, Nelson, Canterbury and 
Otago,807 and for each of these provinces there was a Provincial Council.808 Recognising the 
expediency of encouraging the formation of associations ‘for the promotion of Agricultural, Mining, 
Mercantile, Mechanical, Manufacturing, and other undertakings’, and trusting that this object could 
be promoted ‘by enabling persons to employ their Capital as Partners in certain cases, without liability 
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to the debts of the Partnerships beyond the amount contributed by them’, the Provincial Councils of 
Auckland and Wellington passed laws to legalise partnerships with limited liability.809  
 
These Acts of the Provincial Councils, and the Special Partnerships Act 1858 (NZ), which repealed 
and replaced them, was the first statute passed in New Zealand to provide for the general introduction 
of limited liability. The Act was remarkable, however, for extended limited liability to unincorporated 
partnerships rather than bodies corporate, specifically excluding banking companies.810 Instead of 
‘directors’ and ‘shareholders’, the Act referred to ‘general partners’ and ‘special partners’: 
 
Every such Partnership may consist of general Partners, who shall be jointly and severally responsible as general 
Partners are now by law, and of Persons, to be called special Partners, who shall contribute to the common stock 
specific sums in money as capital, beyond which they shall not be responsible for any debt of the Partnership, 
except in cases hereinafter provided for.811  
 
The Act’s dividends provision included a type of minimum share capital requirement and a cash flow 
and balance sheet solvency requirement, in language which shows a clear evolution from the Special 
Partnerships Act 1858 (NZ): 
 
During the continuance of any Partnership under the provisions of this Act no part of the certified Capital thereof 
shall be withdrawn, nor shall any division of interest or profit be made so as to reduce such Capital below the 
aggregate amount stated in the Certificate, and if any part of such Capital shall be so withdrawn, or any such 
division be made, so that at any time during the continuance, or at the termination of the Partnership, the assets 
shall not be sufficient to pay the Partnership debts, the special Partners shall be severally liable to refund every 
sum by them respectively received in diminution of such Capital, or by way of such interest or profit; and all 
such sums may be recovered as money had and received by them respectively, to the use of the general Partners, 
and may, in the case of any Judgment having been obtained against the general Partners, be recovered by the 
Plaintiff against the special Partners, or either of them, by process of execution to be issued under such Judgment 
by leave of the Supreme Court.812 
  
The provision was remarkable because it prohibited a company from paying a dividend unless the 
company’s share capital was maintained above the amount subscribed and paid up. Before a dividend 
could be paid, any share capital lost or diminished in the course of the company’s trading had to be 
made good. A ‘special partner’ who had received a dividend reducing the share capital beneath the 
amount subscribed and paid up (either because the dividend had been paid out of capital, or because 
the profits ought to have been used to make good the deficiency in share capital), was personally 
liable both to the company for the amount by which the capital had been diminished by the payment 
of the divided, and to a creditor who had obtained judgement against the company upon the leave of 
the Supreme Court.813 
 
The Special Partnerships Act 1858 (NZ) appears to have been judged a failure, for, barely two years 
later, the General Assembly enacted New Zealand’s first modern companies statute, the Joint Stock 
Companies Act 1860 (NZ).  
 
4.4.2 Recent Innovations in South Africa 
 
This section considers the regulation of distributions to shareholders, generally, and dividends, 
specifically, under the current Companies Act [No 71] 2008 (South Africa), its predecessors, and the 
South African common law. 
                                                     
809 Limited Liabilities Act 1854 (Auckland), 17 & 18 Vict sess 2; Mixed Partnerships Act 1854 (Wellington), 17 & 18 
Vict. For the New Zealand statute which repealed and replaced these acts, see Special Partnerships Act 1858 (NZ), 21 & 
22 Vict. 
810 Ibid s 1. 
811 Ibid s 2. 
812 Ibid s 9. 
813 Ibid. 
101 
 
 
Enacted into law on 1 May 2011,814 the Companies Act [No 71] 2008 (South Africa) was the product 
of more than four years of broad consultation led by the Department of Trade and Industry. The 
Department had promised ‘an overall review of company law’815 with the purpose of developing a 
‘clear, facilitating, predictable and consistently enforced’816 legal framework (based on the principles 
reflected in the Companies Act [No 61] 1973 (South Africa), the Close Corporations Act [No 69] 
1984 (South Africa) and the common law),817 which ‘should promote the competitiveness and 
development of the South African economy’818 by providing ‘a protective and fertile environment for 
economic activity’.819 
 
One of the ‘specific goal statements’820 of the reform of the South African company law, and the first 
which was associated with the objective of corporate efficiency,821 was to abolish the concept of par 
value shares and nominal value, and shift to ‘a capital maintenance regime based on solvency and 
liquidity’.822 As Kathleen Van der Linde points out, however, the Act did not replace par value shares 
and nominal value with a solvency and liquidity regime823 (although each concept is intended to 
protect creditors). Instead, nominal and par value shares were replaced with shares issued without a 
nominal or par value. 824  
 
The nominal or par value of a share represents to a company’s creditors both that the company has 
received consideration equivalent to the amount of the nominal value credited as being paid up, and 
the liability of a shareholder in respect of each share held. While par value shares and nominal value 
regulate the issue of shares and the raising of share capital, the solvency and liquidity regime governs 
distributions to shareholders and the reduction of share capital. Although the former is meaningless 
without the latter (at least as a creditor protection), the reverse is probably not true. Par value shares 
and nominal value are neither necessary nor sufficient for the maintenance of share capital. 
Accordingly, nominal or par value shares have been described as ‘meaningless and valueless’, and 
their ‘continued existence’ is ‘difficult to justify’.825 
 
Van der Linde also argues that the solvency and liquidity regime cannot qualify as a maintenance of 
share capital regime as the term is traditionally understood.826 Whereas the rule that no dividend may 
                                                     
814 President, South African Government Gazette, vol 526, No 32121, 9 April 2009. 
815 Department of Trade and Industry, ‘South African Company Law for the 21st Century — Guidelines for Corporate 
Law Reform’ (General Notice 1183, Staatskoerant No 26493, 23 June 2004) 9 [1.3]. The publication of this policy paper 
was the latest in a number of events which had had an impact on company law since the ‘Proposed Guidelines for 
Competition Policy’ had been issued by the Department of Trade and Industry in 1997, including the preparation of the 
draft Financial Reporting Bill 2002, the draft Securities Services Bill 2004 and the King II Report of 2002. For a 
consideration of the King I, King II and King III reports within the context of the Companies Act [No 71] 2008 (South 
Africa), see: Irene-Marie Esser, ‘The Protection of Stakeholder Interests in Terms of the South African King III Report 
on Corporate Governance’ (2009) 21(2) South African Mercantile Law Journal 188; Piet Delport and Irene-Marie Esser, 
‘The Duty of Care, Skill and Diligence: The King Report and the 2008 Companies Act’ (2011) 74 Journal of 
Contemporary Roman-Dutch Law 449. 
816 Ibid 11 [1.4]. 
817 Ibid 9–10 [1.3]. 
818 Ibid 9 [1.2]. 
819 Ibid 11 [1.4]. 
820 Explanatory Memorandum, Companies Bill 2006 (South Africa) 4. 
821 Ibid. 
822 Ibid 4, 11. 
823 Van der Linde, ‘Solvency and Liquidity’ (n 22) 224 n 2. 
824 South African Companies Act (n 22) s 35(2). For the transitional arrangements to which this provision is subject, see 
South African Companies Act (n 22) sch 5 item 6. For commentary on the provision see Kathleen Van der Linde, ‘The 
Regulation of Share Capital and Shareholder Contributions in the Companies Bill 2008’ (2009) 1 Journal of South African 
Law 39, 44–5. 
825 Louise Gullifer and Jennifer Payn, Corporate Finance Law — Principles and Policy (Hart, 2011). 
826 Van der Linde, ‘Solvency and Liquidity’ (n 22) 224. For a consideration of both the solvency and liquidity regime and 
the maintenance of share capital regime as the terms were traditionally understood, see: Michele Havenga, ‘Shares and 
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be paid except out of profits prevents a dividend from being paid out of the fund of share capital (and, 
in so doing, prevents the reduction of share capital from distributions to shareholders), the rule that 
no dividend may be paid while a corporation is insolvent does not. Accordingly, Van der Linde 
describes solvency and liquidity as ‘a completely alternative system of regulating distributions by a 
company to its shareholders’.827 
 
4.4.2.1 Traditional Common Law Principles 
 
4.4.2.1.1 Common Law Rule that Dividends Are Payable Only From Profits  
 
The Companies Act [No 71] 2008 (South Africa) does not define the term ‘dividend’. 
 
The editors of Henochsberg on the Companies Act,828 cite only two authorities on the definition of 
dividends — a decision of the Privy Council on appeal from the Supreme Court of New South Wales, 
and a Namibian decision. The case of Hill v Permanent Trustee Co of New South Wales,829 which 
was decided by the Privy Council in 1930, has been cited with approval in South Africa in respect of 
the rule that ‘[d]ividends may only be paid from profits.’830 In Cooper v A & G Fashions Pty Ltd; Ex 
Parte Milman, Conradie J of the Cape Provincial Division referred to the observation of the Privy 
Council that: 
 
A limited company not in liquidation can make no payment by way of return of capital to its shareholders except 
as a step in an authorized reduction of capital. Any other payment made by it by means of which it parts with 
moneys to its shareholders must and can only be made by way of dividing profits. Whether the payment is called 
‘dividend’ or ‘bonus’, or any other name, it still must remain a payment on division of profits.831 
 
The High Court of Namibia (the decisions of which are reported in the South African Law Reports) 
also made clear that only profits could be declared as dividends, stating in the case of South African 
Iron and Steel Industrial Corporation Ltd v Moly Cooper Mining and Exploration Co (Swa) Ltd that 
‘[t]he ordinary meaning of “dividend” is a share of profits, whether at a fixed rate or otherwise, 
allocated to the holders of shares in a company’.832 
 
As a matter of historical fact, the maintenance of share capital rules, which were developed by British 
courts, were, ‘[s]ince the earliest days’, firmly recognised as part of the South African company law 
at common law.833 In the earlier case of Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Collins,834 which was 
decided by the Appellate Division (Bloemfontein) in 1923, Innes CJ considered the judgement of the 
House of Lords in Trevor v Whitworth.835 His Honour observed by way of dicta that the reason a 
                                                     
Shareholders, Reduction of Capital, the Turquand Rule, Winding-Up, and Deregistration’ [2004] (3) Juta’s Business Law 
122; Michele Havenga, ‘Simplification and Unification in Corporate and Insolvency Law: Are We Making Any Progress’ 
[2001] (3) South African Mercantile Law Journal 408. 
827 Ibid.  
828 Piet Delport, LexisNexis, Henochsberg on the Companies Act, 71 of 2008, vol 1 (8) (at May 2014) 23 s 1. 
829 Hill v Permanent Trustee Co of New South Wales [1930] AC 720 (‘Hill v Permanent Trustee’). 
830 Harris v Fisher NO [1960] 4 SA 855, 860 (Ogilvie Thompson JA) (Appellate Division); Ex Parte Venter NO [1984] 
3 SA 135, 139 (De Kock J) (Provincial Division); Cooper v A & G Fashions Pty Ltd; Ex Parte Milman [1991] 4 SA 204, 
213 (Conradie J) (Provincial Division) (‘Cooper v A & G Fashions’). For a Zimbabwean case citing Hill v Permanent 
Trustee (n 829) see X Co Ltd v Commissioner of Taxes [1956] 3 SA 38, 43 (Young J) (Southern Rhodesia Special Income 
Tax Court). 
831 Hill v Permanent Trustee (n 828) 729 (Lord Russel), cited in Cooper v A & G Fashions (n 830) 213 (Conradie J) 
(Provincial Division). 
832 South African Iron and Steel Industrial Corporation Ltd v Moly Cooper Mining and Exploration Co (Swa) Ltd [1993] 
4 SA 705, 712 (Hannah J) (Namibia High Court). 
833 Unisec Group Ltd v Sage Holdings Ltd (1986) 3 SA 259, 264–5 (Coetzee J) (Provincial Division) (‘Unisec v Sage’). 
See also Ex parte Vlakfontein Gold Mining Co Ltd [1970] 2 SA 180; Cohen NO v Segal [1970] 3 SA 702, 705–6. 
834 Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Collins (1923) AD 347 (Appellate Division) (‘Inland Revenue v Collins’). 
835 Trevor v Whitworth (n 8) 409. 
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company’s purchase of its own shares was illegal and void at common law was because it ‘amounted 
to a reduction of capital in a manner not authorised by statute’.836 In the same case, the idea that a 
dividend presupposed a distributable profit (and that the manner of declaration and payment of a 
dividend may be regulated by the memorandum of incorporation) was asserted by De Villiers JA. His 
Honour stated: 
 
A limited liability company having made or accumulated profits is, within the limits of its memorandum and 
articles of association, free to do with such profits what it pleases. … The company may decide to divide the 
whole or a portion of the profits amongst the shareholders, in which case it will proceed to declare a dividend 
and distribute the profits it has declared among them. … On the other hand the company may decide not to 
declare a dividend but to utilize the profits in the business. It may, eg, require money for improving its works or 
extending its operations in various directions. If it decides to spend the profits in that way and puts them to 
reserve account or spends them, they ipso facto cease to be divisible among the shareholders and take on the 
character of capital. By deciding to devote the undivided profits to capital expenditure the company stamps them 
with the character of capital. And it follows that, as regards such profits, not only can no dividend be declared, 
but there are none to divide.837  
 
The requirement that a company maintain its share capital has been described as ‘very much the 
unexpressed principle of South African company law’838 — i.e. a principle of the South African 
common law, not legislation. However, it was eventually given effect in s 86bis of the Companies 
Act [No 46] 1926 (South Africa) (and the provision’s successors, ss 24bis839 and 39),840 which 
enforced the principle that a company may not traffic in its own shares,841 following the provision’s 
introduction by the Companies Amendment Act [No 23] 1939 (South Africa).  
 
Summarising the purpose of the provision, Goldstone J quoted from the British text-writer Gore-
Brown, saying that the rule aimed ‘to preserve the company’s share capital for the sake of its 
creditors’, and described it as ‘in this sense … an aspect of maintenance of capital’.842 However, in 
an appeal against his Honour’s judgement in 1986, Coetzee J pointed out that, so fundamental was 
the principle that a company may not purchase its own shares, the prohibition ‘was not even expressly 
contained in any of the company statutes until some 50 years ago’843 (instead the articles of 
association traditionally dealt with such transactions),844 and even omitted from the Companies Act 
[No 46] 1926 (South Africa) after s 86bis was amended in 1952.845 Indeed, the editors of Henochsberg 
on the Companies Act assert that this principle of the South African common law was so clear that 
the Company Law Amendment Enquiry Commission, which was led by Philip Millin, felt it 
unnecessary to express it in legislation.846  
 
  
                                                     
836 Inland Revenue v Collins (n 834) 362 (Innes CJ) (Appellate Division), citing Trevor v Whitworth (n 8) 506 (Lord 
Dunedin). 
837 Inland Revenue v Collins (n 834) 362 (Innes CJ) (Appellate Division). 
838 Capitex Bank Ltd v Qorus Holdings Ltd [2003] 3 SA 302, 306 (Malan J) (Local Division) (‘Capitex’). 
839 This provision prevented a company from acquiring its own shares, providing that ‘[e]xcept in the cases hereafter in 
this section mentioned, a body corporate cannot be a member of a company which is its holding company, and any 
allotment or transfer of shares in a company to its subsidiary shall be void’: Companies Act [No 46] 1926 (South Africa) 
s 24bis(1), as amended by Companies Amendment Act [No 46] 1952 (South Africa). For the British statute upon which 
the provision was based see Companies Act 1948, 11 & 12 Geo 6, c 38, s 27. 
840 This provision provided that ‘[s]ave as is provided in this section, no company shall be a member of a company which 
is its holding company, and any allotment, issue or transfer of shares of a company to its subsidiary shall be void’: 
Companies Act [No 46] 1926 (South Africa) s 39(1). 
841 Incorporated Industries Ltd v Standard Finance Corporation Ltd [1961] 4 SA 254, 255 (Kuper J) (Local Division). 
842 Sage Holdings Ltd v Unisec Group Ltd [1982] 1 SA 337, 348–9 (Goldstone J) (Local Division), quoting Stewart Gore-
Browne, On Companies (Jordans, 43rd ed, 1982). 
843 Unisec v Sage (n 833) 264 (Coetzee J). 
844 Ibid 306 (Coetzee J). 
845 See Companies Amendment Act [No 46] 1952 (South Africa). 
846 ES Henochsberg, Henochsberg on the Companies Act (Butterworths, 2nd ed, 1963) 243. 
104 
 
4.4.2.2 Legislative Background 
 
4.4.2.2.1 Reduction of Capital in the Companies Act [No 61] 1973 (South Africa) as Enacted 
 
The Companies Act [No 46] 1926 (South Africa) was remarkably long-lived — it was not repealed 
and replaced until the enactment of the Companies Act [No 61] 1973 (South Africa). 
  
Prior to amendment by the Companies Amendment Act [No 37] 1999 (South Africa), the Companies 
Act [No 61] 1973 (South Africa) provided that a company could ‘by special resolution reduce its 
share capital’847 only if ‘it has no creditors or all its creditors have consented to the reduction of 
capital’,848 or upon successful application to the Court for an order confirming the reduction.849 The 
interests of creditors were protected powerfully by ss 85 and 86, which provided that every creditor 
‘shall be entitled to object to the reduction’,850 and that the Court should not make an order confirming 
the reduction ‘unless it is satisfied’ that every creditor ‘has consented to the reduction or that his debt 
or claim has been discharged or has determined or has been secured’.851 
 
The courts have held that this statutory mechanism for the reduction of share capital did not have the 
effect of modifying the maintenance of capital rule at South African common law.852 Upon a proper 
construction, the provision should not be considered as providing a prohibition on the reduction of 
share capital, since the common law itself had come to regard such reductions as unlawful, but merely 
authorising a company to reduce its capital subject to court approval. According to Coetzee J, the 
statutory prohibition ‘therefore does not fall to be strictly construed at all’, but rather should ‘receive 
a liberal construction so far as its language permits’.853   
 
4.4.2.2.2 Acquisition of a Company’s Own Shares in the Companies Act [No 61] 1973 (South 
Africa) as Amended 
 
The enactment of the Companies Amendment Act [No 37] 1999 (South Africa), which amended the 
Companies Act [No 61] 1973 (South Africa), ‘changed dramatically’ the maintenance of share capital 
rule ‘and the perceived protection it afforded [creditors]’.854  
 
The Companies Amendment Act [No 37] 1999 (South Africa) repealed and replaced ss 83 and 84, 
which allowed a company to reduce its share capital in certain circumstances. Provided that its articles 
of association authorised it to, and the shareholders of the company approved the acquisition by 
special resolution,855 s 85(1) of the amended provisions allowed a company to acquire the shares 
issued by the company, unless there were ‘reasonable grounds for believing’ that: 
 
(a) the company is, or would after the payment be, unable to pay its debts as they become due in the ordinary course 
of business; or 
                                                     
847 Companies Act [No 61] 1973 (South Africa) s 83(1), prior to amendment by the Companies Amendment Act [No 37] 
1999 (South Africa). 
848 Ibid s 83(1)(b). 
849 Ibid s 84. 
850 Ibid s 85. 
851 Ibid s 86(2). 
852 See Unisec v Sage (n 833) 269 (Coetzee J). 
853 Ibid. 
854 Capitex (n 838) 305 (Malan J). 
855 Companies Act [No 61] 1973 (South Africa) s 85(1) (‘Amended Companies Act [No 61] 1973 (South Africa)’, as 
amended by the Companies Amendment Act [No 37] 1999 (South Africa). 
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(b) the consolidated assets of the company fairly valued would after the payment be less than the consolidated 
liabilities of the company.856 
 
Under s 86(1), the director of a company that had acquired its own shares in contravention of the 
above provision was jointly and severally liable to restore to the company any amount paid for such 
acquisition.857 Additionally, either a director who was liable under s 86(1), a creditor, or any 
shareholder could apply to court for an order compelling a shareholder to repay to the company any 
money that was paid to such shareholder contrary to s 85(4).858  
 
Opinion is divided on the question whether the amended provision had the effect of modifying the 
maintenance of share capital rule at South African common law. David Butler disputed that it did so, 
observing that the provision contained no express abolition of the unexpressed maintenance of capital 
rule.859 He said: 
 
[Nowhere is it stated expressly that the common law prohibition on a company acquiring its own shares is 
repealed. The conclusion is therefore inevitable that the common law prohibition continues, subject to the 
existing exceptions that are not repealed by the Companies Amendment Act [No 37] 1999 (South Africa),860 and 
the new procedures for the acquisition of shares introduced by the amendment.]861 
 
In Capitex Bank Ltd v Qorus Holdings Ltd, Malan J took issue with the above assertion.862 His Honour 
placed the emphasis on s 85(1), which he said ‘in so many words as a general proposition’ allowed a 
company to approve the acquisition of its own shares subject only to the requirements that the 
acquisition be authorised by the articles and approved by special resolution.863 In his Honour’s 
opinion, this ‘general power’ effectively repealed ‘one of the three sub-rules’ of the common law 
maintenance of share capital rule, ‘viz that a company may not purchase its own shares’.864 Although 
his Honour conceded that ‘that the capital maintenance principle may still have residual application’, 
Malan J observed that the general power given to all companies in s 85(1) was ‘inconsistent with the 
unexpressed rule of the common law that a company may not purchase its own shares’, and asserted 
that the rule had ‘effectively been done away with’.865 
 
4.4.2.2.3 Payments to Shareholders under the Companies Act [No 61] 1973 (South Africa) as 
Amended 
 
According to Cassim, the core of the amended Act’s share buy-back provisions was ‘the substitution 
of the modern dual tests of “solvency” and “liquidity”’ for what was seen as ‘the outdated nineteenth-
century concept of capital maintenance’.866 
 
                                                     
856 Ibid s 85(4). For a contemporaneous discussion of the amended provisions, see F H I Cassim, ‘The New Statutory 
Provisions on Company Share Repurchases: A Critical Analysis’ (1999) 116(4) South African Law Journal 760 (‘New 
Statutory Provisions’). 
857 Amended Companies Act [No 61] 1973 (n 855, South Africa) s 86(4). 
858 Ibid ss 86(2)–(3). 
859 David Butler, ‘‘N Maatskappy se Nuwe Statutere Bevoegdheid om sy Eie Aandele te Verkry: ‘N Vertrekpunt’ [‘A 
Company’s New Statutory Power to Acquire its Own Shares: A Starting Point] (1999) 10(3) Stellenbosch Law Review 
284, 290–1. 
860 These exceptions were that the redemption of redeemable preference shares should not be deemed to constitute a 
reduction of a company’s authorized share capital, and that, in case of oppressive or unfairly prejudicial conduct 
complained of by a shareholder, a court could make such order as it thought fit, including for the purchase of the shares 
of shareholder y the company and for the reduction accordingly of the company’s capital. See amended Companies Act 
[No 61] 1973 (n 855, South Africa) ss 98(3), 252(3). 
861 Butler (n 859) 290–1. 
862 Capitex (n 838) 309 (Malan J). 
863 Ibid. 
864 Ibid. 
865 Ibid. 
866 Cassim, ‘New Statutory Provisions’ (n 856) 765. 
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Although the share buy-back provisions received the most publicity, the Companies Amendment Act 
[No 37] 1999 (South Africa) introduced an additional provision which was perhaps even more 
remarkable, for it also extended the dual solvency and net assets requirements to the regulation of a 
category of distributions to shareholders that included dividends, and in doing so it effectively 
modified the common law rule. Section 90(1) provided that, if authorized by its articles, a company 
could ‘make payments to its shareholders’,867 subject to the provision in sub-s (2) that a company 
should not make any payment ‘in whatever form’ to its shareholders if there were ‘reasonable grounds 
for believing’ that: 
 
(a)   the company is, or would after the payment be, unable to pay its debts as they become due in the ordinary 
course of business; or 
(b)   the consolidated assets of the company fairly valued would after the payment be less than the consolidated 
liabilities of the company.868 
 
For the purposes of s 90, a payment was defined broadly, and included ‘any direct or indirect payment 
or transfer of money or other property to a shareholder of the company by virtue of the shareholder’s 
shareholding in the company’.869 The provision therefore permitted a company to pay a dividend out 
of capital or to return capital to its shareholders. 
 
The dual solvency and net assets requirements in sub-s (2) were identical to those provided for in the 
amended Act’s share buy-back provisions. However, Cassim criticised the amended Act’s s 90 for 
lacking consistency with the share buy-back provisions in several other important respects.870 In the 
first place, the section lacked any provision making personally liable the director of a company that 
had made a payment to shareholders in contravention of the section871 (under sub-s (4), however, a 
shareholder who had received such a payment was made liable to the company for any payment 
received).872 In the second place, the section did not require that the payment receive approval by 
special resolution.873 In the third place, no statutory mechanism was provided by which a creditor 
could apply to court for an order compelling a shareholder to repay to the company any money that 
was paid to the shareholder contrary to s 90(2).874 Indeed, neither was a shareholder given the right 
to recover such payment from the recipient. 
 
Given the above, the amended Act’s s 90 left much to be desired, not only for introducing 
inconsistency into the South African company law’s provisions regulating the return of share capital 
to shareholders, but also as a protection for creditors, shareholders or the company, or as a restraint 
on directors. 
 
However, as we saw above, the concepts of par value shares and nominal value survived the 
amendments. 
 
4.4.2.3 Evaluation of the Companies Amendment Act [No 37] 1999 (South Africa) 
 
In the Explanatory Memorandum to the Companies Amendment Bill 1999, the drafters of the Act 
which was to introduce the first dual solvency and net assets requirements regulating reductions of 
                                                     
867 Amended Companies Act [No 61] 1973 (n 855, South Africa) s 90(1). 
868 Ibid s 90(2). 
869 Ibid s 90(3). 
870 F H I Cassim, The Reform of Company Law and the Capital Maintenance Concept (2005) 122(2) South African Law 
Journal 283, 285–6 (‘Reform of Company Law’).  
871 Ibid 285. Cf amended Companies Act [No 61] 1973 (n 855, South Africa) s 86(1). 
872 Amended Companies Act [No 61] 1973 (n 855, South Africa) s 90(4). 
873 Cassim, Reform of Company Law (n 870) 285–6. Cf amended Companies Act [No 61] 1973 (n 855, South Africa) s 
85(1). 
874 Cassim, Reform of Company Law (n 870) 286. Cf amended Companies Act [No 61] 1973 (n 855, South Africa) s 
86(3). 
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share capital asserted that, in almost all countries, the principles of capital maintenance had undergone 
significant changes.875 ‘The modern notion of capital maintenance’, the Explanatory Memorandum 
asserted, ‘is that companies may reduce capital … but subject to solvency and liquidity criteria’:876 
 
This has the advantage of affording protection to creditors whilst at the same time giving flexibility to companies 
to achieve sound commercial objectives. These aspects of flexibility and achievement of sound commercial 
objectives have become extremely important since South Africa’s re-entry into the global markets.877 
 
The ‘unsystematic efforts to eliminate the capital maintenance principle’878 which South Africa 
undertook at the close of the 21st century generated not inconsiderable criticism. It should perhaps 
not be so surprising, then, that when given the opportunity to revisit the company law several years 
later, real effort was made to provide a logical and consistent rule governing distributions to 
shareholders. 
 
  
                                                     
875 Explanatory Memorandum, Companies Amendment Bill 1999 (South Africa) 28. 
876 Ibid. 
877 Ibid. 
878 Van der Linde, ‘Solvency and Liquidity’ (n 22) 224 n 10. 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
 
5.1 General 
 
Shareholders expect a reasonable return on their investment, not only in the form of growth in the 
price of their shares held, but also in the form of more periodical income from the payment of 
dividends to them. In a proprietary company, the shares of which are not traded on a securities 
exchange, receiving a dividend may be the most important expectation of a return on investment for 
shareholders. The selling of shares in proprietary companies to receive a return on investment will 
not be a consideration for most shareholders in proprietary companies, because of the pre-emptive 
rights of other shareholders, and the real practical difficulty in determining the true value of shares in 
a commercially sound and trading proprietary company. It is no wonder that from the earliest 
development of company law, the right to dividends has been described as the most important right 
of shareholders.879  
 
Although there is a shareholder expectation of receiving a dividend, there is also a directly competing 
interest at stake, that of the creditors. The payment of excessive dividends may put the creditors at 
risk. It is for this reason that, historically, some doctrines, concepts and rules were developed, 
originally by the courts but later taken up in company law legislation, to protect the interest of 
creditors. These include the concept of maintenance of share capital and the rules that dividends could 
not be paid out of share capital and that dividends could only be paid out of profits (the ‘profits test’).  
 
The third competing interest to consider is that of the company’s own best interests. The board of 
directors must answer the question (normally upon the advice of ‘management’) what proportion of 
profits it ought not to pay out as dividends to shareholders, but use instead in the best interests of the 
company, for instance to fund further expansion, improve facilities for employees or acquire new 
property, plant and equipment. This aspect was not discussed in this thesis880 — the focus of the thesis 
was primarily on the law applying to the payment of dividends, the rules applying to ensure the 
protection of the interest of creditors, and the statutory provision to ensure a fair and reasonable 
treatment of shareholders when dividends are paid. 
 
The reason why the legal rules applying to the payment of dividends are currently of such 
significance, and topical, is primarily because of the considerable legal confusion and complexity in 
this area of the law in Australia at the moment. In the past the profits test and the capital maintenance 
rule were dominant, and provided the primary yardsticks for the payment of dividends. In 28 June 
2010 the legislature removed the statutory provision that dividends may only be paid out of profits, 
although pertinently without abolishing the common law rule that dividends may only be paid out of 
profits. The legislature replaced the rule that dividends may only be paid out of profits by inserting 
three additional conditions, tests or requirements in the legislation.  
 
Currently, a company may not pay a dividend to its shareholders unless: 
 
1. the company’s assets exceed its liabilities immediately before the dividend is declared and the excess 
is sufficient for the payment of the dividend; and 
2. the payment of the dividend is fair and reasonable to the company’s shareholders as a whole; and 
3. the payment of the dividend does not materially prejudice the company’s ability to pay its creditors.881 
 
                                                     
879 Williston (n 103). 
880 See, however, C G Killian and Jean J du Plessis, ‘Possible Remedies for Shareholders when a Company Refuses to 
Declare Dividends or Declare Inadequate Dividends’ [2005] 1 Journal of South Africa Law 48, 55–56, 61–65. 
881 Corporations Act (n 3), s 254T. 
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In 2010 the Parliament had intended that the profits test should be replaced with a “more flexible 
requirement”.882 However, the new approach caused considerable confusion; so much so that, barely 
two years after the new provision had become law, significant amendments had been proposed by 
way of the Corporations Legislation Amendment (Remuneration Disclosures and Other Measures) 
Bill 2012 (Cth) released for consultation on 14 December 2012. It is now argued that it is necessary 
to “further clarify the test for payment of dividends”.883 In 2013 the Law Council of Australia even 
pleaded for a “return to a test similar to the previous drafting of [s 254T of the Corporations Act]” if 
a “simple solvency test” is not adopted.884 The 2012 exposure draft legislation intends to simplify the 
current s 254T by omitting two of the three requirements contained in the current s 254T, namely the 
requirement that dividends can only can only be paid if it is “fair and reasonable to shareholders” (s 
254T(1)(b)); and the requirement that dividends can only be paid if there is “no material prejudice to 
creditors” (s 254T(1)(c)).885 It is proposed that there should only be two requirements for a dividend 
to be paid, namely that immediately before a dividend is paid:886 
 
1. the company’s assets exceed its liabilities, and the excess is sufficient for the payment of the dividend 
(proposed s 254T(1)(a)); and 
2. the directors of the company reasonably believe that the company will, immediately after the dividend 
is paid, be solvent (proposed s 254T(1)(b)). 
 
These proposed amendments are to be welcomed, as they will definitely bring the Australian statutory 
provision dealing with the payment of dividends closer to comparable statutory provisions in other 
jurisdictions. However, there will still be some issues that are unresolved, and that will lead to legal 
uncertainty. In addition, there are some broader law reform issues that should be taken into 
consideration when a specific area like the payments of dividends is reformed in a piecemeal way, 
and without looking at the broader issue of distributions and to international trends. These issues are 
discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3 of this thesis. Chapter 3 also considers the reasons given for 
omitting the profits test from s 254T (see Section 3.3), before introducing some problems with the 
2010 reforms (see Section 3.4), including those problems which have been identified by the exposure 
draft legislation and explanatory materials and, perhaps more importantly, the problems which remain 
unidentified and that will lead to legal uncertainty. The focus then shifted to the three additional 
conditions, tests or requirements in the current s 254T. The thesis critically evaluates the 2012 
proposed dividends provision in the exposure draft legislation (see Section 3.5). The thesis also 
includes a consideration of the international case for a balance sheet test, with a particular focus on 
the early examples of the United States (see Section 4.2) and Canada (see Section 4.3), attempts at 
harmonisation with New Zealand (see Setion 4.4.1), and a look at South Africa (see Section 4.4.2) as 
an example of the dual solvency and liquidity test common in overseas jurisdictions. Finally, this 
chapter summarises the defects of the current legislation and proposes how the current confusion and 
uncertainty should be addressed. 
 
5.2 Findings and Recommendations 
 
In this thesis, the following hypothesis was tested: 
 
Despite significant efforts at law reform in the last twenty years, or perhaps because of it, the inconsistent 
application of balance sheet and solvency tests to the provisions of the [Corporations Act] remains troubled and 
unsatisfactory. To make it possible to rationalise and reconceptualise this problematic area of Australia’s 
corporate law, it is now timely to undertake a comprehensive overhaul of corporate insolvency laws, as was done 
in South Africa and New Zealand. 
 
                                                     
882 Explanatory Memorandum, Corporations Amendment Bill 2010 (n 1) 20. 
883 Ripoll (above n 35). 
884 Law Council, Submission for ‘Corporations Amendment Bill 2012’ (n 349) 1. 
885 Explanatory Memorandum, Corporations Amendment Bill 2012 (n 320) 9. 
886 Ibid 4. 
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The options which Treasury identified for dealing with the current dividends provision in its 2011 
discussion paper included ‘retaining s 254T as currently drafted’, ‘adopting a [strict] solvency test’, 
‘reinstating the former profits test’ or ‘adopting an arrangement under which a company would have 
a choice of two ways of determining whether it is able to pay a dividend’.887 Paradoxically, none of 
these options were selected to form the basis of the 2012 exposure draft legislation. Under the 
proposed amendments of the Corporations Legislation Amendment (Remuneration Disclosures and 
Other Measures) Bill 2012 (Cth), the current s 254T would have been repealed and replaced with the 
following section: 
 
Declaration of dividends  
(1) A company must not declare a dividend unless, immediately before the dividend is declared:  
(a) the company’s assets exceed its liabilities, and the excess is sufficient for the payment of the 
dividend; and  
(b) the directors of the company reasonably believe that the company will, immediately after the 
dividend is declared, be solvent.  
  Note: For a director’s duty to prevent insolvent trading on payment of dividends, see section 588G.  
 
Payment of dividends without declaration  
(2) A company must not pay a dividend unless, immediately before the dividend is paid:  
(a) the company’s assets exceed its liabilities, and the excess is sufficient for the payment of the 
dividend; and  
(b) the directors of the company reasonably believe that the company will, immediately after the 
dividend is paid, be solvent.  
 Note: For a director’s duty to prevent insolvent trading on payment of dividends, see section 588G.  
(3) Subsection (2) does not apply to a dividend that is declared.  
 
Calculation of assets and liabilities  
(4) The assets and liabilities of a company at a particular time are to be calculated for the purposes of this 
section in accordance with:  
(a) if the company is required to prepare a financial report, for the financial year during which the time 
occurs, that complies with one or more of the accounting standards – accounting standards in force 
at that time; or  
(b) otherwise – the financial records of the company.888 
                                                     
887 ‘Proposed Amendments’ (Discussion Paper, Treasury, n 24) 5. 
888 Corporations Amendment Bill 2012 (n 474) sch 1 item 3. In this thesis, reference was also made to the alternative 
amendments to s 254T proposed in the withdrawn draft Corporations Amendment Bill 2014 (n 35), which were omitted 
from the enacted Corporations Amendment Bill 2014 (n35). The withdrawn exposure draft legislation proposed the repeal 
and replacement of the current s 254T with: 
 
254T  Circumstances in which a dividend may be declared or paid 
Declaration of dividends 
 (1) A company must not declare a dividend unless, immediately before the dividend is declared, the 
directors of the company reasonably believe that the company will, immediately after the dividend 
is declared, be solvent. 
Note: For a director’s duty to prevent insolvent trading on payment of dividends, see 
section 588G. 
Payment of dividends without declaration 
 (2) A company must not pay a dividend unless, immediately before the dividend is paid, the directors 
of the company reasonably believe that the company will, immediately after the dividend is paid, 
be solvent. 
Note: For a director’s duty to prevent insolvent trading on payment of dividends, see 
section 588G. 
 (3) Subsection (2) does not apply to a dividend that is declared. 
 
254TA  Share capital reductions by way of dividends 
 (1) A company may reduce its share capital by declaring or paying a dividend, if: 
 (a) the dividend is declared or paid, as the case may be, in accordance with section 254T; and 
 (b) the reduction in share capital is an equal reduction. 
 (2) For the purposes of paragraph (1)(b), the reduction is an equal reduction if: 
 (a) it relates only to ordinary shares; and 
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Although the ‘fair and reasonable to shareholders’ and ‘no material prejudice to creditors’ tests in the 
current s 254T would not survive the amending Bill, if enacted into law, both tests would have, in 
practice, remained for dividends paid out of capital, as a result of a company’s need to comply with 
pt 2J.1, div 1.889  
 
5.2.1 Proposals for Amending the Dividend Provisions 
 
The conclusion of this thesis is that the Corporations Legislation Amendment (Remuneration 
Disclosures and Other Measures) Bill 2012 (Cth) fails to clarify the key ambiguity with the current 
dividends provision, which is the uncertainty about whether and if so in what circumstances a 
dividend may be paid from amounts other than current year profit or asset revaluation reserves. The 
draft Explanatory Memorandum explains that the existing requirements in relation to conducting 
share capital reductions under pt 2J.1, div 1 continue to apply under the proposed s 254T.890 If 
anything, this implies an even greater role for ch 2J than that described in the Explanatory 
Memorandum to the Corporations Amendment (Corporate Reporting Reform) Bill 2010 (Cth) 
(‘Corporations Amendment Bill 2010’), which stated only that the share capital concept would remain 
‘for other purposes, such as the provisions dealing with share buy-backs in Part 2J’.891  
 
As explained in Section 3.3.1, not referring to the profits test in the statutory provision dealing with 
the payment of dividends does not mean that the common law profits test does not apply any longer. 
Only an explicit statutory provision that the profits test is abolished would bring an end to its 
existence. This thesis does not argue for such an approach. Instead, the intention is to use this this as 
an illustration of the current legal confusion and complexity of the law regarding the payment of 
dividends in Australia. Instead, this thesis argues that a comprehensive reform in this area of the 
Australian law is necessary. The personal liability of directors for paying dividends to shareholders 
in circumstances where such payment could significantly affect the interests of creditors is the 
ultimate remedy. 
  
5.2.2 International Case for a Dual Solvency and Balance Sheet Requirement 
 
The 1988-2010 bilateral discussions between the governments of Australia and New Zealand focused 
on the harmonisation and co-ordination of business law to facilitate closer economic relations and 
advance a trans-Tasman single economic market. This understanding committed to an objective ‘in 
which there is no significant discrimination in the Australian and New Zealand markets arising from 
differences in the policies and regulations of both countries’ and it recognised both ‘the trend towards 
increasing international convergence of financial market and business regulation’ and ‘the benefit of 
co-ordination to influence evolving international regulatory standards and regimes’.892 Part of the 
work program that the countries have jointly determined should be the focus of the business law co-
                                                     
 (b) it applies to each holder of ordinary shares in proportion to the number of ordinary shares 
they hold; and 
 (c) the terms of the reduction are the same for each holder of ordinary shares, disregarding 
differences that are: 
 (i) attributable to the fact that shares have different accrued dividend entitlements; or 
 (ii) attributable to the fact that shares have different amounts unpaid on them; or 
 (iii) introduced solely to ensure that each shareholder is left with a whole number of shares; 
or 
 (iv) attributable to the use of dividend reinvestment plans. 
 
Withdrawn Draft Corporations Amendment Bill 2014 (n 35) sch 1 item 5 (emphasis in original). 
889 See Corporations Act (n 3), s 256B(1)(b)-(c). 
890 Explanatory Memorandum, Corporations Amendment Bill 2012 (n 320) 10. 
891 Explanatory Memorandum, Corporations Amendment Bill 2010 (n 1) 22. 
892 DFAT, Memorandum Between New Zealand and Australia (n 487). 
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ordination program in the short term includes the goal that an insolvent should face equivalent 
outcomes on both sides of the Tasman;893 however, the scope for harmonisation includes many areas 
of company and securities laws, including share capital requirements.894 Recognising the importance 
of harmonisation and co-ordination of Australian and New Zealand business law, CPA Australia and 
the Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia have, since the consultations which led to the 2010 
reforms, consistently advocated a dual solvency and balance sheet test, similar to that in place in New 
Zealand.895 
 
That test, contained in s 4(1) of the Companies Act 1993 (NZ) reads: 
 
Meaning of solvency test  
(1) For the purposes of this Act, a company satisfies the solvency test if:  
(a) the company is able to pay its debts as they become due in the normal course of business; and 
(b) the value of the company’s assets is greater than the value of its liabilities, including contingent 
liabilities. 
 
In line with international developments, the proposal advocated in this thesis is the adoption of this 
solvency and liquidity test as the guiding principle for directors to apply when determining whether 
a dividend should be paid, and what the total sum of that dividend should be. This will inevitably 
require a rethink of the current definition of ‘solvency’ in Australia and also a slight adjustment to 
the approach to ‘insolvent trading’ and the personal liability of directors under s 588G of the 
Corporations Act. 
 
The question could be asked why the Australian approach should not rather be adopted by New 
Zealand, with a much smaller economy and fewer incorporated companies. The answer is quite 
simple, namely that it is the New Zealand approach which is based on modern international trends in 
the US, Canada and South Africa. In 2002, the Australian Accounting Research Federation argued in 
favour of consistency with international trends in Canada and New Zealand with respect to adopting 
a simple solvency requirement for the payment of dividends,896 but paradoxically argued against 
introducing the balance sheet tests of those overseas jurisdictions into Australia,897 considering the 
latter “capital maintenance measures” and noting that there were no areas of law in Australia which 
had such a test.898 However, where the AARF was most sceptical of the appropriateness of the 
objective of harmonisation of legal and accounting principles across jurisdictions was with respect to 
the argument that it would be inappropriate for the test of payment of dividends in Australia to depart 
from the profits test in other key overseas jurisdictions (“in particular the UK”).899 The AARF argued 
as follows: 
 
[T]he overriding objective should be to propose a test which is workable and which eliminates or reduces the 
distortions and other problems which exist as a result of the profits test. Having concluded that a [strict] solvency 
test would be less open to distortions and other problems, and would reflect the fundamental requirement of 
solvency in the case of all company distributions, and that the test would protect shareholders and creditors, we 
cannot accept that harmonisation with other jurisdictions should force us to stick with an out of date test.900 
  
Although the Explanatory Memorandum to the Corporations Amendment Bill 2010 states that the 
first limb of the current dividends provision, s 254T(1)(a), is similar to the balance sheet tests 
                                                     
893 Ibid. 
894 Ibid [5]. 
895 CPA, ICAA and NIA, Submission to Treasury (n 486) 1; CPA, ICAA and IPA, Submission to Treasury (n 432, 
6 February 2012) 3; CPA and ICAA, Submission to Treasury (n 479) 2. 
896 AARF ‘Payment of Dividends’ (n 391, Position Paper) 33, replacing AARF ‘Payment of Dividends’ (n 391, Discussion 
Paper).  
897 Ibid 21. 
898 Ibid. 
899 Ibid 5. 
900 Ibid. 
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currently in operation in New Zealand and Canada,901 the balance sheet test in s 254T does not allow 
for the directors’ overriding appraisal, which in those foreign jurisdictions weakens, or even removes, 
the rigid connection between financial reports and the calculation of distributions, by referring to 
“valuations”902 or “the realizable value”903 of the company’s assets.  
 
As shown above, although the current s 254T(1)(c) has introduced a type of a liquidity test, this test 
does not sit comfortably with either international developments in this area904 or with other Australian 
provisions. Section 254T(1)(c) provides that a dividend can only be paid if the dividend does not 
materially prejudice the company’s ability to pay its creditors – is this fundamentally the same or 
different to saying, as provided for in s 94A(1)-(2) of the Corporations Act, that a company will be 
considered “insolvent” if it cannot pay all its debts as and when they become due and payable? Note 
2 to s 254T(1) only refers to the directors’ duty to prevent insolvent trading when a dividend is paid 
and it can render the company “insolvent” (as per the definition in s 95A). Note 1 then refers to 
directors’ potential liability under the insolvent trading provision contained in s 588G. However, what 
will the consequences be if the payment of dividends does “materially prejudice the company’s ability 
to pay its creditors” as prohibited under s 254T(1)(c)? The phrase “materially prejudice the 
company’s ability to pay its creditors” also occurs in several reduction of share capital provisions (ss 
256B(1)(b), 257A(a) and 260(1)(a)(ii)), but the same uncertainties are present as with s 254T(1)(c). 
A new yardstick was developed which falls short of the solvency test in s 95A, but with no legal 
certainty, and this has resulted in the confusion that currently exists in this area of Australian 
corporation law. 
 
The thesis makes the case for comprehensive reforms in the area of dividend payments and other 
distributions, as well as some other resolutions, agreements or transactions where there is a particular 
risk to creditors and also a considerable risk for abuse of directors’ powers. Australian law should 
work with the modern solvency and liquidity test used in the Canadian and New Zealand jurisdictions, 
and mobilise directors’ liability if directors fail to meet the solvency and liquidity test when they take 
resolutions, conclude agreements or execute transactions, in dealing with certain identified areas of 
particular risk to creditors and where there is also a considerable risk for abuse of directors’ powers. 
In this regard, the South African approach is utilised as an example. The claim is not made that the 
South African approach is without its issues or the best in the world. Instead, the South African 
approach is used as an illustration of what the solvency and liquidity test entails and how the test is 
integrated with the personal liability of directors if the test is not met. 
 
In 1999, South Africa started to move away from the complex concept of the maintenance of share 
capital, and the complex rules associated with it, and adopted the solvency and liquidity test in certain 
limited instances.905 Experience had shown that capital maintenance is not only an imperfect way to 
protect creditors, but that the rules associated with the concept of maintenance of share capital were 
notoriously imprecise and uncertain.906   
 
South Africa is now firmly on a similar route to the US and Canada. The ‘solvency and liquidity test’ 
is contained in s 4(1), which provides as follows:907 
 
For any purpose of this Act, a company satisfies the solvency and liquidity test at a particular time if, considering 
                                                     
901 Explanatory Memorandum, Corporations Amendment Bill 2010 (n 1) 21. 
902 New Zealand Companies Act (n 22) s 4(2)(b). 
903 Canada Business Corporations Act (n 22) s 42(b). 
904 See du Plessis, ‘Company Law Developments’ (n 23). 
905 Du Plessis, ‘Company Law Developments’ (n 23) 55. 
906 Hendrik Stephanus Cilliers et al, Cilliers and Benade: Corporate Law (Butterworths, 3rd ed, 2000) 322. 
907 Regarding the meaning of solvency and liquidity, see Van der Linde, ‘Solvency and Liquidity’ (n 22) 226–30; Richard 
Jooste, ‘Issues Relating to the Regulation of ‘Distributions’ by the 2008 Companies Act’ (2009) 126(4) South African 
Law Journal 627, 641–4. 
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all reasonably foreseeable financial circumstances of the company at that time: 
(a) he assets of the company, as fairly valued, equal or exceed the liabilities of the company, as fairly valued; 
and 
(b) it appears that the company will be able to pay its debts as they become due in the ordinary course of 
business for a period of: 
(i) 12 months after the date on which the test is considered; or 
(ii) in the case of a distribution contemplated in paragraph (a) of the definition of “distribution” in section 
1, 12 months following that distribution. 
 
It is convenient, for comparative purposes, also to reconsider the US and Canadian tests. The Model 
Business Corporation Act (2010) (US) provides that: 
 
(c) No distribution may be made if, after giving it effect: 
(1) the corporation would not be able to pay its debts as they become due in the usual course of business; or 
(2) the corporation’s total assets would be less than the sum of its total liabilities plus (unless the articles of 
incorporation permit otherwise) the amount that would be needed, if the corporation were to be dissolved 
at the time of the distribution, to satisfy the preferential rights upon dissolution of shareholders whose 
preferential rights are superior to those receiving the distribution.908 
 
The Canadian company law legislation provides: 
 
A corporation shall not declare or pay a dividend if there are reasonable grounds for believing that 
(a) the corporation is, or would after the payment be, unable to pay its liabilities as they become due;  
(b) or the realizable value of the corporation’s assets would thereby be less than the aggregate of its liabilities 
and stated capital of all classes.909 
 
5.3 Limitations of the Thesis and Some Concluding Remarks 
 
There can be no dispute; the current dividends provision is a failure910 and in no way an improvement 
on the old profits test, upon which stakeholders achieved a remarkable degree of consensus both as 
to its shortcomings and the policy which ought to underlie future changes to the law. Of the three 
options identified by the Australian Research Foundation in 2002 for determining the amount 
available for distribution as a dividend,911 a simple solvency test has received overwhelming support, 
but a decade later it has been adopted unevenly, if at all. Some of the suggestions which might address 
the problems identified in relation to the proposed s 254T are obvious, and one may only speculate 
why the legislature has not adopted them already. At the very least, the dividends provision should 
explicitly authorise the payment of dividends to shareholders from amounts other than profit, rather 
than prohibiting dividends from being paid in three specified circumstances, as it currently does; and 
the provision should exempt dividends paid out of capital from share capital reductions obligations 
under div 1 of Ppt 2J.1. This would give effect to Parliament’s intention in the 2010 reforms of 
allowing the payment of dividends out of capital, and also relieve companies and their officers from 
being placed at risk of breaching the Corporations Act, which may attract criminal penalties,912 as a 
result of their reliance on the erroneous explanations of the operation and effect of the dividends 
provision provided in the Explanatory Memorandum.  
 
There is no simple answer to many of the other questions. Determining whether the balance sheet test 
should be removed for the same reasons which supported the removal of the profits test requires a 
careful analysis, which has not yet been conducted; there are divergent views on this issue. The 
AARF, Law Council Australia and Australian Institute of Company Directors each recommended a 
                                                     
908 Am Bar Ass’n, Model Bus Corp Act (n 22) § 6.40(c)(2). 
909 Canada Business Corporations Act (n 22) s 42(b). 
910 Austin, ‘New Dividend Law a Failure’ (n 36). 
911 AARF ‘Payment of Dividends’ (n 391, Position Paper), replacing AARF ‘Payment of Dividends’ (n 391, Discussion 
Paper). The Position Paper identified the existing approach, a solvency test and a going concern test. 
912 Corporations Act (n 3) sch 3 item 83. A director contravening the current s 254T may be subject to a maximum penalty 
of 100 penalty units or imprisonment for two years, or both. 
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simple solvency test and criticised the concept of a net assets requirement; CPA Australia and the 
ICAA have pointed out that a dual solvency and balance sheet test follows international (particularly 
New Zealand) legislative developments,913 which is consistent with the business law harmonisation 
process forming part of the Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement between the two 
countries.914 More importantly, perhaps, the latter approach also recognises the trend towards 
increasing international convergence between jurisdictions regulating financial markets and business. 
Net asset insolvency is not an unfathomable mystery to the lawyers and legal theorists of Australian 
company law; arguments for it were known to the courts of the colonies. Balance sheet considerations 
were applied as one of the factors in court confirmations of capital reductions, and it was originally 
Parliament’s intent that a positive net assets test replace this safeguard. This was before the 1996 
election of the Coalition government and the abandonment of the idea. However, the balance sheet 
test was not dead; it was revived for the 2010 reforms.  
 
There is ‘no new thing under the sun’ of Australian companies law reform. The ‘economico-legal 
stratification’ of law regulating the payment of dividends, share capital reductions and share buy-
backs in the Corporations Act has been formed by the accumulation of more than a century and a half 
of uniquely Australian case law, statutory drafting and ad hoc amendment. The three specified 
prohibitions of the current s 254T are a family of orphaned clauses from the development of div 1 of 
pt 2J.1. Since company law reform has tended to be improvised and uneven, the result has been 
internal inconsistency and conceptual confusion. As an example, there is little reason for the proposed 
s 254T to apply a solvency test whilst ss 256B and 257A apply a ‘no material prejudice to creditors’ 
test, or for the dividends provision to include a balance sheet test and the capital reductions provision 
not to include such a test. These idiosyncrasies may be the legacy of a fragmentary, haphazard 
approach, which often leaves behind difficult ‘questions about the policy foundations for the changes 
made’; ‘questions about how important shifts of policy were implemented under the guise of 
simplifying the regulatory system’; ‘questions about the adequacy of consultation and public 
exposure of the proposals’; and ‘questions about the style and efficacy of the drafting’.915  
 
Bringing Australia in line with world-class legislation, and placing Australia at the forefront of 
international company law reform will require effective consultation, a regular and systematic 
reassessment of the law, and comprehensive legal reform by reference to the benchmarks of clarity 
and simplicity and with regard to developments in overseas jurisdictions. Such an approach will 
involve, first of all, identifying the areas where there are particularly high financial risks associated 
with particular decisions by a company, for instance the payment of dividends to shareholders, and 
where there is potential significant tension between the interests of creditors and shareholders.916 
These areas have already been identified in the Australian law.917 It will also require a reconsideration 
of the definition of “solvency”, which in the Australian context has only been given the narrow 
meaning of “liquidity”, focusing on a company’s ability to pay all its debts as and when they become 
due and payable.918 This thesis compared this proposal with the policy rationale which was provided 
by the AARF, which was one of the first institutions or bodies in the modern era to recommend the 
adoption in Australia of a simple solvency test for determining the amount available for distribution 
as a dividend. In a position article released in 2002, the AARF reasoned: 
 
                                                     
913 CPA and ICAA, Submission to Treasury (n 479). 
914 DFAT, ‘Closer Economic Relations’ (n 541) 18. 
915 Robert Austin, ‘Mergers and Acquisitions 2007 – Opening Commentary’ (Speech, Centre for Continuing Legal 
Education, University of New South Wales, Faculty of Law, 24 October 2007). Although his Honour was commenting 
specifically upon the Corporations Legislation Amendment (Simpler Regulatory System) Act 2007 (Cth), his speech 
invites speculation on similar questions about many other examples of corporate law reform offered up since the 
commencement of the Corporations Act (n 3). 
916 See generally du Plessis, ‘Company Law Developments’ (n 23) 64. 
917 See Paul Redmond, Corporations and Financial Markets Law (Thomson Reuters, 6th ed, 2013) 761. 
918 Corporations Act (n 3) s 95A(1). 
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Developing a solvency test as a basis for determining whether the payment of dividends is appropriate] is 
consistent with Australia’s past corporate law simplification in terms of share buy-backs, and capital reductions 
and no par value shares, is consistent with recent trends in overseas jurisdictions and would also reinforce 
directors’ responsibilities in terms of a company’s solvency.919 
 
The AARF considered ‘solvency’ to be a question of whether the company was able to pay its debts 
as and when they became due and payable. It may be time for this meaning to be reconsidered. The 
2012 exposure draft legislation improves on the AARF recommendation by proposing a real solvency 
and liquidity test, although in terminology often at odds with modern international trends. However, 
neither the current nor the proposed 254T effectively removes the profits test, which is the approach 
most stakeholders promote, and whether this goal can be achieved without comprehensive reform is 
doubtful.  
  
                                                     
919 AARF ‘Payment of Dividends’ (n 391, Position Paper), replacing AARF ‘Payment of Dividends’ (n 391, Discussion 
Paper). 
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